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ABSTRACT 
DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers is a relatively small firm specialising in 
materials technology in the specialist civil engineering consulting and contracting 
industry. The organization has experienced many positive and negative changes over 
its history, and is currently in a precarious position, faced with numerous 
environmental opportunities and threats, while exhibiting significant strengths but 
also critical weaknesses. The firm does not have a formally crafted strategic plan from 
which to base its managerial decision making. 
It is widely held that strategic planning is critical for the success of a competitive 
business in today' s turbulent environment. In this study, pertinent theories pertaining 
to strategy development and evaluation are explored, and relevant models are adapted 
for the purpose of analysing and evaluating the organization and its circumstances. 
The facts provided in the case study pertaining to the organization are then analysed 
through the developed body of theory and the models presented. The theoretical 
models utilized provide the criteria by which it is possible to determine the areas in 
which the organization is performing well or poorly. At the same time, strategic 
options are developed and are evaluated in the context of the case study, and 
recommendations are provided with respect to the appropriate courses of action. 
It is shown that a competitive strategy of focused differentiation will be appropriate 
for the organisation. An assessment of available grand strategies reveals that the 
organization will be best served by an initial turnaround strategy, followed by a 
strategy of concentrated growth and innovation. It is also shown that a strategy of 
concentric diversification, in terms of the spin-off of the contracting business is 
appropriate under the circumstances. However, it is also evident that unless the 
recommendations pertaining to the turnaround strategy are followed, the firm's 
critical weaknesses and environmental threats will severely threaten the sustained 
survival and success of the organization. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
1.2. BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
1.3. MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
1.4. VALUE OF THE PROJECT 
1.5. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.6. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.8. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROJECT 
1.9. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
1.10. SUMMARY 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORY IN CONTEXT 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
2.2. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
2.2.1. Industry Analysis 
2.2.1.1. The Industry's Dominant Economic Features 
2.2.1.2. Driving Forces of the Industry 
2.2.1.3. Key Success Factors 
2.2.1.4. The Relative Positioning of Organisations 
in the Industry 
2.2.1.5 . Industry Attractiveness and Profitability 
Prospects 
2.2.2. The Five-Forces Model of Competition 
2.2.2.1 . The Extent of Competitive Rivalry 
2.2.2.2. The Threat of Potential New Entrants 
2.2.2.3. The Threat of Substitutes 





























2.2.2.5. The Bargaining Power of Buyers and 
Seller-Buyer Collaboration 
2.2.3. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
(SWOT) Analysis 
2.2.3.1. Internal Resource Based Factors-
Strengths and Weaknesses 
2.2.3.2. External Environmental Based Factors-
Opportunities and Threats 
2.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
2.3.1. The Company Mission 
2.3.2. Long-Term Objectives 
2.3 .3. Generic Strategies 
2.3.3 .1. Low-Cost Leadership Strategy 
2.3.3.2. Differentiation Strategy 
2.3.3.3 . Focussed Competitive Strategies 
2.3.4. Grand Strategies 
2.4. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS 
2.4.1. Life-Cycle Analysis 
2.4.2. Positioning 
2.4.3. Value Chain Analysis 
2.4.4. Portfolio Analysis 
2.5. ACCEPTABILITY ANALYSIS 
2.5.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
2.5 .2. Analysing Stakeholder Reactions 
2.6. CONCLUSION 






















CONSUL TING ENGINEERS 59 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 59 
3.2. COMPANY BACKGROUND AND BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 59 
3.3. PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OFFERED BY DPA 61 
3.4. THE CIVIL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY - PRESSURES 
AND TRENDS 65 
Vll 
3.5. DPA FROM 1998 TO 2003 - A RAPIDLY CHANGING 
ORGANISATION 
3.6. COMPANY EMPLOYEES 
3.7. COMPANY MARKETING 
3.8. COMPETITORS AND COMPETITION 
3.8.1. Competition in the Consulting Field 
3.8.2. Competition in the Contracting Field 
3.9. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY EV ALUA TION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
4.2 . STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
4.2.1. Industry Analysis 
4.2.1.1. The Industry ' s Dominant Economic Features 
4.2.1.2. Driving Forces of the Industry 
4.2.1.3. Key Success Factors 
4.2.1.4. The Relative Positioning of Organisations 
in the Industry 
4.2.1.5. Industry Attractiveness and Profitability 
Prospects 
4.2.2. The Five-Forces Model of Competition 
4.2.2.1. The Extent of Competitive Rivalry 
4.2.2.2. The Threat of Potential New Entrants 
4.2.2.3. The Threat of Substitutes 
4.2.2.4. The Bargaining Power of Suppliers and 
Supplier-Seller Collaboration 
4.2.2.5 . The Bargaining Power of Buyers and 
Seller-Buyer Collaboration 
4.2.3. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
(SWOT) Analysis 
4.2.3.1. Internal Resource Based Factors -


























4.2.3.2. External Environmental Based Factors-
Opportunities and Threats 
4.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
4.3.1. The Company Mission 
4.3.2. Long-Term Objectives 
4.3.3. Generic Strategies 
4.3.4. Grand Strategies 
4.4. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS 
4.4.1. Life-Cycle Analysis 
4.4.2. Positioning 
4.4.3 . Value Chain Analysis 
4.4.4. Portfolio Analysis 
4.5. ACCEPTABILITY ANALYSIS 
4.5.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
4.5.2. Analysing Stakeholder Reactions 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
5.2. THE TURNAROUND STRATEGY 
5.2.1. Human Resources 
5.2.2. Administration and Commercial Issues 
5.2.3. Derek Penhall's Contribution 
5.2.4. Black Economic Empowennent 
5.2.5 . Retrenchment of Services and Clients 
5.2.6. Marketing 
5.3. CONCENTRATED GROWTH AND INNOVATION 
5.4. CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICA nON 
5.5. BACKWARD INTEGRATION 


































LIST OF FIGURES 
PAGE 
Figure 2.1 . SWOT Analysis Diagram 34 
Figure 2.2. Grand Strategy Selection Matrix 35 
Figure 2.3. Model of Grand Strategy Clusters 36 
Figure 2.4. Market Options Matrix 37 
Figure 2.5. The Life-Cycle Matrix 48 
Figure 2.6. The Strategy Clock: Competitive Strategy Options 50 
Figure 2.7. The Boston Box 52 
Figure 2.8. The Power-Interest Matrix 55 
Figure 3.1. Provincial Market Share 68 
Figure 4.1 . Strategic Group Map: The Specialist Consulting Industty 93 
Figure 4.2. Strategic Group Map: The Specialist Contracting Industry 94 
Figure 4.3. Impact SWOT Analysis for DPA 103 
Figure 4.4. Sensitivity Analysis for DP A 113 
Figure 4.5. Power-Interest Matrix - Proposed turnaround actions 116 
x 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognised that for a business to be successful, in terms of maximizing its 
strengths and neutralizing its weaknesses in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented, a well-crafted strategy is required. DP A Specialist Consulting 
Engineers, a company that has undergone many changes over the years and has 
experienced many successes and failures, is a company in need of a strategic 
direction. 
The directors of the firm have to make some critical strategic decisions with respect to 
averting a potential crisis and restoring the organisation' s competitive position in the 
industry. Research into the organisation ' s current situation needs to be conducted in 
order to arrive at a set of appropriate recommendations on which such decisions can 
be based. 
This chapter briefly provides the background behind the proposed research and an 
outline of the manner in which the research is to be conducted. It is recognised that 
the research needs to be conducted in line with well-established theories on corporate 
strategy, and that the qualitative case study approach is required. 
1.2. BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
Company Background 
DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers is a relatively small company specialising in 
materials technology in the civil construction industry. The company is relatively well 
known in the niche market in which it operates and it has developed a well-deserved 
track record, dating back to the origins of the company in 1981. DP A offers a wide 
range of specialist services, including concrete diagnostics, assessment and repair, the 
rehabilitation of architectural structures, waterproofing design, insulation design, steel 
corrosion assessment and protection, forensic engineering and failure analysis, 
1 
contract documentation and management, laboratory testing and materials evaluation 
and quality control and assurance services. 
The company, based in New Gennany, Kwa-Zulu Natal, was founded by Patrick 
Draper, an industrial chemist, and Derek Penhall, a professional civil engineer, both 
of whom had considerable prior experience in the industry. Pat Draper had a 
background in corrosion protection technology and specialist materials, and had also 
been a founder of abe Construction Chemicals and Prostruct, two well-known 
specialist materials suppliers in the industry. Pat had been instrumental in the 
development of many specialist materials currently available. Prior to joining Pat, 
Derek Penhall was the national technical manager for Sika SA, another well-known 
specialist materials supplier. The two headed the business, along with Wynand Louw, 
a partner based in Johannesburg, until 1998, when Pat Draper retired and Derek 
Penhall, the managing director of DP A, brought his brother in law, Shane Harrison, 
into the company as the financial director. Shane' s qualifications as a chartered 
accountant and his background of running various small businesses effectively stood 
DP A in good stead, as he came into the business during a period of flux and financial 
difficulty. 
Shane Harrison joined DPA at a point at which it had stumbled along and grown to a 
stage where important aspects of the business were becoming unmanageable, simply 
due to a lack of adequately trained personnel. Derek Penhall simply could not run the 
business on his own and still be effective in the marketing and technical departments. 
Shane implemented various administrative structures and procedures, resulting in the 
streamlining and proper functioning of the administrative and financial departments, 
leading to better reporting and overall management of the business. As Shane' s role 
within DP A developed, he readily took on more decision-making, often basing his 
decisions on accounting principles. For example, the Johannesburg office was closed 
in 2001 as it had been making an accounting loss for a period of about five years. 
However, the management issues that were the cause of the financial problems were 
not addressed, rather, the symptom was removed. 
Brendon Jewaskiewitz joined DP A in 1998 as an engineer with a BSc degree in Civil 
Engineering. After gaining a few years of experience with DP A, he was appointed to 
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the board of directors in November 2000. During this time, the focus of the company 
shifted gradually towards turnkey projects where DP A would handle both the 
consulting and contracting components of projects. The result was the formation of a 
separate company, DPA Projects, run by the same board of directors and employing 
the staff and resources of DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers. In this manner, DP A 
Projects could also be used as a purely contracting concern, a decision that has proved 
very successful in light of the apparent reduction in available consulting work and 
associated downward pressure on professional fees. It is indeed the contracting side of 
the business that is currently supporting the firm as a whole. 
At present, DP A does not have any formal strategic planning and evaluation process 
in place. Historically, strategic decisions have been made solely and informally by the 
owner and managing director of DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers, Derek PenhalL 
More recently, the managing director of DP A Projects, Shane Harrison has played a 
greater role in terms of decision-making, especially in the contracting field. Such 
decisions have been entrepreneurial and opportunistic in nature for the most part, 
based on the company' s fields of expertise in specialist civil engineering niche 
markets. The company experienced reasonable growth in terms of turnover and staff 
compliment over its initial ten to fifteen years of existence, but the lack of strategic 
planning ultimately lead to deficiencies in many areas. Even good ideas that were 
based on strategic thinking were often not implemented or monitored adequately, 
mostly due to Derek Penhall' s over commitment to almost all areas of the business. 
It is evident that a genuine lack of delegation and structuring of the business has lead 
to the current circumstances in which the company finds itself. All too often, it is the 
case that Derek Penhall's overall enthusiasm in terms of ' getting involved' In 
anything from equipment maintenance to employment contract writing, results In 
neglect of the critical success areas of the business. This has ultimately lead to the 
current strategic situation in which the company finds itself, which could be likened to 
that of a ' rudderless ship ' . 
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Theoretical Background 
It is widely held that strategy development and planning is vital to the success of a 
business in today's competitive environment. Many theoretical models have been 
developed for the purpose of strategic analysis and evaluation, and it is necessary to 
select appropriate models to be applied to the case at hand. 
For the purposes of the development of a strategic framework for DPA Specialist 
Consulting Engineers, the framework for the evaluation and selection of strategies of 
10hnson and Scholes (2000) will be used in a slightly modified form. Initially, a 
strategic analysis pertaining to the organization and the circumstances in which it is 
operating will be presented, followed by the development of strategic options, based 
on the various forms of analysis. According to the framework of 10hnson and Scholes 
(2000), these options will then be evaluated through various forms of suitability and 
acceptability analyses, highlighting those areas in which the organization is 
performing well and those areas in which the organization is weak. An assessment of 
the financial feasibility of the developed options will be excluded, as this is expected 
to form the basis of further research in the future. 
The strategic analysis will be based on the circumstances of the organization, 
including strategically relevant internal and external factors. The analysis will 
incorporate an examination of industry conditions, a Five Forces competitive analysis 
based on Michael Porter's theory, and a weighted SWOT analysis (Jacobs et aI, 
1998). The models employed will be used to illustrate the current circumstances in 
which the organization is operating and will also be used to identify trends in the 
industry. 
Following the development of a company mission and long-term objectives, strategic 
options will then be developed, based on the findings of the strategic analysis. 
Michael Porter' s model for the selection of generic competitive strategies and the 
models for grand strategy selection proposed by Pearce and Robinson (2000) will be 
used for this purpose. 
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The strategic options developed will be then assessed for suitability, in accordance 
with the framework of 10hnson and Scholes (2000). This will include a life-cycle 
analysis, an assessment of the positioning of the company's services, a value chain 
analysis and a portfolio analysis. This will enable the relative merits of the strategic 
options to be assessed. Following this process, the acceptability of the strategic 
options will be assessed through a sensitivity analysis and an analysis of stakeholder 
reactions, with a significant portion of this part of the evaluation focused on the 
organisation' s culture and leadership. 
Finally, based on the strategic analysis and evaluation process, appropriate 
recommendations with respect to strategic action will be provided. 
l.3 . MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers does not currently have a formally developed 
strategic plan. Whereas strategic choice has conventionally been the domain of the 
managing director of the organization, it has been realized that a more formal process 
of strategy development based on the available body of theory is necessary. 
The organization has a wealth of expertise and competencies, but also suffers from a 
wide range of weaknesses, hampering the sustained success of the organization. It has 
been recognised that the current lack formal strategy development is one of the main 
reasons for the organization not being able to achieve its full potential. In addition, a 
formal strategy would be extremely beneficial in light of the current environmental 
conditions facing the firm, presenting both opportunities and growing threats. It is for 
this reason that research into strategy development for the organization has been 
deemed necessary. 
5 
1.4. VALUE OF THE PROJECT 
The study is expected to provide significant value to DP A in terms of the proper 
guidance of strategic decision-making and strategic planning. At present, the company 
does not have a formal strategic plan or strategic planning system in place, and it is 
envisaged that the outcomes of the study will result in a platform from which future 
planning may take place, ultimately resulting in better de.cision making by the 
management team. 
The coordination of business activities along appropriately determined strategic 
guidelines should add significant value to the firm in terms of improving revenues and 
profitability, while also guarding against potential pitfalls which could irreparably 
damage the organization. 
1.5 . PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The aim of the proposed research is to derive a formally crafted business strategy for 
DPA Specialist Consulting Engineers, which it currently lacks. 
The problem statement is therefore "What is the most appropriate business strategy 
for DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers?" 
1.6. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of the study are as follows : 
• 
• 
To determine the theoretical basis on which the company's business strategy 
should be founded. 
To evaluate the company within the framework provided by the developed 
theoretical models. 
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• To provide recommendations with respect to strategic options, based on the 
findings of the evaluation exercise. 
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology will be qualitative and descriptive in nature. The research 
will be based on a cross-sectional, in-depth case study approach, based on the 
knowledge and experiences of Brendon Jewaskiewitz, a director of the organization. 
All data and information pertaining to the organization provided in the case study will 
be primary data, based on his knowledge of the firm and internal company records. 
Secondary data pertaining to the industry in which the organization is operating will 
be sourced through the internet and relevant journals and publications. 
The data and information provided in the case study will be processed through the 
selected theoretical models, obtained from secondary sources, forming the framework 
for strategy development. This will enable the identification of positive and negative 
aspects of the organisation' s current environmental situation, internal strengths and 
weaknesses, and aspects of the business that are being well or poorly executed. The 
conclusions drawn from this proposed form of analysis will essentially entail the 
provision of recommendations with respect to improving the performance of the 
organization and providing strategic guidance. 
1.8. LIMIT A nONS OF THE PROJECT 
It is recognised that a limited strategic study of an organization on a case study basis 
cannot cover all aspects of the business or the available body of theory. The study will 
therefore be limited to a theoretical investigation of strategic options and 
recommendations, to the exclusion of an analysis of sensitive financial data relevant 
to the company. Further research into this area of the business is however , , 
recommended in terms of supplementing the findings of this study. 
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The research is intended to provide strategic insights with respect to the current 
circumstances of the organization. It must be recognised that the findings of the 
research will not be valid on an indefinite basis. As environmental circumstances, 
competitive conditions, and internal organizational aspects change, the identified 
strategic options and recommendations will also be subject to change. It will therefore 
be necessary to periodically review the findings of this research and update the 
research should it be deemed necessary. 
1.9. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The subsequent chapters 2 through 5 will cover the proposed research. The chapters 
will be presented as follows : 
• CHAPTER 2: THEORY IN CONTEXT 
This section of the research will cover the theoretical basis for the research. 
This will be based on an extensive literature survey and will comprise the 
compilation of appropriate selected theoretical models within the framework 
of strategic analysis and evaluation of Johnson and Scholes (2000). This 
chapter will effectively form the "model" on which the relevant aspects of the 
case study will be analysed and evaluated. 
• CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY: DPA SPECIALIST CONSULTING ENGINEERS 
A detailed review of the case study is provided in this section. The case study 
will be based on the theoretical considerations provided in the previous 
section, thereby ensuring that the necessary information and data for the 
analysis and evaluation stage are provided. The aspects to be covered by the 
case study are the company background and historical overview, products and 
services offered by the firm, the pressures and trends within the civil 
engineering industry, the changes in the organization from 1998 to 2003 , 
company employees, marketing, and competitive pressures. 
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• CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
In Chapter 4, the case study developed in Chapter 3 is analysed and evaluated 
against the theoretical models developed in Chapter 2. This chapter will focus 
on identifYing the strategically important factors pertaining to the organization 
and its circumstances, thereby providing a basis on which strategic options can 
be developed. This process will also enable the identification of areas in which 
the organization performs well and those in which it does not. 
• CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this final chapter, strategic recommendations based on the findings of 
Chapter 4 will be presented. The strengths of the organization will be 
reinforced and the weaknesses of the organization will be targeted with a view 
to recommending appropriate changes. The manner in which the organization 
should approach these changes will be addressed, with specific reference to 
the opportunities and threats currently posed by the external environment. It is 
expected that, in light of the recommendations provided, the organization will 
be provided with an appropriate business strategy on which management 
decisions can be based. 
1.10. SUMMARY 
In essence, the proposed study concerns the development of an appropriate business 
strategy for DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers, and recommendations pertaining to 
changing or improving certain areas of the business. It is proposed that this be carried 
out through the evaluation of a case study, based on a developed body of theory 
comprising relevant theoretical strategic models. Such an approach is expected to 
result in the provision of appropriate strategic options and recommendations 
pertaining to their implementation. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY IN CONTEXT 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The generation of strategic options and the effective evaluation of these options relies 
on a number of interdependent strategic thought processes and analyses. A suitable 
logical framework for this purpose is therefore necessary. For the purposes of this 
investigation, the framework for the evaluation and selection of strategies developed 
by 10hnson & Scholes (2000) will be used in a slightly modified form. 
The framework initially entails a detailed strategic analysis incorporating relevant 
theoretical models designed to interrogate the organization' s internal resources and 
external environment. The concept of "company mission" and associated long-term 
objectives are then investigated, resulting in the development of strategic options. 
Following this process, the proposed strategic options are evaluated for suitability 
through a life-cycle analysis, an assessment of the positioning of the organisation' s 
products/services, a value chain analysis and a portfolio analysis. The options are 
finally evaluated for acceptability through a sensitivity analysis and an examination of 
stakeholder reactions, with specific regard for the organisation's culture and 
leadership. The generated strategic options will not be evaluated in terms of financial 
techniques used to determine acceptability and feasibility as this is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
2.2. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
In an attempt to establish strategic options for an organization for evaluation, it is 
necessary to carry out various forms of strategic analyses, based on the internal 
characteristics of the company (its resources) and the environment in which the 
company operates. To this end, the forms of analysis explored include an analysis of 
various aspects of the relevant industry in which the organization is active, the Five-
Forces Model of Competition of Michael Porter for the assessment of competitive 
forces acting on the organization, and an assessment of the organization' s resource 
based strengths and weaknesses versus the opportunities and threats posed by the 
external environment (a SWOT analysis). 
10 
2.2.1. Industry Analysis 
An analysis of relevant industry conditions is essential in the development of strategic 
options for an organization. Thompson & Strickland (2003) provide a framework for 
such an industry analysis, using 'a tool kit of concepts and techniques to get a clear 
fix on key industry traits, the intensity of competition, the drivers of industry change, 
the market positions and strategies of rival companies, the keys to competitive 
success, and the industry's profit outlook'. Thompson & Strickland (2003) further add 
that the 'tool kit provides a way of thinking strategically about any industry' s overall 
situation and drawing conclusions about whether the industry represents an attractive 
investment for company funds ' . The relevant features of the framework suggested by 
Thompson and Strickland (2003) are explored below, to the exclusion of an 
examination of competitive forces which is covered separately by the F've-Forces 
Analysis. 
2.2.1.1. The ,Industry ' s Dominant Economic Features 
Thompson and Strickland (2003) identify the following factors as being fairly 
standard in terms of profiling an industry's economic features: 
• The size of the market. 
• The geographical scope of competitive rivalry. 
• Market growth rate and position in the business life cycle. 
• The number of rivals and their relative sizes, providing an indication of the 
degree of fragmentation or concentration and industry domination. 
• The number of buyers and their relative sizes. 
• The degree of vertical integration of industry rivals. 
• The types of distribution channels used. 
• The pace of technological change. 
• The degree of product or service differentiation between firms. 
• The degree to which companies can realize economies of scale in various 
functional areas. 
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• The degree of clustering of industry participants in a particular location. 
• The degree to which strong learning and experience effects characterize the 
industry such that costs decline as cumulative output grows. 
• The degree to which capacity utilization plays a role in achieving low-cost 
production efficiency. 
• Capital requirements and the ease of entry or exit. 
• Industry profitability. 
2.2.1.2. Driving Forces of the Industry 
A key aspect in the analysis of a particular industry is ' change', that is, the nature of 
changes occurring and the speed at which they occur. Some changes may be 
insignificant in terms of their impact on business operations and profitability, but 
other changes may have profound influences on various aspects of the industry. 
Change is the result of various forces at play, . the most dominant of which are 
generally referred to as 'driving forces'. Thompson & Strickland (2003) break down 
the analysis of these driving forces into two components, 'identifying what the driving 
forces are and assessing the impact they will have on the industry'. The following 
common categories of driving forces, adapted from those suggested by Thompson & 
Strickland (2003), should be investigated and then factored into the strategic decision 
making process: 
• The intemet and new e-commerce opportunities and threats. 
• Increasing globalisation of industries. 
• Changes in the long-term industry growth rate. 
• Changes in the types of consumer and how the product/service is used. 
• Product/service innovation. 
• Technological change. 
• Marketing innovation. 
• Entry or exit of major firms. 
• Diffusion of technical know-how across more companies and more countries. 
• Changes in cost and efficiency. 
• Growing buyer preferences for differentiated products/services. 
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• Regulatory influences and government policy changes. 
• Changing societal concerns, attitudes and lifestyles. 
• Reductions in uncertainty and business risk. 
2.2.1.3. Key Success Factors 
Lynch (2000) notes that, in terms of trying to consider every part of the organization 
with limited resources, ' corporate strategy analysis could be overwhelmed by the size 
of the task' , and suggests that ' an analytical process is needed that will examine the 
many factors that can potentially impact on strategy' . Ohmae (1983) suggests that the 
company' s ' key factors for success that are likely to deliver the company' s objectives ' 
be identified, arguing that scarce resources should be concentrated on key business 
activities crucial to delivering success. Ohmae (1983) classifies key success factors 
into three main areas, that is, ' Customers', ' Competition', and 'Corporation', and 
Lynch (2000) further notes that key success factors ' are directed at all companies in 
an industry'. Each of these three areas is examined below (based on Lynch, 2000). 
Customers are important to consider, as the organisation is dependent on them. The 
organization must identify the types, needs and wants of the customers served, and the 
reasons for their purchasing behaviour. An understanding of market segmentation on 
the basis of pricing is important, as is understanding the importance of aspects such as 
service levels demanded, product or service reliability, quality, technical 
specifications and branding. 
Competitive aspects to consider in determining key success factors include cost and 
price comparisons between competitors, quality comparisons, an assessment of the 
degree of market dominance and the possible reasons therefor, service level 
comparisons and distribution comparisons. The objective should be to identify key 
areas that are possible reasons for competitive success in the industry. 
Aspects pertaining to the ' Corporation' are focused on resource-based competencies 
required for achieving success. This includes an assessment of whether low-cost 
operations are required, the importance of economies of scale, labour costs, 
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production output levels, quality operations, the degree of innovative capability 
necessary, the importance of labour and management relations, the influence of 
specialist technologies and copyright, and the importance of skills. 
Lynch (2000) further adds that it is important to ensure that the key success factors 
identified be ' consistent with the company's mission and objectives' and that they be 
'selected on the basis of providing significant value added to the organisation'. 
2.2.1.4. The Relative Positioning of Organisations in the Industry 
Lasher (1999) suggests that 'an industry' s structure relates to the relative sizes and 
strengths of the companies in it', and that it is possible to classify organizations into 
different categories or segments. These categories or segments can often be seen to 
behave independently of each other, effectively suggesting that little or no 
competition between them exists. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003), among others, propose that a 'strategic group map' is 
useful in analysing the structure of a particular industry, with the objective being to 
identify the relevant competitors to a particular organization. Generally, a strategic 
group map is constructed with any two relevant industry attributes on the axes, with 
each organization of group of organizations represented by a circle or sphere 
proportionate in size to revenue or market share if this is not one of the attributes 
already considered. The result is a graphical representation of industry segmentation 
which allows relevant competitors or rivals to be identified. Thompson & Strickland 
(2003) recommend that, for the purposes of selecting relevant industry attributes on 
which to base the map, the 'competitive characteristics that differentiate firms in the 
industry' should be considered. They suggest typical variables as being price/quality 
range (high, medium or low), geographic coverage (local, regional, national, global), 
the degree of vertical integration (none, partial, or full), product-line breadth (wide or 
narrow), use of distribution channels (one, some, all), and degree of service offered 
(no-frills, limited or full). 
Lasher (1999) identifies the most important competitor as either the leader in the 
organisation's segment or 'another firm that is, in some sense, close by'. He goes on 
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to suggest that once relevant rivals have been identified, knowledge of their strengths, 
weaknesses and unusual characteristics should be developed, thereby enabling 
attempts to be made to predict likely strategic initiatives they might launch. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) assert that some valuable insights can be learned from 
a strategic group map. For instance, some strategic groups may be favoured by 
industry driving forces and competitive pressures, while others may be disadvantaged, 
suggesting that firms will naturally try to make a move to a more advantageous 
position. In addition, it should be recognised that the profit potential of each strategic 
group will vary, depending on strengths and weaknesses associated with their relative 
positioning. 
2.2.1.5. Industry Attractiveness and Profitability Prospects 
Overall, in the context of an industry analysis, it is important to draw conclusions 
regarding the attractiveness of the industry considered and the associated profitability 
prospects. Such conclusions will be important when crafting an appropriate strategy 
for the organization. The important factors to consider when drawing these 
conclusions include the following (based on Thompson & Strickland, 2003): 
• The growth potential of the industry. 
• The degree of profitability governed by current competition and the likely 
development of future competitive forces. 
• The effect ofthe prevailing driving forces on industry profitability. 
• The position of the organisation in the industry with respect to 
competitiveness and whether its position is likely to improve or deteriorate. 
• The potential for the organization to capitalize on the weaknesses of rivals, 
enabling the organization to take opportunities and realize gains in an 
otherwise lacklustre industry. 
• The ability of the organization to counteract the factors that reduce the 
attractiveness of the industry. 





The severity of the current problems facing the industry and the likely 
consequences. 
Whether continued participation in a particular industry is significant in terms 
of the organisation' s ability to achieve success in other industries in which it is 
active. The concept of synergy will be important to consider here. 
F or the purposes of strategy formulation, it is an important assumption that other 
organizations will also react to prevailing industry conditions. In favourable 
conditions, competing firms will probably try to bolster their competitive standing and 
market shares. Likewise, in unfavourable conditions, firms will probably proceed 
cautiously or look for other opportunities. It is therefore important for strategists to 
realize that even under favourable conditions, pro-active strategic moves must be 
made to prevent a possible loss of market share, and that under unfavourable 
conditions, cautious but opportunistic moves must be taken in order to strengthen or 
maintain the organization' s position. 
2.2.2. The Five-Forces Model of Competition 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that ' even though competitive pressures in 
various industries are never precisely the same, the competitive process works 
similarly enough . to use a common analytical framework in gauging the nature and 
intensity of competitive forces'. The Five-Forces Model of Competition developed by 
Michael Porter provides such an analytical framework. However, it must be borne in 
mind that one of the most important shortcomings of the model is that it only provides 
a "snapshot" picture of competitive conditions in an industry at a particular point in 
time, not taking future developments or elements of change into account. Lynch 
(2000) adds that 'the basic assumption of the model is that all organizations will wish 
to benefit and protect their own interests first' . This is generally accepted to be true 
for commercial businesses operating in a competitive environment. 
Nevertheless, the model is an acceptable means of gauging the forms and varying 
degrees of the current competitive forces at play. It would be dangerous, however, to 
base long term strategic planning on the findings of a Five-Forces analysis without 
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reiterating the process and adjusting strategic plans appropriately at reasonable time 
intervals, depending on industry conditions and the rate of change experienced in the 
particular industry. 
Lynch (2000) identifies the five competitive forces to be considered by the analysis as 
follows : 
• The bargaining power of suppliers. 
• The bargaining power of buyers. 
• The threat of potential new entrants (to the industry). 
• The threat of substitutes. 
• The extent of competitive rivalry. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) further contend that, with respect to the first two 
forces identified, supplier-seller collaboration and seller-buyer collaboration 
respectively, are relevant competitive forces to consider. 
2.2.2.1. The Extent of Competitive Rivalry 
Competitive rivalry generally refers to the continuous jockeying for position of the 
various competitors in an industry, with each competitor aiming for a greater degree 
of buyer acceptance and favour. The basis for competitive rivalry can take various 
forms and is often dynamic, with competitors either engaging in offensive, defensive 
tactics or a combination of both, depending on the circumstances at the time and the 
competitive strategies employed. Robbins & DeCenzo (2001) note that 'Porter 
proposed that management must select a competitive strategy that will give its unit a 
distinct advantage by capitalizing on the strengths of the organization and the industry 
it is in'. 
The type of competitive strategies pursued by market participants is an important 
consideration. The three generic competitive strategies proposed by Porter are 'cost 
leadership, product or service differentiation, and narrow target market focus 
(pursuing competitive advantage within niche markets), (Engelbrecht, 2000). Cost 
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leadership is the basis for competition where organizations in an industry compete on 
price, with competitors jostling for position as the lowest-cost producer. Thompson & 
Strickland argue that this type of competitive strategy usually applies to producers of 
' standard commodities' , where differentiation is difficult or inappropriate. Product or 
service differentiation, however, is based on product uniqueness in a broad market, 
with competing organizations basing their competitiveness on differentiating 
characteristics such as quality, service efficiency and innovation. Such an approach 
usually enables competing organizations to price their products or services at a 
premium. The narrow target market focus competitive strategy is based on either of 
the cost leadership or differentiation strategies, but is applied to a narrow target 
market or a selected market segment or group of segments. In this case, the 
competitive strategy is tailored to meet the requirements of the selected target market. 
The following factors can be considered in determining the intensity of competitive 
rivalry (based on Lynch, 2000, Porter, 1980, and Thompson & Strickland, 2003): 
• As competitors grow to similar sizes and develop similar capabilities, rivalry 
can be expected to intensify, as competition for market share may increase. In 
addition, rivalry can be expected to intensify if the number of competitors 
increases, as a result of the erosion of market share previously held by larger 
competitors. 
• Greater rivalry may be expected when the demand for a particular product or 
service diminishes or the market is growing slowly. Competitive firms 
wishing to continue growing will attempt to erode the market shares of other 
competitors, leading to intense rivalry. 
• Where the cost to customers of switching between products or serVIce 
providers is low, competitive rivalry will be more intense. In this case, 
competitors will be forced to employ more competitive tactics to retain 
customers or expand market share, as they will not enjoy the protection 
provided by high switching costs. 
• Rivalry may be expected to increase when certain competitors embark on 
expansion activities to improve their market position or react aggressively to a 
fall in their market share or other adverse conditions. 
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• The greater the potential gams from successful strategic moves to expand 
market share or capture new markets, the greater the expected intensity of 
competitive rivalry will be, as many organizations may pursue the same 
opportunities with intent. 
• In an industry characterised by high exit costs, existing organizations may 
decide to remain and compete, even in adverse market or financial conditions, 
leading to a greater intensity of competitive rivalry. 
• The greater the diversity of competitors in terms of their resources, strategies 
and visions, the more volatile and unpredictable competitive rivalry may be 
expected to be. 
• Greater competitive rivalry may be expected when a new entrant or existing 
competitor acquired by a strong outsider launches aggressive competitive 
strategies designed to capture market share and bolster market position. 
• If it is difficult to differentiate products or services, the intensity of 
competitive rivalry may be expected to increase. 
2.2.2.2. The Threat of Potential New Entrants 
The potential entry of new competitors can generally be regarded as a function of 
industry attractiveness and the number and severity of barriers to entry. Competitive 
pressures will stem from the reactions of the existing market participants to the entry 
of these new competitors. Several major sources of entry barriers may be considered 
(based on Lynch, 2000, Porter, 1980, and Thompson & Strickland, 2003): 
• Industries characterised by economies of scale often require large, risky, initial 
capital outlays and also often dictate that profits may only be realized in the 
long-term. This may deter would-be entrants to the industry. 
• Existing organizations may have a competitive advantage based on cost and 
resource advantages not available to new entrants. Thompson and Strickland 
(2003) suggest that this may include 'partnerships with the best and cheapest 
suppliers of raw materials and components, possession of patents and 
proprietary technology, existing plants built and equipped years earlier at 
lower costs, favourable locations, and lower borrowing costs ' . 
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• Where learning and expenence curve effects are significant, existing 
competitors are more formidable. Existing firms would have a significant cost 
advantage based on savings made with incremental production. 
• Some organizations in the industry may possess superior technology and 
specialised know-how not easily available to new entrants. Patents, key skilled 
personnel, technological know-how and proprietary knowledge are important 
factors to consider. 
• Product differentiation creating brand preferences and customer loyalty often 
present formidable challenges to new entrants. Existing firms may be in an 
enviable position, with loyal customers paying premium prices due to their 
attachment or affinity to their brands and reputations for special levels of 
service. New entrants would have to invest heavily in promotion and business 
establishment in order to attract some of these customers. 
• High switching costs may present high entry barriers. It may be more 
convenient for customers to retain the services of an existing organization if 
switching costs are high. 
• High capital requirements involving investment in technology, plant, 
distribution and service outlets may deter new entrants. There are often 
significant risks .in raising the required capital and financing activities 
appropriatel y. 
• Access to distribution channels may present a challenge to new entrants. In 
order to provide a good or a service to customers, suitable distribution 
channels are necessary. Existing firms may be in a position to control existing 
distribution channels, often forcing new entrants to create their own. 
• Regulatory policies can play a major role in creating entry barriers. 
International markets can be protected by stringent government policies 
regarding investment. Certain industries are severely regulated and are 
therefore extremely difficult to enter successfully. Thompson & Strickland 
(2003) note that ' stringent government-mandated safety regulations and 
environmental pollution standards' can be significant entry barriers due to the 
increased set-up costs involved. 
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2.2.2.3. The Threat of Substitutes 
Substitute products or services provided by different industries can often heighten the 
degree of competition in a particular industry. Competitive pressures can arise when 
suitable substitutes are found or developed. Technological advances may make this 
possible. Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that three factors should be 
considered when determining the strength of competitive pressures posed by 
substitute products: 
• Whether attractively priced substitutes are available, 
• Whether buyers view the substitutes as being satisfactory in terms of quality , 
performance, and other relevant attributes, and 
• Whether buyers can switch to substitutes easily. 
In addition, Lynch (2000) suggests that, from a strategic viewpoint, key issues to be 
analysed should include: 
• The possible threat of obsolescence, 
• The costs of providing some extra aspect of the service that will prevent 
switching, and 
• The likely reduction in profit margin if prices come down or are held. 
2.2.2.4. The Bargaining Power of Suppliers and Supplier-Seller Collaboration 
The relationships that an organization has with its various suppliers can often result in 
competitive advantage. Porter (1980) suggests that there are certain conditions under 
which suppliers can be extremely powerful: 
• If there are few suppliers to an industry, switching between suppliers may be 
difficult and costly. In such conditions, lower competition between suppliers 
results in higher supply prices. 
• If no substitutes are available for the supplied products or services, choice is 
diminished and sellers are at a disadvantage. 
• If suppliers ' costs comprise a large part of the total costs of an organization, 
any price fluctuations will have a large impact on value-added and thus 
profitability. 
21 
• If it is possible for a supplier to integrate forward and undertake the 
organisation' s value added process, a real threat to the survival of the 
organization is posed. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) also contend that a supplier is more powerful when an 
organization is dependent on that supplier as a major supplier. The opposite also 
applies, in that suppliers are a relatively weaker force when they rely on major buyers. 
Competitive pressures stemming from collaboration between suppliers and rival 
sellers in an industry are often the result of the formation of strategic partnerships and 
close working relationships. The result is that suppliers become more cognisant of 
their customer' s requirements and can structure their businesses and processes 
accordingly, reducing costs overall. In addition, such arrangements eliminate the costs 
incurred in marketing efforts. 
2.2.2.5. The Bargaining Power of Buyers and Seller-Buyer Collaboration 
Lynch (2000) suggests that buyers have more bargaining power under the following 
conditions: 
• If buyers are concentrated and there are few of them, the organization is at a 
disadvantage, mainly due to the lack of alternative buyers. 
• If the product or service offered by the organization IS essentially 
undifferentiated, buyers can usually switch to alternatives easily. 
• If the potential for backward integration by the buyers is great, the threat of 
such an occurrence increases the buyers' bargaining power. 
• If the selling price of the product or service provided by the organization is 
fairly insignificant in terms of the total costs of the buyer, the easier it will be 
for the buyer to select alternatives. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) also suggest the following conditions under which 
buyers will have greater bargaining leverage: 
• If the buyer' s costs of switching to competing products or services are low, 
• Ifbuyers are well informed about the seller's products, prices and costs, and 
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• If buyers have discretion in whether and when they purchase the product or 
service, that is, they are not necessarily dependent on it. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) contend that, with respect to collaboration between 
sellers and buyers, it is mostly business-to-business relationships that have the 
potential to generate competitive advantage. This is achieved through seller and buyer 
firms forming strategic alliances or close working relationships in order to generate 
greater value added by streamlining processes and linking the firms in various ways in 
order to improve efficiency and decrease costs. 
2.2.3. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis 
Lynch (2000) asserts that ' a SWOT analysis of the organization - its strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats - is a useful way of summarizing the current 
status of the organization'. This is intended to enable the rational analysis of future 
possibilities, argued by Andrews (1987) to be essential to strategy development. The 
objective is to compare the relevant strengths and weaknesses (internal resource based 
characteristics) of the organization with the opportunities and threats posed by 
external environmental conditions. 
Jacobs et al (1998), confirm the use of a SWOT analysis as a useful analytical tool but 
also caution against possible pitfalls, including the possibility of generating a long list 
of observations which provide little overall insight or clarity about required action. In 
addition, Jacobs et al (1998) caution that care must be taken to ensure the objective 
evaluation of observations, not to assume that environmental changes are necessarily 
threats and that strengths and weaknesses identified are based on current strategy 
rather than intended strategy. 
Jacobs et al (1998) suggest the use of a concise matrix for the effective integration of 
the identified strengths and weaknesses and the environmental opportunities and 
threats, stating that the objective ' is to match likely external environmental changes 
with internal capabilities, to test these out and challenge how an organization can 
capitalize on new opportunities, or defend itself against future threats' . By assigning 
scores to the matrix, and weightings of relative importance to the environmental 
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factors , the relative impact that particular combinations of internal and external 
factors may have on strategy development can be identified. In this manner, it is 
possible to highlight areas that require change in order to improve competitiveness or 
defend the current position of the organization. 
2.2.3.1. Internal Resource Based Factors - Strengths and Weaknesses 
Resource Based Strengths: 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) define a strength as ' something a company is good at 
doing or a characteristic that gives it enhanced competitiveness' . They suggest that a 
strength can take many forms, including, ' a skill or important expertise, valuable 
physical assets, valuable human assets, valuable organizational assets, valuable 
intangible assets, competitive capabilities, an achievement or attribute that puts the 
company in a position of market advantage, and alliances or co-operative ventures' . 
The aspects of competence and competitive capability are important to consider. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that a company competence has to be 
deliberately and consciously built and developed through experience, accumulative 
learning over time and the development of 'real proficiency ' as a result. They suggest 
that competencies should be seen to be a collection of 'skills, know-how, resources 
and technologies ' as opposed to a single element, and further assert that competencies 
only become a competitive capability when customers deem them to be ' valuable and 
beneficial ', and when they are factors of differentiation and competitiveness. 
Many organizations may have similar competencies, and it is therefore necessary to 
define those competencies that give rise to competitive capability, in other words, 
"core competencies". 10hnson & Scholes (1993) define core competencies as being 
' concerned with identifying those particular strengths which give the company an 
edge over its competitors, and those areas of particular weakness which are to be 
avoided'. They further suggest that the strategic importance of core competencies can 
be tested through determination of the following: 
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• Ownership of core competencies - In professional serVIce oriented 
organizations, knowledge and skills are "owned" by individuals and may 
easily be taken to another firm. 
• Durability of core competencies - Where rapid changes in technology occur 
and product life-cycles are short, competencies may have a limited life-span. 
Smaller, more flexible and opportunistic firms may have an advantage over 
larger firms unable to cope with the speed of change. 
• Ease of transfer of core competencies - Some competencies may be easily 
transferred from one firm to another, but others are difficult to transfer, such 
as brand equity or reputation. 
• Ease of replication of core competencies - Some competencies may be easily 
developed or imitated by competitors. 
Prahalad & Harnel (1990) take the argument further, suggesting that a core 
competence can be classified as a "distinctive competence" if the competence is 
competitively superior to the capability of competitors, forming the basis of genuine 
competitive advantage. Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that this allows the 
organization to enjoy ' competitive superiority ' and assert that the importance of such 
a competence rests with ' the competitively valuable capability it gives a company, the 
potential for being a cornerstone of strategy, and the competitive edge it can produce 
in the market place' . Further, a distinctive competence must make a differentiable 
contribution to customer value, be unique and superior to competitor capabilities, and 
be able to be used to develop new products and services or enter new markets (Harnel 
& Prahalad, 1994). 
Resource Based Weaknesses: 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) define a weakness as ' something a company lacks or 
does poorly (in comparison to others) or a condition that puts it at a disadvantage. 
They suggest that such a weakness can relate to 'deficiencies in competitively 
important skills or expertise or intellectual capital ', to ' a lack of competitively 
important physical, organizational or intangible assets, or 'missing or weak 
competitive capabilities in key areas '. Some weaknesses may be more important to 
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the intended well-being of the organization than others, and some may prove to be 
critical weaknesses in light of the competitive and environmental conditions the 
organization is facing. The SWOT analysis is intended to identify and highlight the 
implications of these critical areas of weakness so that attention to their remedy may 
be appropriately focussed. 
2.2.3.2. External Environmental Based Factors - Opportunities and Threats 
Opportunities: 
The identification and evaluation of opportunities is critical to strategic decision-
making. The future success and prosperity of the organization depends on the 
existence of such opportunities and the capability of the organization to capitalize on 
them. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that ' the market opportunities most relevant 
to a company are those that offer important avenues for profitable growth, those 
where a company has the most potential for competitive advantage, and those that 
match up well with the company's financial and organizational resource capabilities ' . 
They also caution that organizations must be particular in selecting appropriate 
opportunities to pursue, as they may find themselves outclassed by other competitors. 
In this regard, strategic decision-making should also include an assessment of how the 
firm's resources may need to be adapted or extended to enable pursuit of an 
opportuni ty. 
Threats: 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that certain environmental factors may pose 
threats to the organization in terms of profitability, competitiveness and market 
position, adding that it is critical for an organization to assess the relative impact of 
the various threats identified. This is necessary in order for the organization to co-
ordinate the appropriate re-direction of resources in moves to minimize or neutralize 
the more important threats. 
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Threats can emerge from a variety of different areas, including the introduction of 
more cost effective or superior technologies, the introduction of new or improved 
products or services, the entry of low-cost foreign competitors, the promulgation of 
new regulations, economic instability including interest rate and exchange rate shifts, 
unfavourable demographic shifts and political upheaval (based on Thompson & 
Strickland, 2003). It is therefore vital to ensure that organizations are continuously 
aware of environmental developments, so that they may be taken into account III 
strategy decision-making. "Environmental scanning" may enable 'such awareness. 
2.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
Following a detailed strategic analysis of the organization and its circumstances, 
strategic options may be examined. The findings of the various forms of analysis are 
used in the development of these strategic options. This process begins with the 
development of a company mission and long-term objectives. Subsequently, the 
criteria governing the selection of generic competitive strategies and grand strategies 
are explored. 
2.3.1. The Company Mission ., 
Many strategists agree that the starting point for the development of strategic options 
is the development of a company mission. David (1986) defines the corporate mission 
as 'an enduring statement of purpose that distinguishes one organization from other 
similar enterprises' , and suggests that 'a mission statement is a declaration of an 
organisation's reason for being' . He further asserts that a mission statement IS 
essential to effectively establishing objectives and formulating strategies. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that the development of a mission is part of a 
more important process of developing a ' strategic vision ' (generally designed to last 
in excess of five years), identifying three elements constituting the process: 
• Developing a mission statement that defines the business the company IS 
presently in and which conveys the essence of "who we are, what we do, and 
where we are now". 
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• Deciding on a long-term course, based on the mission statement, making 
choices about "where we are going" and mapping out a strategic path. 
• Communicating the strategic vision in clear, exciting terms, arousing 
organisation wide commitment. 
With respect to the development of a mission, Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest 
that three elements should be incorporated: 
• Customer needs, or what is being satisfied. 
• Customer groups, or who is being satisfied. 
• The firm ' s activities, technologies and competencies, or how the organization 
creates and delivers value to customers and satisfies them. 
The strategic vision, based on the mission and the direction in which the organization 
is headed in the longer term, can provide several benefits if it is well conceived and 
well worded. Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that the benefits include: 
• Crystallisation of senior executives own views about the long-term future. 
• Reduction in risk of "rudderless" decision-making. 
• Conveyance of purpose in ways that motivate members of the firm. 
• Providing a baseline on which lower-level managers can base departmental 
strategies. 
• Helping the organization prepare for the future. 
2.3 .2. Long-Term Objectives 
The formation of long-term objectives naturally follows the creation of strategic 
vision. Hamel & Prahalad (1989) suggest that the existence of meaningful strategic 
objectives indicates the existence of "strategic intent" . Such intent is necessary should 
the organization realistically wish to make its mark on the industry in the longer term. 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) assert that an approach to achieving ' sustained corporate 
growth and profitability ' must be found, and that to achieve such long-term 
prosperity, long-term objectives in seven areas should be established. These areas 
include profitability, productivity, competitive position, employee development, 
28 
employee relations, technological leadership and public responsibility. Pearce & 
Robinson (2000) further suggest that the objectives be developed according to seven 
criteria: 
• Long-term objectives should be acceptable to management in terms of their 
ideals, thereby ensuring their pursuance. In addition, it may be necessary to 
ensure that these objectives are acceptable to external groups. 
• The flexibility of long-term objectives is important to ensure adaptability to 
unforeseen circumstances, however, it must be ensured that an acceptable 
level of specificity is maintained. 
• The objectives should be measurable over time. Therefore, the objectives must 
be clear and quantifiable. 
• Long-term objectives should be set a level that motivates people. 
• The objectives must be suitable, that is, in alignment with the broad aims of 
the organization. 
• The stated objectives must be clear, meaningful and unambiguous in order for 
proper understanding of the objectives to be achieved. 
• It must be possible to achieve the objectives that have been set. However, 
turbulence in the remote and operating environments may create obstacles, 
highlighting the need for flexibility. 
2.3.3 . Generic Strategies 
The next step in the strategic options development process is the development of 
generic strategies. This is necessary to enable the establishment of a basic 
understanding of the organisation' s strategic orientation prior to the development of 
long-term or grand strategies. Pearce & Robinson (2000) assert that 'a long-term or 
grand strategy must be based on a core idea about how the firm can best compete in 
the market place' . This is based on the work of Michael Porter who suggested that any 
long-term strategy should be based on the method in which the organization seeks 
competitive advantage. 
Based on Barnett & Wilsted (1988), Porter' s model suggests that three generIC 
approaches can be taken on the basis of competitiveness, that is, to either aim to 
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achieve low-cost leadership in the industry, to aim to achieve competitive advantage 
through differentiation, or to target specific consumer groups or segments through 
focusing on cost-leadership or differentiation requirements. Pearce & Robinson 
(2000) suggest that each of these generic competitive strategies could be very 
successful, but for very different reasons. 
2.3.3 .1. Low-cost Leadership Strategy 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) assert that, for low-cost leadership, some fairly unique 
capabilities are required to maintain such a position, including, for example, securing 
suppliers of scarce raw materials, being in a dominant position with regards to market 
share or having a high degree of capitalization. In general, in a low-cost position, cost 
reductions and efficiency creation are keys to success, with organizations seeking to 
exploit economies of scale, cost-cutting technology, experience curve effects, 
reducing overhead costs wherever possible and using volume sales to achieve 
incremental cost reductions. Pearce & Robinson (2000) assert that the cost-advantage 
achieved enables the . organization to charge lower prices or enjoy higher profit 
margins, thereby being able to defend itself in price wars or to attack the market share 
of competitors on the basis of price. 
Based on Thompson & Strickland (2003), possible pitfalls of a low-cost leadership 
strategy could include excessive price cutting resulting in lower profitability, not 
carefully considering the sustainability of cost-advantage creating capabilities, and 
becoming too ,fixated on cost reduction in a market where buyers may actually 
develop an affinity for differentiated products or services. 
2.3 .3.2. Differentiation Strategy 
Alternatively, a differentiation strategy is based on appealing to consumers with a 
'special sensitivity for a particular product attribute ' (Pearce & Robinson, 2000), with 
the organization aiming to build customer loyalty based on the attributes in question. 
Such attributes are numerous and could include, for example, a unique taste, multiple 
features, a wide selection and one stop shopping, superior service, spare parts 
availability, more for the money, engineering design and performance, prestige and 
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distinctiveness, product reliability, quality manufacture, technological leadership, a 
full range of services, a complete line of products, and top of the line image and 
reputation (Thompson & Strickland, 2003). Pearce & Robinson (2000) suggest that 
competitive advantage may be achieved through the creation of "perceptual" barriers 
to entry, with the customer unable to see essentially identical products as substitutes 
for each other. Small service oriented organizations, such as engineering consulting 
practices, may therefore benefit extremely well from a differentiation based business 
strategy. 
Based on Thompson & Strickland (2003), certain market situations exist in which a 
differentiation strategy may work well: 
• When the product or service can be differentiated in many ways and the 
customer perceives such differentiating characteristics as having real value. 
• When buyer needs and uses for the product or service are diverse. 
• When few rival organizations are following a similar differentiation approach, 
reducing the likelihood of head-to-head competition. 
• When technological change and product innovation occur rapidly, and 
competitiveness is based on the evolution of product or service features. 
However, there are also possible pitfalls associated with differentiation strategies 
(based on Thompson & Strickland, 2003): 
• If buyers actually perceive little value in the unique attributes or capabilities of 
an organization, very little will be achieved. 
• If competitors can easily copy the differentiating characteristics, the basis for 
competitive advantage will be nullified. 
Other possible pitfalls include the following (based on Porter, 1985): 
• Not being able to properly identify and understand exactly what it is that 
buyers consider to be of value. 
• 
• 
Not paying enough attention to the need to emphasise the added value created, 
relying too heavily on the actual product or service attributes themselves. 
"Overdifferentiating" such that the buyers ' needs are exceeded, often resulting 
in overpricing relative to competitors. 
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• Charging too high a price premium, relative to the perceived added value 
provided. 
2.3 .3.3. Focussed Competitive Strategies 
A focused competitive strategy essentially encompasses either a low-cost approach or 
a differentiation approach but is based on targeting the particular needs of a specific 
consumer segment or segments that may not be serviced adequately by the general 
market. Pearce & Robinson (2000) suggest that focus strategies could entail, for 
example, servicing isolated geographic areas, servicmg customers with special 
financing, inventory or servicing problems, or servIcmg the unique demands of 
smaller customers in the market. 
A focused competitive strategy may often be the optimal competitive approach for 
low-market share businesses. Hamermesh et al (1983) assert that a low-market share 
business may achieve respectable returns and profitability if it competes in market 
segments 'where its own strengths will be most highly valued and where its large 
competitors will be most likely to compete' . They further assert that low-market share 
companies can improve their performance by spending on research and development 
in those specific areas most likely to product the greatest benefits to them, and by 
remaining small, 'emphasizing profits rather than sales growth or market share, and 
specialization rather than diversification'. Hamermesh et al (1983) also comment that 
the performance of low-market share businesses pursuing a strategy of focused 
competitive strategy depends on the influence and involvement of the chief executive, 
stating that 'the influence of the chief executive often extends beyond formulating and 
communicating an ingenious strategy to actually having a deep involvement in the 
daily activities of the business'. 
A focused competitive strategy becomes increasingly attractive as more of the 
following conditions are met (based on Thompson & Strickland, 2003): 
• The niche market targeted is large enough to offer growth potential and be 
profitable. 
32 
• Industry leaders and major competitors do not regard targeting the same niche 
or market segment as crucial to their success. 
• It is difficult and costly for larger competitors to meet the specialised needs of 
the targeted niche or segments, while also keeping their mainstream customers 
satisfied. 
• Many different segments and niches are available in the industry, thereby 
allowing for the selection of a niche suited to the organization' s particular 
resource capabilities. 
• Few rivals are attempting to target the same segment or niche, reducing the 
risk of "overcrowding". 
• The organization can effectively compete with challengers, based on its 
resource strengths suited to the niche and customer goodwill. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) also caution that certain risks are associated with 
focus strategies, including: 
• The chance that competitors will offset the organisation' s advantage by 
matching or bettering its competencies. 
• The potential for the needs and preferences of the targeted consumer segment 
to shift towards mainstream needs and preferences, lowering entry barriers to 
the niche market. 
• The potential for the appeal of the particular market segment or niche to be so 
great so as to attract many competitors, thereby intensifying rivalry and 
diminishing the profit potential. 
2.3.4. Grand Strategies 
Following on from the development of generic competitive strategies, Pearce & 
Robinson (2000) suggest that widespread agreement exists regarding the importance 
of "grand strategies" as the basis for providing ' basic direction for strategic actions ', 
or ' co-ordinated and sustained efforts directed toward achieving long-term business 
objectives ' . 
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On a basic level, the general findings of the SWOT analysis can be used to determine 
whether the organization should be pursuing an aggressive strategy, a diversification 
strategy, a turn-around oriented strategy or a defensive strategy, depending on the 
prevailing degree of internal strength/weakness and environmental opportunity/threat. 




Ce ll 3: Supports a 
turnaround 
ori ented strategy 
Ce ll 4 : Supports a 
defensive strategy 
Numerous 
environme nta l 
opportunities 
Ce ll I : Supports an 
aggressive strategy 









Grand strategy selection can then be based on the 'Grand Strategy Selection Matrix' 
and the ' Model of Grand Strategy Clusters '. 
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Pearce & Robinson (2000) note that the selection of an optimal grand strategy from 
the available alternatives must be carefully considered, and that for firms involved in 
'multiple industries, businesses, product lines or customer groups ', a combination of 
grand strategies may form an optimal solution. The different grand strategies are now 
explored in further detail. 
The first four grand strategies, namely, concentrated growth, market development, 
product development and diversification are based on options with respect to 
"product" and "market". The 'market options matrix' provided by Lynch (2000), 
based on the market/product matrix of Ansoff (1989), illustrates these relationships. 
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Figure 2.4. Market Options Matrix 
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Concentrated growth is also often referred to as market penetration, and is based on 
the organization's current markets and products. Pearce & Robinson (2000) define 
concentrated growth as a grand strategy where a firm 'directs its resources to the 
profitable growth of a single product, in a single market, with a single dominant 
technology ', and as a strategy that leads to enhanced performance. Lynch (2000) 
asserts that the underlying motive for market penetration is to attract customers away 
from directly competing products, in order to gain market share. Day (1987) suggests 
that the strategy should begin with existing customers, as an attack on competitors is 
likely to result in retaliation. Following this, Buzzel & Wiersema (1981) suggest that, 
if attacks are to be undertaken against competitors, a combination of activities is more 
likely to be successful , reducing the threat of neutralization. 
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Pearce & Robinson (2000) assert that the core capabilities of the organization are 
more important determinants of ' competitive market success than are the 
environmental forces faced by the firm' . They confirm that concentrated growth of a 
firm should entail 'building on its competencies', achieving a ' competitive edge by 
concentrating in the product-market segment it knows best' . 
The following conditions can be considered to favour concentrated growth (Pearce & 
Robinson, 2000): 
• Where the industry is resistant to major technological advancements, usually 
occurring in the late-growth and maturity stages of the industry life-cycle, and 
in product markets where demand is stable and barriers to entry are high. 
• Where targeted markets are not saturated, allowing for the capture of market 
share as opposed to direct attacks on competitors ' market shares. 
• Where the firm ' s product markets are sufficiently distinctive to dissuade 
competitors in adjacent product markets from invasion. 
• Where the firm ' s input costs and quantities are stable and available as and 
when required. 
• Where the market is stable, without seasonal or cyclical swings in demand. 
• Where the firm enjoys competitive advantages based on efficiency 
• Where 'market generalists ' succeed by using 'universal appeals', specialists 
can enjoy concentrated growth in market segments overlooked by such an 
approach. 
However, Pearce & Robinson (2000) caution that high risks may be faced when 
embarking upon a concentrated growth strategy under unstable conditions, with 
slowed growth or economic changes in the targeted segment jeopardizing the success 
of the firm. In addition, new developments or trends that could possibly present a real 
threat in the future may not be detected under a very focused approach. Care must 
also be taken to avoid over commitment to a specific product or technology that 
would hinder the pursuit of lucrative new opportunities. Finally, Pearce & Robinson 
(2000) note that, despite the various risks, concentrated growth may often be the most 
viable option, due to the premise that only limited additional resources, if any, are 
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required, with the firm basically attempting to 'get the most out' of its existing 
resources. 
Market Development: 
Lynch (2000) asserts that, under a strategy of market development, ' the organization 
moves beyond its immediate customer focus into attracting new customers for its 
existing product range', noting that the firm may seek new market segments, 
geographical expansion, or new uses for its products or services. 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) suggest that market development may be considered to be 
a form of concentrated growth, is also relatively inexpensive, with the organization 
marketing its present products with only minor modifications designed to appeal to 
customers in ' related market areas ' . Engelbrecht (2002) notes that forms of market 
development could include expansion into export markets, the development of a 
broader range of product pack sizes (or the manner in which the product or service is 
"packaged"), the creation of new distribution channels and differential pricing to 
attract new markets. 
Product Development: 
Lynch (2000) asserts that product development entails ' significant new product 
developments, not a minor variation on an existing product' to be marketed to existing 
customers. He also provides some reasons for embarking on such a strategy, namely, 
' to utilize excess production capacity, to counter competitive entry, to exploit new 
technology, to maintain a stance as a product innovator, or to protect overall market 
share' . 
With respect to important product development issues to consider, Baker (1992) notes 
the significant contribution to sales and profits as a result of new product 
introductions across a wide range of industries, and Davidson (1987) advises that, if 
new products are to be successful, a genuine improvement in performance is vital. 
Engelbrecht (2002) also notes that, under a successful product development strategy, 
competitors are forced to innovate and new entrants to the industry are discouraged, 
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but cautions that development costs may prove to be prohibitive and that very 
successful products may also erode the market share of the existing product mix 
offered by the organization. 
Diversification: 
Lynch (2000), among others, distinguishes between diversification into related 
markets and diversification into unrelated markets, confirming that, 'when an 
organization diversifies, it moves out of its current products and markets into new 
areas ' . Engelbrecht (2002) notes that diversification is often fraught with risk due to a 
lack of experience, but comments that risk can be lowered when surplus funds exist, 
that it may be the most attractive option due to the potential of new products and 
markets and that it may provide a more comprehensive service to customers, thereby 
building loyalty. 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) confirm that strategies involving diversification ' represent 
distinctive departures from a firm's existing base of operations' , and that a possibility 
includes the acquisition or internal generation (spin-off) of a separate business with 
' synergistic possibilities' . A distinction between concentric and conglomerate 
diversification is made. These two forms of diversification are explored below. 
Concentric Diversification: 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) define concentric diversification as involving ' the 
acquisition' , or spin-off, 'of businesses that are related to the acquiring firm in terms 
of technology, markets or products ', suggesting a high degree of compatibility 
between the firms. In addition, it is suggested that the optimal result should be an 
overall increase in combined strengths and opportunities and an overall decrease in 
combined weaknesses and risk exposure. 
Conglomerate Diversification: 
Generally, conglomerate diversification is undertaken principally on profit 
considerations, with financial synergy being sought in order to minimize risk (based 
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on Pearce & Robinson, 2000). This form of diversification is usually undertaken in 
the form of acquiring businesses for the investment opportunity that they present. 
Innovation: 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) suggest that in many industries, consumer and industrial 
markets have come to expect periodic changes and improvements in products on 
offer. In such conditions, it may be necessary to embark on a grand strategy of 
innovation, whereby the initially high profits associated with new product demand are 
sought, in addition to ensuring that the organization is not left behind by the 
competition. Pearce & Robinson (2000) state that the 'underlying rationale.is to 
create a new product life cycle and thereby make similar existing products obsolete ' . 
Horizontal Integration: 
Horizontal integration can be defined as the 'acquisition of one or more similar firms 
operating at the same stage of the production-marketing chain' (Pearce & Robinson, 
2000). It is commonly stated that the main advantages of such a grand strategy 
include the elimination of competitors and the creation of access to new or expanded 
markets. In addition, synergies can be created through the merging of the 
organizations. 
Vertical Integration: 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) define vertical integration as extending the 
competitive scope of the firm within the same industry, involving extending the firm's 
activities backwards (towards the sources of supply) or forwards (towards end users 
of the final product). The organization may either develop its own in-house 
competencies in this regard, or may elect to acquire an existing organization 
performing the necessary functions . 
Many benefits may be derived from vertical integration (based on Thompson & 
Strickland, 2003): 
• The bargaining power of suppliers/buyers can be nullified. 
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• Dependency on supplierslbuyers can be nullified. 
• Significant cost savings may be realized through the integration of the value 
added activity into the organisation's value chain. 
• Product enhancement can be achieved if the organization can improve on the 
particular product, process or service, resulting in competitive advantage 
based on differentiation. 
Vertical integration also has its drawbacks (based on Thompson & Strickland, 2003): 
• Outsourcing may provide greater cost reductions due to specialization and 
volume output. 
• Substantial capital may be tied up, increasing business risk and constraining 
development of the core business. 
• The organization could become locked III to its in-house supplier/buyer, 
presenting flexibility problems. 
• Balancing capacity at each stage of the value chain can be difficult. 
• Radically different business skills and competencies may be required for the 
different parts of the vertically integrated organization, often resulting in a loss 
of focus. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that vertical integration should only be 
pursued when: 
• The performance of strategy critical activities can be enhanced (lower cost, 
build expertise, or increase differentiation, 
• The impact on investment costs, flexibility and administrative overheads 
associated with coordination of the value chain across more stages is 
favourable, and 
• Competitive advantage is created. 
Turnaround: 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) assert that ' turnaround strategies are needed when a 
business worth rescuing goes into crisis ', and that ' the objective is to arrest and 
reverse the sources of competitive and financial weakness as quickly as possible ' . 
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It is commonly suggested that the starting point in a turnaround strategy should be the 
identification of the root causes of the organisation's poor performance, as any 
recovery strategies should take these factors into account. Thompson & Strickland 
(2003) suggest a few possible reasons for poor performance, including taking on too 
much debt, overestimating sales growth potential, ignoring the profit depressing 
effects of "buying" market share through price cuts, being burdened with heavy fixed 
costs, failing to produce effective innovations, betting on technological long shots, 
being too optimistic about the ability to penetrate markets, making frequent strategic 
changes, and being overpowered by more successful rivals. The possibility of 
important resource deficiencies and the inappropriate use of resources should also be 
considered. 
Once the problems have been identified, action needs to be taken on the basis of a 
plan, resulting in what is commonly referred to as a "recovery strategy". Thompson & 
Strickland (2003) suggest that this can involve any of five actions, namely, selling off 
assets (asset reduction), strategy revision, boosting revenues, cutting costs, or using a 
combination of these efforts when fast action is required' on a broad front' . 
Asset reduction is normally carried out in order to generate cash under critical cash-
flow circumstances. Thompson & Strickland (2003) assert that the choice of which 
assets to sell is often based on the disposal of non-core business assets to support the 
turnaround strategy based on the organisation's core-business. This is carried out 
through the sale of physical assets and the retrenchment of personnel, products and 
serVices. 
The revision of strategy is required when the existing strategy is inappropriate and the 
root cause of poor performance. Thompson & Strickland (2003) suggest that this may 
be carried out through the following paths, and that successful strategy revision must 
be tied to the firm's strengths, short-term competitive capabilities and directed 
towards its best market opportunities: 
• Revising the competitive approach to rebuild market position. 
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• Overhauling internal operations and functional strategies to better support the 
overall business strategy. 
• Merging with another firm m the industry and revlsmg strategy to take 
advantage of the newly merged firm's strengths, or 
• Retrenching into a reduced core of products and customers more closely 
matched to the firm's strengths. 
Should the short-term objective be to increase revenue, efforts to increase sales 
volumes may be deemed necessary. Thompson & Strickland (2003) assert that this is 
necessary when cutting expenses will probably not result in breaking even, and when 
increased utilization of capacity is seen as the key to restoring profitability. They 
suggest that methods for achieving this objective could include cutting prices, 
increasing promotion, using a larger sales force, providing added services and rapidly 
creating product improvements. 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) advise that cost-reducing turnaround strategies work 
well when the value chain and cost structure are flexible enough, when operating 
inefficiencies are easily correctable, when obvious savings can be achieved in many 
areas, and when the firm is close to break-even. They suggest that cutting costs could 
include reducing administrative overheads, the elimination of non-essential and low-
value added activities, the modernisation of plant and equipment to achieve greater 
productivity, delaying non-essential capital expenditure, and debt restructuring. 
Divestiture: 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) define a divestiture strategy as involving ' the sale of a firm 
or a major component of a firm' and comment that this is an option when 
retrenchment fails to accomplish the required turnaround or when a non-core business 
achieves an unusually high market value. However, it is necessary to find a 




This grand strategy typically involves the sale of a firm 'in parts, only occasionally as 
a whole - but for its tangible asset value and not as a going concern' (Pearce & 
Robinson, 2000). The reasoning behind such a strategy is the admission of failure and 
an attempt to minimize losses to shareholders. Pearce & Robinson (2000) suggest that 
this process should be planned and orderly in order to generate as much cash in the 
sale of assets as possible, while slowly relinquishing market share at the same time. 
Bankruptcy: 
Declaring bankruptcy as opposed to going into liquidation could essentially provide 
the organization with more time to re-organise strategic initiatives and restore the 
viability of the business. This would depend on whether or not creditors and other 
stakeholders can be convinced that this is a workable solution to the problems 
plaguing the organization. 
Corporate Combinations: 
Engelbrecht (2002), among others, suggests that relationships between organizations 
can become important growth factors. Three such combinations are joint ventures, 
strategic alliances and consortia. Pearce & Robinson (2000) advise that these 
strategies should be carefully considered by organizations operating in 'global, 
dynamic and technologically driven industries'. 
Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances/Partnerships: 
Thompson & Strickland (2003) state that 'joint ventures typically entail forming a 
new corporate entity owned by the partners, whereas strategic partnerships represent a 
collaborative arrangement that usually can be terminated whenever one of the partners 
so chooses'. Pearce & Robinson (2000) assert that strategic alliances are often 
partnerships that exist over a defined period of time, and that in such a situation, 
partners will contribute their separate skills and expertise to a co-operative project. 
45 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) suggest that such relationships between businesses may be 
appropriate when 'a necessary component for success in a particular competitive 
environment' may be lacking. The combination of the businesses may overcome this 
problem through the exploitation of synergies created by the partnership. 
Doz & Hamel (1998) suggest three situations in which a joint venture or strategic 
alliance may be used to gain access to a new business: 
• If an opportunity exists that is too complex, uneconomical or risky for a 
single organization to pursue, 
• Where a wider range of competencies and knowledge is required than that 
which a single organization can provide, and 
• Where access to a foreign market is determined by requirements regarding 
partnering a local organization. 
It is generally accepted that certain risks are involved when deciding to pursue a grand 
strategy based on organizational partnerships - conflict can arise and in addition, 
certain organizations may use the opportunity to enhance their own competencies and 
acquire new competitive skills, finally breaking away and becoming a direct 
competitor to its original partner. 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) suggest that the concept of outsourcing, or the engagement 
of sub-contractors to replace certain in-house functions, falls under the category of 
strategic alliances and may provide significant advantages. Such advantages could 
include improved business focus, access to world-class capabilities through 
specialization, accelerated re-engineering benefits, shared risks, and the release of 
company resources for other purposes. 
Consortia: 
Pearce & Robinson (2000) define consortia as 'large interlocking relationships 
between businesses of an industry ' . Such relationships may prove fruitful when 
undertaking very large projects with numerous aspects and responsibilities, where the 
co-operation of many organizations is required. 
46 
2.4. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS 
10hnson & Scholes (2000) suggest that the first step in the evaluation of strategic 
options or choices is a suitability analysis. They define suitability as 'a broad 
assessment of whether the strategy addresses the circumstances in which the 
organization is operating ', ' for example, the extent to which new strategies would fit 
with the future trends and changes in the environment; or how the strategy might 
exploit the core competencies of the organization' . 
A suitability analysis is seen to be a qualitative assessment of the rationale of the 
strategic options and can lead to the screening of these options. The analytical 
techniques explored here include a life-cycle analysis, an assessment of the 
positioning of the organisation's products/services, a value chain analysis and a 
portfolio analysis. 
2.4.1. Life-Cycle Analysis 
10hnson & Scholes (2000) state that a ' life-cycle analysis assesses whether a strategy 
is likely to be appropriate given the stage of the product life-cycle ' . This could be 
extended to include the stage of the "service" life-cycle for service oriented 
organizations. Faulkner (1998) proposes the use of the Arthur D. Little life-cycle 
matrix for this purpose. 
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'Competitive position' is used as a measure of the strength of the organization and 
this is mapped against the 'stages of industry maturity', indicating that different 
appropriate strategies exist for each stage of industry maturity. Faulkner (1998) -
advises that the matrix should be used for guidance purposes only, due to the ' very 
limited range of 'natural ' strategic thrusts ' recommended, and the fact that the rate of 
industry maturation process is not taken into account. 
10hnson & Scholes (2000) suggest that the position within the life-cycle can be 
determined through an evaluation of eight descriptors, namely ' market growth rate, 
growth potential, breadth of product' (or service) ' lines, number of competitors, 
spread of market share between these competitors, customer loyalty, entry barriers 
and technology ' . They suggest that, for example, an embryonic industry displays 
rapid growth, changes in technology, fragmented market shares and the pursuit of new 
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customers, and that agemg industries often display falling demand, the exit of a 
number of competitors and narrow product lines. 
With respect to competitive position, 10hnson & Scholes (2000) suggest that a 
"dominant" position is indeed rare in the private sector, except under monopolistic 
conditions, that "strong" organizations can follow their own strategies relatively 
unimpeded by competition, and that a "favourable" position is where no particular 
competitor stands out, but where industry leaders are relatively better placed. In 
contrast, they suggest that a "tenable" position can be maintained by specialization or 
focus and that a "weak" position is indicative of small organizations unable to exist 
independently in the long-run. 
2.4.2. Positioning 
In terms of a suitability analysis, it is important to determine the viability of present 
and future positioning based on market conditions dictating the nature and levels of 
demand. Competitive conditions will dictate whether a positioning based on low-price 
or differentiation is appropriate, depending on which option the organization can 
realistically support. Therefore, as lohnson & Scholes (2000) suggest, the 'key 
resources and competencies underpinning the strategy' must be investigated in terms 
of their potential contribution to the proposed strategy. The 'strategy clock' provided 
by 10hnson & Scholes (1993) is a good starting point. 
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Figure 2.6. The Strategy Clock: Competitive Strategy Options 
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The strategy clock essentially enables the key resources and competencies identified 
to be examined in terms of reasoning behind the particular product/service or market 
strategy being assessed. Strategies concerning cost·,reduction will be important for 
positions 2 and 3 in the strategy clock, with the creation of greater perceived added 
value being critical for positions 3, 4 and 5. 
Based on the strategy clock model, 10hnson & Scholes (2000) suggest that the 
organization's resources and competencies should be classified as either leading to 
cost-reduction or greater perceived added value (differentiation strategies), and then 
revisited to establish whether they are 'sustainable or difficult to imitate ' . In this 
manner, it can be established whether the key resources and competencies match the 
strategy under consideration and whether they will contribute to sustainable 
competitive advantage. However, 10hnson and Scholes (2000) caution that the real 
sources of competitive advantage may well be the linkages between the resources or 
activities of the organization and the ' tacit knowledge ' of the organization as opposed 
to the resources and competencies in their own right. This is important to consider in 
this form of analysis. 
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2.4.3. Value Chain Analysis 
Lynch (2000) asserts that 'the concept of value added can be used to develop the 
organisation's sustainable competitive advantage' through the 'value chain' of an 
organization and the ' value system' consisting of linkages between organizations. 
Porter (1985) proposed that two areas be examined, being the added value that each 
part of the organization contributes to the organization as a whole, and the 
contribution to the organisation's competitive advantage that each part makes. 
10hnson & Scholes (2000) suggest that a value chain analysis is a useful tool to 
establish the suitability of strategic options, noting, in addition to the contribution to 
value added and competitive advantage made by each part of the organization, that the 
configuration and linkages between value activities are just as important. Suitability is 
therefore tested on the basis of re-configuration of the value chain proposed by 
developed strategies. Any changes should improve value-added, the competitiveness 
of the organization, or both. 
The concept of 'synergy' is important to consider in a value-chain analysis. 10hnson 
& Scholes (2000) assert that synergy entails the creation of greater value for money 
by reconfiguring the linkages in the value chain, and that synergy is often used as 
justification for product or market diversification strategies. 
2.4.4. Portfolio Analysis 
Ambrosini (1998) states that 'portfolio analyses can facilitate an organisation's 
assessment of the balance of its mix of services, products or businesses' . 10hnson & 
Scholes (2000) assert that the evaluation of 'specific options for the future' can be 
carried out by plotting these options onto a matrix, thereby highlighting the long-term 
rationale of the proposed business development. In practice, many matrices designed 
for portfolio analyses are used, the most common of which is the BCG matrix or 
"Boston Box" designed by the Boston Consulting Group (Faulkner, 1998). 
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Figure 2. 7. The Boston Box 
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The Boston Box attempts to relate the market attractiveness with the internal strength 
of a particular business unit. Grant (1991) suggests that the matrix 'provides clear 
predictions as to . the pattern of profit earnings and cash flow associated with the 
different cells ', and that ' it also provides recommendations as to appropriate 
strategies: Milk the cows, invest in the stars, divest the dogs, and analyse the question 
marks to determine whether they can be grown into stars or will degenerate into 
dogs ' . 
However, Faulkner (1998) notes that market growth rate can only approximate market 
attractiveness, due to the fact that many other factors also play a role in determining 
market attractiveness. In addition, the model assumes that growth is important - this 
depends on whether the business unit examined has a strategic advantage in terms of 
the competencies and resources required for growth to lead to improved performance 
and results. Faulkner further notes that ' relative market share' is an approximation of 
company strength, with the model assuming that strength is directly related to market 
share to the exclusion of other influences. In addition, another weakness of the model 
is the fact that declining markets are not allowed for. 
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Grant (1991) further notes that the relationship between market growth, market share 
is contentious and ambiguous, and importantly, that the model's assumption that each 
business unit is entirely independent must be carefully considered. Faulkner (1998) 
also comments that, in many industries, the concept of a ' cash dog' can be found in 
situations where good profits are made under conditions of low market share and slow 
growth. It would be unwise to simply divest such businesses without careful 
consideration of their contribution. In addition, Faulkner (1998) suggests that 
opportunities may exist in specific segments or niches in slow-growth markets, and 
that well-focused organizations directing their resources towards these segments or 
niches may be very profitable. 
Despite the various shortcomings of the Boston Box, cautionary use of the model can 
provide realistic and uncomplicated insights into the rationale for a strategic approach 
towards diversity. The following approach should be taken (based on lohnson & 
Scholes, 2000): 
• It should be determined whether or not the proposed strategy will improve the 
dominance of the organization in its various markets, with the focus being on 
strategies able to move "question marks" through to "stars" and eventually to 
"cash cows". It should be noted that the "question marks" often require a high 
level of innovative capability. 
• It is important to ensure that sufficient capital (profit) is generated by "cash 
cows" to allow for the investment required in the development of "stars" and 
"question marks". This is of extreme importance when considering potentially 
lucrative opportunities requiring significant initial expenditure. 
• Should an acquisition strategy be examined, care should be taken to match 
resources and competencies with opportunities. "Question marks" and "dogs" 
may in fact be excellent targets if the organization is able to develop these 
appropriately. 
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2.5. ACCEPTABILITY ANALYSIS 
According to 10hnson & Scholes (2000), 'acceptability is concerned with the expected 
performance outcomes, such as risk or return, if a strategy is implemented'. It is 
necessary to explore these issues in order to establish whether or not the proposed 
strategies will be acceptable to management. Although many techniques are available 
for the analysis of acceptability, and due to the exclusion of financial data analysis in 
this research, only two forms of acceptability analyses are investigated, namely, a 
sensitivity analysis and an analysis of stakeholder reactions (which includes an 
investigation of the culture and leadership of the organization). 
2.5.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
10hnson & Scholes (2000) suggest that a sensitivity analysis is useful for 
' incorporating the assessment of risk during strategy evaluation', allowing ' each of 
the important assumptions underlying a particular strategy to be questioned and 
changed' . 
Essentially, the sensitivity analysis involves testing the sensitivity of predicted 
outcomes with respect to the assumptions made during strategy development. This is 
facilitated by the weighted SWOT (impact) analysis carried out as part ofthe strategic 
analysis process. 10hnson & Scholes (2000) assert that the sensitivity analysis enables 
management to understand the risks involved in a particular strategy and the degree of 
confidence that can be assigned to decision making. 
2.5.2. Analysing Stakeholder Reactions 
10hnson & Scholes (2000) recommend that the stakeholders in the organization 
should be carefully considered in terms of the degree of interest that they are likely to 
exhibit towards or against the proposed strategy, and their ability or power to assist or 
hinder the adoption of the strategy. 
Scholes (1998) asserts that 'purposes and priorities emerge from the political interplay 
between different stakeholder groups' and that ' strategic managers must both 
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understand this political context in detail and be able to develop and implement 
strategies which are politically viable as well as rational'. He suggests the use of a 
"stakeholder mapping" exercise to illustrate the level of importance of the relevant 
stakeholders. This is carried out through plotting a power-interest matrix in which the 
relevant stakeholders can be positioned. The matrix can then be used to determine 
who the 'key players' are that can potentially champion or detract from the strategy. 
A course of political action can then be decided upon. 
Figure 2.8. The Power-Interest Matrix 








Keep satisfied Key players 
Source: Scholes, 1998 
10hnson and Scholes (2000) assert that there are many situations in which the correct 
judgement of stakeholder reactions could be crucial, for example: 
• 
• 
A new strategy requiring the issue of new shares may be unacceptable to 
powerful shareholders. 
A new strategy concerning a merger with another company or trade with new 
countries may be unacceptable to unions, government or customers. 
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• A new strategy involving the removal of channels could result in a backlash. 
• A new strategy may upset the current market conditions to such an extent that 
competitors retaliate in a damaging manner, such as engaging in a price war. 
This would undermine the assumptions on which the strategy was based. 
Leadership: 
The type of leadership of the organization should also be carefully considered when 
assessing the suitability and consequent acceptability of a proposed strategy. The 
existing leader of the organization may, in fact, not be the appropriate individual for 
the position. Rothschild (1993) asserts that there is 'no leader for all seasons', 
meaning that a different type of leader is required for the different stages of the 
business life cycle. He proposes that essentially four broad categories of leader exist, 
with each one suited to the four main stages of the business life cycle. It becomes 
evident that a mismatch between leadership and the business life cycle stage could 
have disastrous consequences. 
Firstly, the "risktakers" are leaders exhibiting revolutionary business talent in 
developing and leading new businesses. Rothschild (1993) asserts that such leaders 
have 'a vision and a commitment that allow them to gamble their entire career and 
personal wealth on making their dreams a reality ' , and that such leaders are required 
when the business is in its infancy or youth - a rapid growth period. Secondly, the 
"caretakers" are leaders that take the business through the stable growth phase. 
Rothschild (1993) suggests that such leaders are required to 'nurture a more orderly, 
evolutionary growth and long-term prosperity' , adding ' structure and stability' to the 
organization. Certain leaders may become "evolutionary caretakers", that is, they are 
able to fuel new growth spurts during the maturing process, thereby renewing the 
upward trend of business growth and prosperity. 
When the business matures and eventually slows, as businesses often do, Rothschild 
(1993) asserts that a "surgeon" leader is required, someone able to ' focus on those 
parts that can survive and grow, while discarding the weak pieces that need to be 
pruned". Such a "surgeon" needs to be skilled enough to ensure that the business 
56 
survives the degree of change implemented. Finally, should it be necessary to close 
down the ageing organization during a period of irreparable decline, Rothschild 
(1993) suggests that the "undertaker" leader is required, an individual able to harvest 
the remains of the business while gracefully and compassionately assisting the final 
demise of the organization. 
The Culture of the Organisation: 
In determining the acceptability of strategies, consideration of the culture of the 
organization is important. The culture must suit the direction proposed by the strategy 
for it to be successful. Alternatively, certain aspects of the organisation' s culture may 
require adaptation or change. 
10hnson (1998) proposes that a ' cultural web ' be constructed in order to illustrate the 
important cultural aspects to be considered, and as a consequence, their ' fit ' with the 
proposed strategy. The following elements should be considered (based on 10hnson, 
1998): 
• Paradigm: The set of assumptions about the organization which is held in 
common and taken for granted. 
• Routine: The ways in which the members of the organization behave towards 
each other, in other words, "the way we do things around here". 
• Rituals: Aspects such as training programmes, promotion and assessment, 
reinforcing the routine aspects. 
• Stories: The tales told by members of the organization to each other, to 
outsiders, and new recruits, embedding the present in organizational history, 
flagging important events, personalities and mavericks. 
• Symbols: Aspects such as logos, offices, vehicles and titles, the type of 
language and terminology commonly used. 
• Control Systems: Formalised systems that focus attention and activity, based 
on control, measurement and reward systems that monitor and emphasise what 
is important. 
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• Power Structures: The aspect of powerful managerial groupings that are likely 
to be the ones most associated with core assumptions and beliefs of what is 
important. 
• Organisational Structure: The formal or informal ways III which the 
organization works, reflecting power structures and delineating important 
relationships. 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
The overwhelming existing body of evidence suggests that strategic analyses, 
strategic options development and evaluation can employ many different forms of 
analyses. A review of available literature based on the subject matter highlighted the 
important aspects to consider and provided a theoretical basis on which a model for 
the purpose of a case analysis could be constructed. 
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY: DPA SPECIALIST CONSULTING ENGINEERS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The case of DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers illustrates a number of common 
problems associated with the growth and development of a small business, and the 
various available avenues of opportunity. The case involves an initial exploration of 
the company's background and history, followed by a discussion relating to the nature 
of the business and the services it offers. To place the case in context, a discussion of 
the pressures and trends associated with the civil engineering industry is then 
presented. The main body of the case follows, and is presented in the format of a 
discussion of the activities and happenings pertaining to the organization during the 
period of 1998 to 2003 , a period characterised by dramatic change. Pertinent aspects 
of the organization are then investigated, specifically the issues surrounding 
employees and marketing. Finally, the competitive arena in which the organization is 
active is discussed. 
3.2. COMPANY BACKGROUND AND BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers is a relatively small company specialising in 
materials technology related to the civil engineering construction industry. It has, 
however, grown considerably as a practice since the amalgamation of two long-
standing corrosion consultancies in 1992, namely Eric Duligal and Associates and 
Draper Penhall and Associates. 
In 1981 , Patrick (Pat) Draper, an industrial chemist, began consulting in Natal, South 
Africa, under the name of Patrick Draper and Associates, after twenty-five years of 
experience in laboratory development, manufacturing and contracting in the coatings 
and corrosion industry. In the same year, Eric Duligal formed a practice in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, after forty years of experience in the coatings and 
corrosion industry, culminating in eleven years of specification writing for the South 
African Bureau of Standards. Derek Penhall joined Patrick Draper and Associates, 
leaving his previous position as National Technical Manager for Sika SA, and became 
a partner in 1990, forming the consultancy of Draper Penhall and Associates (DP A). 
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The initial focus of Draper Penhall and Associates was in the areas of corrosion 
protection, waterproofing, and specialist remedial work pertaining to deteriorated 
reinforced concrete structures, bringing together the skills and experience of both 
partners. The firm ' s head office was based in Pinetown, Kwa-Zulu Natal, and opened 
a Johannesburg office in the early 1990s. 
Pat Draper specialised in corrosion and coatings technology and systems development 
due to his background in industrial chemicals. He was originally one of the founding 
members of Pro-Struct and ABE, two of the largest domestic materials suppliers in 
the civil engineering industry today, and was responsible for the development of 
many materials and systems currently in use. 
Derek Penhall specialised in waterproofing technology and reinforced concrete 
remedials, leading on from his experience gained as National Technical Manager of 
Sika SA, one of the largest and most successful multi-national material suppliers in 
the civil engineering industry. While at Sika SA, Derek travelled to Switzerland, 
Germany and the UK, and gained extensive training and experience in the diverse and 
highly specialised fields of operation of the Sika group. 
Pat Draper formally retired in 1997, leaving Derek Penhall as the owner and 
managing director of the company and Shane Himison, Derek Penhall's brother-in-
law, as the financial director. He still acts as a consultant to the company from time to 
time and involves himself in product development and other projects where clients 
request his input. He is also currently involved in materials development in the 
company's laboratory. 
Other relevant long-standing employees of the company, besides some of the 
administrative staff include Lanic Devananan, Brownlee Barry and Brendon 
Jewaskiewitz. Lanic and Brownlee have both been employed by DPA for over ten 
years, with Lanic originally joining the company as a relatively inexperienced 
laboratory technician and progressing to project manager status and Brownlee joining 
the company with an architectural drafting qualification. Both Lanic Devananan and 
Brownlee Barry were effectively trained in the business by Pat Draper and Derek 
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Penhall, and are now fairly influential in the firm, able to implement most projects on 
their own, but still with a large degree of involvement on the part of the directors. 
Brendon lewaskiewitz joined the firm in 1998 with a BSc in Civil Engineering and 
was appointed as a director in 2000, after gaining some experience in the firm's 
various fields of expertise, and successfully managing a number of projects. 
3.3. PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OFFERED BY DPA 
Since inception, DPA has offered a wide range of specialist consultancy services in 
the field of civil engineering and construction. These services include concrete 
diagnostics, assessment and repair, the rehabilitation of architectural structures, 
waterproofing design, insulation systems design, steel corrosion assessment and 
protection, forensic engineering and failure analysis, contract documentation and 
management, laboratory testing and materials evaluation, and quality control and 
assurance services. On occasion, Pat Draper and Derek Penhall are appointed to legal 
teams as expert witnesses and to provide independent technical advice. Such 
appointments often involve forensic investigations into material failures. 
To illustrate the different types and the nature of the projects pursued by DPA, a few 
major projects in which the company has been involved are listed below: 
• Lining of the wave pool, coatings to the Cascades and hotel structures, and 
waterproofing at the Lost City (the first successful major epoxy based coating 
applied to a dynamic reservoir in South Africa). 
• Specialist below ground and water table waterproofing at the International 
Conference Centre, Durban (the first of its kind to be used in Africa and the 
largest of its kind internationally at that time). 
• Specialist waterproofing application to the suspended swimming pool at the 
Hilton Hotel, Durban (involving an elastomeric bonded waterproofing lining 
incorporating directly bonded ceramic tiles). 
• Advanced waterproofing system to a 35m deep water tower at the Huletts 
Aluminium Rolling Mill, Pietermaritzburg (the deepest water retaining 
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structure lined with a fully bonded elastomeric crack-bridging lining in South 
Africa) . 
• Coatings and corrosion consulting to the Burj Al Arab Hotel in Dubai for 
Murray and Roberts International. 
• Design and project management of fast track waterproofing and paving of 42 
OOOm2 parking deck at Eastgate Shopping Centre, Johannesburg. 
• Design and project management of waterproofing of 45 OOOm2 parking deck at 
Sandton City Shopping Centre, Johannesburg. 
• Design and project management of innovative and robust insulation and vapour 
barrier system to cold pressure vessels at Richards Bay Bulk Storage, Richards 
Bay. 
• Concrete diagnostic survey by abseil of 130m high operational chimney stack 
and subsequent rehabilitation and protection thereof at Lonhro Platinum Mine, 
Rustenburg. 
• Concrete diagnostic survey of external concrete windshield of operational 
300m high chimney stack and subsequent rehabilitation and protection thereof 
at Sasol Synthetic Fuels, Secunda (the tallest structure in the southern 
hemisphere). 
• Concrete diagnostic survey and waterproofing investigation of 16 unit 40m 
high Silo complex, Port Louis, Mauritius undertaken by abseil techniques. The 
report was used successfully as legal document. 
• Concrete diagnosis, rehabilitation and protection of a highly sulphate 
contaminated concrete chemical plant for DOW chemicals, Sasolburg. This 
included complete removal and replacement of structural columns and beams 
whilst maintaining full operation of the facility. 
• Concrete investigation and diagnosis of a 2,5 km sea bridge to Portuguese 
Island, Mozambique for the World Bank. 
The nature of these projects indicates that DPA is a specialist, technology driven firm, 
focusing on ' specialist solutions ' to engineering problems. 
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DP A serves a wide range of clientele, including national and local government 
departments, property managing agents, developers, industrial plants, chemical plants, 
large contractors, and even private individuals, depending on the size and nature of 
the project. Practically, any person or organization with a need for the specialist 
services provided by DPA is viewed as a potential client. 
DP A has a definite advantage in its array of specialised instruments and proprietary 
techniques. Since DPA' s inception, Derek Penhall has ensured that the procurement 
and development of specialised equipment has been of paramount importance. This is 
due to the fact that the forensic nature of detailed concrete investigations and the 
optimisation of remedial designs often requires in-depth data analysis. As a result, 
state of the art equipment and computer software are necessary tools. Most of the 
equipment and software in use by DP A, especially in the field of concrete diagnostics, 
was developed by DPA in-house, or in conjunction with the relevant suppliers, 
specifically to D P A' s requirements. This was made possible through a thorough 
understanding of the workings of the required equipment (mostly electronics based), 
almost entirely on the part of Derek Penhall. In addition, over the years, Derek has 
sought out new technology overseas, keeping in contact with and visiting key people 
in the UK and the middle-east. 
F or example, detailed concrete diagnostic investigations often require the capturing of 
thousands of scanned data units. DPA has the necessary data-logging equipment 
enabling the rapid and efficient capture of such data, which can then be downloaded 
onto DPA's computer systems for processing. The data can then be manipulated, 
resulting in in-depth statistical analyses and the development of a meaningful 
computer model. As a result, investigations and assessments can be refined to high 
levels of accuracy, thereby enabling effective remedial decision making and 
budgeting. 
In addition, most of the laboratory testing pertaining to specialist investigations is 
carried out in the company' s laboratory. However, the laboratory at present is not 
fully equipped in terms of compliance with the required conditions of constant, 
regulated temperature and humidity. This would require the installation of expensive 
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environmental control systems. In addition, most of the laboratory equipment is old, 
often requiring costly maintenance or repair. 
The company's management believes that the services offered, although diverse, often 
complement each other through various combinations. For example, an insulation 
design may require the additional design of a corrosion protection system and a 
quality assurance programme. However, some staff members have expressed 
concerns with respect to the apparent lack of focus on any particular field of expertise, 
and the degree to which this lack of focus mayor may not be impacting on the 
company' s success. The situation appears to have been exacerbated by the directors ' 
decision to diversify into and concentrate on specialist contracting activities, thereby 
spreading key company personnel even thinner, and resulting in a significant decline 
in consulting revenues. This has especially been the case over the period of 2001 to 
2003 , with the main specialist contracting focus being on waterproofing and concrete 
remedial work. 
Derek Penhall's philosophy with respect to the company' s 'product' lies in an intense 
commitment to provide the deliverables to the client on time and at a high level of 
quality. Company employees are often put under pressure to 'get the job done on 
time' which often results in overall client satisfaction and pride in the company's 
work. This is seen as the key to client retention and repeat business - a formula which 
has worked well on many occasions. In addition, Derek Penhall has always impressed 
upon staff the importance of delivering ' value-added' services, or something extra 
that the client is not expecting and will add value to the overall service provided. 
Unfortunately, with staff members being thinly spread and due to mounting 
commitments at times, this philosophy has become distorted and has often lead to 
extreme situations of over-commitment and under-delivery. In an industry where 
reputation and track-record forms the basis for marketing efforts, such a stigma has, in 
the opinion of various staff members and management, unfortunately resulted in a 
large, unquantifiable amount of lost business and clientele. On occasion, some 
relatively important clients have voiced their dissatisfaction to employees directly, 
thereby creating an impression among employees that a tainted image of DP A has 
been generally created throughout the industry. 
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DP A's recent diversification into specialist contracting is explored in further detail 
below, as this strategic move was seen to be an integral part of the changes 
experienced between 1998 and 2003 and the future strategy of the organisation. 
However, to place the case in context, it is first necessary to explore the relevant 
current pressures and trends in the civil engineering industry as a whole. 
3.4. THE CIVIL ENGINEERING INDUSTRY - PRESSURES AND TRENDS 
It is a widely known fact that the levels of competition in the civil engmeenng 
consulting and contracting industry have constantly risen over at least the last decade, 
the main causes of which have been adverse economic circumstances and cyclical 
reductions in spending in this area. The situation where consultants rarely competed 
on the basis of price has now become commonplace, especially when private sector 
work is competed for, with clients attempting to stretch their budgets as far as 
possible. In addition, the larger public sector projects are becoming more competitive, 
with consultants now having to tender for work. Many observers believe that, as a 
result, clients and engineers are tending to sacrifice quality for price, causing long 
term damage to the industry - borne out by the apparent increase in engineering 
failures occurring. 
"Black economic empowerment" or "BEE" is also rapidly becoming a serious issue in 
the civil engineering industry. Whereas previously non-black owned consultancies 
and contracting organizations were able to operate freely, the situation has changed 
dramatically. Almost all national government and local government work requires 
BEE compliance, with points systems often being applied to tenders, severely 
penalizing those not in compliance. At present, BEE compliance entails at least 25,1 % 
ownership of the organization by "previously disadvantaged individuals", whereas a 
"black owned enterprise" entails at least 50,1% ownership. Various other 
classifications exist, such as a "black women owned organization". Depending on the 
particular requirements applied to a specific contract, often at least BEE compliance is 
necessary. Recently, the procurement policies of many larger private sector 
organizations have been amended to include BEE compliance requirements. 
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Many consulting and contracting organizations in the industry have reacted positively 
to BEE requirements, either forming new black empowered companies or forming 
strategic alliances or joint ventures with black empowerment partners. However, this 
has proved very difficult for the smaller businesses, due to the lack of suitable 
available partners. As a result, many businesses have also decided to seek work 
elsewhere, mostly outside South Africa's borders. Alternatively, some businesses 
have closed, with the owners emigrating to countries such as the UK or Australia. In 
addition, some companies previously exercising empowerment policies at their own 
free will have been severely disadvantaged as a result of skilled, trained employees 
leaving to set up their own practices. 
Recently, BEE has been under the spotlight, with government committing itself to the 
promulgation of suitable legislation, enforcing certain guidelines currently in place. In 
addition, a "scorecard approach" is intended, with the focus not only on ownership, 
but also on 'management, employment equity, skills development, procurement, 
corporate social responsibility, investment and enterprise formation' (Extracts from 
President Mbeki' s State of the Nation address, 2003). This is due to the many 
loopholes having been exploited by various organizations. For example, some smaller 
contractors have been known to literally set up businesses, registering their domestic 
workers or gardeners as shareholders, and carrying on as if it was business as usual. 
In general, however, certain trends have become apparent, resulting in a positive 
outlook in some areas. The Management Information Survey undertaken by the South 
African Association of Consulting Engineers (SAACE) during the last six months of 
2002 yielded some interesting results (Consulting engineering industry more upbeat, 
Building, July 2003). Graham Pirie, the SAACE executive director, asserts that the 
'business mood' indicator (calculated upon pre-determined guidelines) is expected to 
remain above 90% for the next twelve to eighteen months, 'signalling an overall 
improvement in conditions'. Other findings of the survey were as follows : 
• Annual turnover for the civil consulting industry is approximately R 4,5 
billion, with the civil contracting industry roughly on par, after lagging behind 
for a few years. 
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• Despite negative expectations, fee income increased in real terms. Compared 
with the last six months of 2001, nominal fee income rose by 16,6% or by 
3,2% after inflation adjustments. 
• The government is playing a larger role in fee income earned by the consulting 
industry, with government funding comprising just over 62% of earnings, 
compared with an average of 56% in 2000. This is attributed to the 
governments continuing commitment to infrastructure investment in areas 
such as ' housing and municipal infrastructure, hospitals and clinics, schools, 
roads, water, electricity and government facilities' . This highlights the 
importance of BEE policies within service provider firms. 
• The private sector, making up the remaining 37,7% of fee income, showed a 
decrease in value of 1,45%. This is attributed to prevailing high interest rates, 
negatively influencing investment spending. 
• Total fee income earned outside South Africa' s borders is growing and is 
estimated at over R 1,3 billion per annum. 
• Mainly concentrated in African countries, average foreign earnmgs as a 
percentage of total fee income rose from 6% in 1998 to 15,2% for 2002. 
• Non-payment or the delayed payment of fees is a problem, with 21 % of fee 
income earned from foreign clients outstanding for over 90 days. 
• Despite a ' severe shortage' of black engineers, the employment of black 
partners or directors rose by 41 % in 2002, with black staff at all levels 
accounting for 25% of total employment. 
• Less than 5% of professional engineers are black. 
• The civils consulting sector is operating at almost full capacity, and a skills 
shortage is impacting on the desired employment levels. This is contributing to 
the difficulty experienced in employing appropriately trained personnel. 
For the civils consulting industry, SAACE has measured the market shares between 
provinces in South Africa and the African and international markets, represented on 
the following chart. 
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Figure 3.1. Provincial Market Share 
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The issue of consulting fee levels has been a highly debated topic in recent years. It is 
commonly known that engineers have "undersold" themselves for years, willing to 
accept the risk involved in engineering projects and being paid poorly in return. The 
engineering fraternity is constantly under the impression that a severe shortage of 
engineers exists, and yet, they still keep cutting their fee income. Fees can be 
calculated on the basis of established fee scales issued by the Engineering Council of 
South Africa (ECSA), but more often than not, large discounts are provided either by 
choice or client pressure. The general opinion in the industry is that civil engineering 
consultants are poorly paid in relation to other professionals in other disciplines, such 
as attorneys. 
The South African Association of Consulting Engineers (SAACE) is an association to 
which various consulting firms can belong, the objective being that the Association 
will protect their interests, one of them being to assist in maintaining fees at 
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acceptable levels. The Association regularly publishes an updated "Form of 
Agreement" which can be used as the basis for engineering appointments, and 
coupled to this are fee scales, to which member organizations are expected to adhere. 
The fee scales issued by SAACE are similar to those issued by ECSA, but are 
specifically for the use of Association members. It is relevant to note that the 
Competition Board of South Africa has recently intervened, condemning the SAACE 
fee scales and policies as a form of price fixing . Following legal advice, SAACE has 
subsequently issued an advisory notice to member firms to the effect that the latest 
form of agreement and fee scales will not be published, referring members to the 
ECSA fee scales. As ECSA is a statutory body, these recommended fee scales are 
deemed to be acceptable at present. However, the result of this action is that SAACE, 
often seen to be a 'toothless' organization, has been dealt a significant blow. 
A further unfortunate and significant problem often encountered in the civil 
engineering industry is that of corruption. This is not only limited to public sector 
organizations but is rife in the private sector as well. DP A has had many opportunities 
snuffed out, possibly due to suspected underhanded activity - in many instances, the 
outcomes of various situations could only be explained through such suspected 
activity. Unfortunately, not much can really be done under such circumstances. 
3.5. DPA FROM 1998 TO 2003 - A RAPIDLY CHANGING ORGANISATION 
Derek Penhall employed Shane Harrison in February 1998, realising that competent 
financial management of the company was lacking. Historically, the financial affairs 
of the company were jointly managed by Patrick Draper and Derek Penhall, often 
resulting in difficult financial circumstances, due to their lack of experience and 
expertise in financial management matters. Derek had also been known to be an 
extravagant spender, both in the business and in his personal capacity. Shane 
Harrison' s qualification as a chartered accountant and his background of running 
various small businesses, together with the family connection, effectively meant that, 
at the time, he was an ideal candidate for the position of financial director. Shane 
Harrison immediately set about reforming the financial well-being of the company 
and developed various financial and administrative systems which were previously 
lacking. He also cut back severely on unnecessary costs over a short period of time -
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an aspect of business he is still good at today. In the mean-time, Derek Penhall 
concentrated most of his efforts on marketing and projects in Durban, Richards Bay 
and Johannesburg. 
At the time that Shane Harrison joined DPA, the Johannesburg office was an integral 
part of DPA, headed up by Wynand Louw, a partner in the business. Various 
technicians and quantity surveyors were employed through the Johannesburg office, 
and Johannesburg based projects were handled by the team, with Derek Penhall 
keeping track of the business on an ongoing basis and providing his marketing 
capabilities to both the head office in Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Johannesburg 
operation. 
At the age of twenty-two, Brendon Jewaskiewitz joined the company at head office in 
November 1998, following the completion of his studies as a civil engineer and a stint 
of ten months at the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. He was involved in 
various projects and spent time on site as a resident engineer, gaining technical 
experience related to the company's areas of specialization. He was appointed to the 
board of directors in November 2000. 
Over the years of 2000 to 2003, DPA Specialist Consulting Engineers experienced 
fluctuating cycles of business activity and income. The company was often in a cash-
flow crisis, with the payment of salaries being delayed in some months, especially 
when a few large clients did not pay their accounts on time and when the company 
was dependent on a few large projects as opposed to many smaller ones. An extreme 
crisis was experienced in December 2000, when a large client terminated the 
company' s services with approximately RI ,5 million in fees still outstanding. The 
company had effectively worked solidly on the project concerned (the Phase I 
waterproofing for the Melrose Arch development), with the majority of its resources 
including staff involved, for about four months. With no sign of payment, the 
financial strain was immense. However, the company endured, and through exposure 
to personal financial risk, Derek Penhall managed to get the company back on track. 
The effects of the shock, however, were felt long afterwards, with staff salaries and 
bonuses being negatively affected for the next two years. 
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The Johannesburg office was closed in 2001, following intense debate on the matter 
between Derek, Shane and Brendon. Shane, basing his judgement on the financial 
data, and the fact that no-one resident in Johannesburg was willing or capable to go all 
out to ensure success in terms of maintaining turnover and securing new clients and 
projects, was adamant that the office should be closed down, and Brendon was in 
agreement. The operation had incurred successive losses, year on year for the past 
five years and was taking its toll on the overall health of the company. Wynand Louw 
had left under a cloud in 1999 as a result of his and the operation' s poor performance 
(and carefully calculated internal politics designed to remove him) and had set.up his 
own small consulting business in competition with DP A. Derek Penhall had assumed 
the management of the Johannesburg office, and as a consequence, spent his time 
travelling between the Durban and Johannesburg offices for approximately two years. 
During this period, many staff members came and went, and no suitable candidate for 
the management of the Johannesburg operation was found . In the end, it was felt that 
the cost of keeping a fully functioning "office" open was unjustified, as most projects 
were already being handled by essentially Durban staff and management who were 
travelling to Johannesburg regularly . It was decided that only Brownlee Barry would 
remain in Johannesburg and work from home, effectively ensuring that someone 
would at least be based in the region and would be able to act under instruction from 
Durban. Further, it was decided that involvement in Johannesburg would be limited to 
project specific opportunities and that such opportunities would continue to be 
serviced from Durban. 
Around the same period, the directors took the decision to diversify into specialist 
contracting. The reasoning was that DP A had the expertise and skills necessary to 
implement specialist contracts, and that many clients were requiring a full-service 
approach, from design to construction. In addition, it was perceived that the 
contractors involved on projects where DP A were the appointed consultants were 
making good profits while DPA effectively ' trained' them and earned substantially 
less. As a result, DP A Projects was incorporated and commenced trading in tandem 
with DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers, headed up by the same directors. Derek 
Penhall remained the sole shareholder of DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers, and 
shared the ownership of DP A Projects 50/50 with Shane Harrison. 
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The intention was for the two businesses to benefit each other, with DPA Specialist 
Consulting Engineers providing the technical expertise and market experience to the 
projects undertaken by DPA Projects, in addition to an injection of start-up capital. 
The intention was to provide clients with the assurance that all projects would receive 
the necessary degree of technical expertise and attention to detail and the quality 
standards associated with DPA' s standing in the industry. It was decided that Shane 
Harrison, who had become frustrated with the mundane activities of managing the 
company's finances and the lack of incoming work, would be the managing director 
of DP A Projects, with Derek Penhall remaining as managing director of DP A 
Specialist Consulting Engineers. 
Initially, the contracts undertaken by DPA Projects were mainly based on a project 
management approach, with DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers carrying out 
quantity surveying, design and engineering functions, DPA Projects carrying out 
project management functions and other sub-contractors carrying out the physical 
contract works under the guidance of DPA Projects. Alternatively, DPA Projects 
would implement the work itself. Such turnkey projects were extremely successful 
and lucrative, and are often considered to be the "saving grace" of DP A during a time 
of extreme financial adversity. 
For all intents and purposes, the personnel involved in DPA Specialist Consulting 
Engineers and DP A Projects were the same - the companies only differed on paper 
and in terms of the services covered under the respective appointments. The client 
effectively still saw DPA as one party, responsible for the project from beginning to 
end. This created problems of its own, with anonymous complainants forcing the 
South African Association of Consulting Engineers (SAACE) to request that the DP A 
Projects name be changed, in order to remove the association with the name DP A 
Specialist Consulting Engineers. Technically speaking, membership of SAACE 
entails adherence to a set of ethical guidelines, and in the engineering industry, 
consultants are not supposed to have any interests in contracting activities, as this is 
seen as creating a conflict of interests. The directors managed to convince SAACE 
that the activities of the two companies are indeed completely separate, and that 
situations where a conflict of interests may arise would be avoided. On this basis, 
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SAACE agreed to a name change as opposed to closure of DP A Projects or the 
resignation of DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers from the association. 
It was decided to re-name the contracting company eThekwini Civils, presenting a 
complete departure from the originally positive marketing association that existed 
between the previous name and the consulting firm's name. In addition, the new name 
was meant to represent the company' s commitment to black empowerment, a loose 
plan that was meant to enhance the company' s ability to secure government work. 
Brendon lewaskiewitz disagreed with the name change for the sake of SAACE 
membership on the basis that he did not believe that SAACE membership was that 
important. The most SAACE could do was revoke the company's membership of the 
Association, having no effect on projects pursued by DP A. Along these lines, SAACE 
is often seen as being 'without teeth' as there are numerous unethical dealings in the 
industry that they seem unable to deal with, especially due to the fact that SAACE 
board members are industry leaders themselves, also with various interests and 
political agendas. In any event, the name was changed and business was carried out 
just as it was before, barring the use of the original company name. In the early 
months of 2003 , the directors decided to revert to the DPA Projects name, primarily 
for the reason of maintaining recognition of the DP A name and market understanding 
and associations. To date, SAACE has not made any further comments. The directors 
are also currently considering resignation from the association. 
Prior to the name change debacle, under the leadership of Shane Harrison, DP A 
Projects tendered for a R40 million contract in Port Elizabeth, for the repair and 
rehabilitation of bridges. The client was the South African National Roads Agency. 
This represented a different approach to that which DPA Projects had originally 
employed, in that the company was now tendering for work alongside the 
conventional, established contractors in the industry. This had major ramifications. 
Some of the existing competitors were not at all happy with the entry of a new 
competitor. They were also wary of the fact that it was widely known that DP A 
possessed superior technical capabilities, providing them with a competitive edge 
based on differentiating characteristics, including the reputation for superior quality. 
However, many competitors and other onlookers in the industry did not view DP A 
Projects as a serious competitor and threat in the contracting business. 
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DP A submitted the lowest tender price overall - the other competitors who had 
conventionally had an oligopolistic grip on the industry had expected DP A to pull out 
_ they submitted extremely high prices within a fairly narrow margin of each other. 
Unfortunately, this only heightened the client' s concerns with respect to DPA's ability 
to complete the project within the time constraints and to an acceptable standard of 
quality. The result was that from January to July 2002, the company was interrogated 
with queries and audits undertaken by the client, amongst obvious political jockeying 
by disgruntled competitors. In the end, the contract was not awarded, and the client 
signalled his intention to split the contract into two portions, with the first to be 
opened for tender in November 2002. During the waiting period, however, DPA had 
taken its eye off the ball in terms of active marketing, and the level of work had 
declined drastically. It was estimated that DP A had effectively lost over R 1 million in 
reserves during the first six months of 2002, thereby negating all growth prospects 
achieved towards the end of 2001 , following the simultaneous completion of three 
very successful and very profitable turnkey projects. 
During the period of decline, some employees became disillusioned and resigned, 
depleting the company's complement of technical staff to the lowest levels ever 
experienced. Staff morale was at a low ebb - it seemed that all the effort that had gone 
into re-building the firm after the events of December 2000 had come to nought. 
Although there were a few projects continuously providing income, company 
revenues were down drastically and new projects were required to revitalize the firm. 
When the first revised bridge repair and rehabilitation contract was put out to tender 
in September 2002, Shane Harrison submitted DPA Project's tender as planned. 
Again DPA's price was the lowest at around R 15 million, compared to the next 
lowest price of approximately R 17 million. The other competitors' prices had been 
reduced drastically and were considered by the client to be more in line with what 
they should have been. DP A Projects were eventually awarded the 18 month contract 
in November 2002. Unfortunately, this came at a price - the award stipulated that 
Derek Penhall would have to be present on site on a full-time basis throughout the 
contract - effectively removing him from marketing and as technical head of the 
organization. 
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The Burman Road bridge rehabilitation project was in full swing by mid-January 
2003. This was a time of extreme stress, requiring careful management to ensure the 
proper coordination and execution of the works. The establishment of the site and all 
associated resource requirements, including labour was handled between Derek and 
Shane, with reasonably competent site supervision being performed by Lanic 
Devananan and Deloshnan Naidoo (a draftsmanlsite supervisor), both of whom had 
been with the company for over ten and five years respectively. Shane relocated to 
Port Elizabeth permanently, with Derek commuting to Durban for a weekend on an 
average of once every two to three weeks. Brendon Jewaskiewitz effectively remained 
in Durban, responsible for Durban and Johannesburg based projects overall. 
It is relevant to note that the BEE requirements of the contract were satisfied through 
an internal arrangement whereby DPA created a black owned company, "LDN 
Specialist Waterproofing and Concrete Repair", under the ownership of company 
employees Lanic Devananan and Deloshnan Naidoo. Therefore, for the purposes of 
the contract, LDN were officially sub-contracted to DP A Projects for a portion of the 
works. 
In June 2003 , Lanic Devananan officially resigned from LDN (but not from DPA), 
stating his dissatisfaction with the manner in which the relationship between DP A and 
LDN was being handled. The main problem, as far as Lanic was concerned, was a 
lack of transparency as far as financial handling was concerned, and the resultant 
unknown risk to which he was being exposed. Deloshnan technically then took over 
LDN on his own, and subsequently resigned from DP A shortly afterwards for similar 
reasons, effectively leaving DPA without a black owned "partner" business. Life on 
site was being made very difficult by what the firm perceived to be an umeasonable 
and inexperienced resident engineer, a common factor in many specialist contracting 
projects. This contributed to the general despondency and crisis at the time, requiring 
Derek Penhall to become even more involved to ensure that the DPA's contractual 
position was not compromised. 
Both Lanic and Deloshnan, inexperienced in commercial and financial matters, stated 
that the main problem was a lack of suitable communication from Shane and Derek 
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regarding the "proper workings" of LDN. A feeling of mistrust had developed, with 
Lanic and Deloshnan having become very uncomfortable under the circumstances of 
such a large commitment proceeding at a rapid rate. In addition, they cited the 
autocratic tendencies of Shane and especially Derek as being problematic. For 
example, whereas Deloshnan was devoutly religious and family oriented, needing to 
travel home for short periods on occasion, he claims that he was often blankly turned 
down and instructed to remain in Port Elizabeth. The arrangement was for Durban 
based personnel to travel home for a long-weekend roughly every three weeks, but 
often disagreement with respect to the timing and coordination of these trips took 
place. In any event, shortly after Deloshnan resigned, Lanic returned to Durban to 
handle a few other projects and has not been back to Port Elizabeth since. He has 
since stated that he never had a problem with the LDN concept, and in fact agrees 
with it wholeheartedly in principle, but that he had a problem with the way in which it 
was handled by Derek, and Shane in particular. 
Derek subsequently took on more and more of the overall management of the 
contract, getting involved in almost everything, from equipment maintenance, to 
getting vehicles serviced, to programming, scheduling and the implementation of the 
works. Frequently, Derek and Shane were at loggerheads over certain issues, with 
Shane eventually deciding to relinquish authority over almost all but the financial 
aspects of the contract. Shane would complain that Derek interfered with almost 
everything, overriding decisions made by others and generally creating chaos and 
affecting morale. Derek, on the other hand, would complain that Shane was not 
handling his responsibilities effectively. For example, upon the employment of new 
site staff to replace Lanic and Deloshnan, Derek spent an entire weekend drafting a 
new contract of employment, as the old one was outdated and Shane had neglected to 
finalise the matter. As a result of taking everything on, Derek has, for all purposes, 
effectively been removed from the rest of the organization and works over sixteen 
hours a day. Fortunately, Derek was able to employ a reasonable site foreman based 
in Port Elizabeth, but had to train him from scratch due a lack of specialist experience. 
By July 2003 , it appeared as though DPA were finally "getting on top" of the 
contract, with a significant quantity of work completed, and the work teams 
functioning well for the most part. However, with Shane having turned over more 
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responsibility to Derek, Derek remained tied up in Port Elizabeth. Shane has since 
voiced his intentions to remain with the company for as long as a significant project, 
such as the Burman Road project, is available and can accommodate him, and has 
confirmed that he does not feel that he has any further contribution to make to the 
consulting side of the business. 
Derek has since recognised the need for an effective company strategy, due to the 
apparent availability of opportunities, but the company's seeming inability to 
capitalize on them. He has admitted that the status quo is unacceptable, and also to the 
fact that he has not even carefully reviewed the company's financial statements for 
the last two years. He has stated his desire to begin distributing shares in the business 
to Brendon and Lanic, and to appoint Lanic to the board of directors. Shane has 
effectively removed himself from the decision making forum on such issues, leaving 
Derek, Brendon and Lanic to finalise matters. 
3.6. COMPANY EMPLOYEES 
Personnel issues have constantly been at the heart of DPA' s success or failure at 
various points in time during the company's existence. Unfortunately, this area is 
probably one of the worst in terms of strategic planning and strategy implementation, 
mostly due to the fact that insufficient attention is paid to addressing pressing matters 
concerning personnel. 
When Shane Harrison joined Derek Penhall in the management of the business in 
1998, it was decided that all personnel issues be removed from Derek and handled by 
Shane. It seemed that this was an appropriate move, considering the fact that Shane 
would be handling the company' s financial affairs, including remuneration packages 
and contracts of employment. Unfortunately, by Shane Harrison' s own admission, he 
is not a 'people's person' and he did not like being responsible for hard issues such as 
discipline. That is not to say that he was unsuccessful in this role. What had to be 
done was done, including handling an occasional warning to setting up legal 
documentation relating to employment contracts and other similar matters. However, 
Shane became someone to avoid, as often happens to many management personnel 
responsible for such matters. In addition, what made matters worse, is that Derek was 
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seen as a soft target for employees with problems that needed to be discussed. Derek 
often took it upon himself to meet with disgruntled employees, occasionally spending 
hours in discussion. The results were often undesirable, with Derek often not having 
the heart to turn down requests that Shane otherwise would have. In addition, it often 
transpired that Derek had made various unreasonable promises to employees that 
were not or could not have been delivered. This was probably done as an attempt to 
motivate employees, but often ended in disaster when disillusionment crept in and 
poisoned various internal relationships. 
Over a period of five years, between 1998 and 2003 , twenty-eight employees resigned 
from DP A. Of these, a total of twenty-five had been employed by DP A for less than 
four years, nineteen for less than three years, and no less than fifteen for less than two 
years. Although there were a few that were dismissed or left for other reasons, many 
left the company under a cloud, citing their inability to "work with Derek" or 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which they had been dealt with as employees of the 
company. As a result, these former employees have assisted in spreading negative 
sentiment towards DPA throughout the industry, as they move on to other competing 
firms in some instances. On many occasions, such as at functions and presentations, 
DP A staff have in fact been cynically questioned by various people as to the reasons 
behind the company' s high staff turnover rate. Many clients have also expressed a 
feeling of uneasiness on occasion, especially where the high turnover rate impacts 
directly on specific projects, disrupting the continuity of operations. 
At present, excluding the Port Elizabeth operation, the staff complement of DP A is at 
one of its lowest levels ever. Besides the three directors, only Brownlee Barry and 
Lanic Devananan provide significant input to the company's operations in terms of 
technical proficiency and project management. With Brownlee Barry being the only 
employee based in Gauteng and Lanic Devananan and Brendon lewaskiewitz based in 
Durban, the once busy and vibrant Durban head-office is almost empty, with Shane 
Harrison and Derek Penhall spending almost all of their time on site in Port Elizabeth. 
Other staff resident in the Durban office include the laboratory technician, the 
company bookkeeper, and three secretaries (currently on rotation between Durban and 
Port Elizabeth for the duration of the Burman Road contract). Deloshnan Naidoo, an 
experienced CAD (Computer Aided Design) draftsman and site assistant, recently left 
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the organization to take up a drafting post at a local structural consulting firm, leaving 
the firm without a suitable replacement. The current situation is considered by many 
staff members to typify the problematic approach whereby DP A relentlessly pursues, 
is awarded, and focuses on a large project, devoting almost all its resources to that 
project, thereby foregoing other opportunities that could sustain the firm ' s turnover in 
years to come. 
3.7. COMPANY MARKETING 
Since the inception of DPA, Derek Penhall has recognised that effective marketing is 
crucial to the success of the business, and in the past has been instrumental in 
marketing the company to a wide range of clients, including private to public sector 
clients of different sizes. 
The marketing initiatives undertaken by Derek have essentially included "keeping an 
ear to the ground" or networking, direct calling on potential clients, and keeping in 
touch with existing clients. Historically, consultants were legally unable to advertise 
their services, but are now at liberty to do so. To date, DPA has not advertised at all, 
but is considering doing so in various magazines distributed to the industry. 
To a certain degree, both Brendon and Lanic contribute to marketing activities, 
depending on the nature of the client or potential project concerned. Brownlee Barry 
does his best in Johannesburg, but really is not considered to be an effective marketer. 
It has been recognised that, at this stage, Derek is by far the best marketer in the firm 
due to his enthusiasm and technical know-how, being able to convince clients of the 
company' s expertise and capabilities. This is crucial in an old-fashioned industry that 
associates age with competence. 
The fact that Derek is presently engaged in Port Elizabeth is especially problematic. 
Due to his commitment to the contract, he is not able to review proposals or follow up 
on leads for new work, often resulting in frustrated clients abandoning DP A. In 
accordance with Derek' s "do all" philosophy, he often holds on to such information 
instead of passing it to Brendon in Durban for rapid follow up and action. By the 
same token, this philosophy also results in some ludicrous situations, for example, an 
79 
important proposal not being done due to Derek spending the weekend servlcmg 
equipment on site. Various attempts have been made to formalize a marketing system 
and database of clients and projects, but these have had limited success so far. 
3.8. COMPETITORS AND COMPETITION 
DPA faces a number of competitors in both the consulting and contracting fields of 
business the company is active in. However, due to the specialist and diverse nature of 
the company, very few competitors, if any, offer the same range of services or 
combination of services as DP A. Rather, DP A often faces different competitors in the 
consulting fields of concrete diagnostics and repair, structural rehabilitation, forensics, 
waterproofing, laboratory testing, and corrosion protection. A similar situation exists 
in the contracting industry, with different contractors often targeting specific types of 
projects. The more notable competitors are discussed below. 
3.8.1. Competition in the Consulting Field 
DPA' s competitors in the consulting field have tended to be small specialist firms 
with interests in similar markets, mostly in the area of concrete and structural 
investigations and remedials. 
Structural Diagnostics is a relatively mmor competitor of DP A, essentially 
comprising a "one man band", run by Garth Gamble, a professional technician. The 
company essentially offers specialist consulting services relating to structural 
integrity, testing and diagnostic investigations. Garth Gamble has had many years of 
experience in the industry and is well known. His basis for success is often the 
relationships he has formed with suppliers, clients and other consulting engineers over 
time. For example, when BKS (a well known large civil consulting company) requires 
these specialist services, Structural Diagnostics is called upon, purely due to the good 
working relationship enjoyed over the years. In addition, the company' s overheads are 
extremely low, enabling them to compete on the basis of low-price. Although Garth 
Gamble is experienced and understands the basic technology involved, he does not 
possess specialised equipment and even prefers to plot his drawings and graphs by 
hand, admitting that he prefers not to use computer technology. He often succeeds in 
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convincing clients that a comprehensive approach to an investigation is not required, 
probably based on the fact that he does not have the necessary capabilities and clients 
prefer cheaper alternatives, irrespective of deficiencies. 
Bell and Associates was formed by Rob Bell, an engineering technician and previous 
employee of DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers. Rob Bell left DP A in 1997 after a 
major faH-out with Derek Penhall. As this occurred prior to DPA instituting an 
employment contract containing certain prohibitions, Rob Bell immediately set up his 
own company, specialising mainly in concrete diagnostics and repair, based on DPA's 
technology. Be has subsequently dabbled in other areas of DPA's expertise, including 
waterproofing and forensic investigations. Bell and Associates is particularly 
problematic for DPA in the market place, due to Rob Bell' s apparent personal 
vendetta against Derek Penhall, resulting in continuous assaults on DPA's image and 
reputation in the industry. In addition, in 2001 , Rob Bell succeeded in poaching 
Michel de Rauville from DP A, a skilled technician in the implementation of concrete 
diagnostic investigations. Bell and Associates also enjoy good relationships with 
certain clients such as Mondi, and Kynochem, previous clients of DP A. Rob Bell has 
also gained a degree of credibility in the industry, recently becoming chairman of the 
Durban division of the Concrete Society of Southern Africa. 
Wynand Louw & Associates was founded by Wynand Louw after he left DPA's 
Johannesburg office and his position as Partner. Be had a solid background in 
concrete technology, having previotisly completed a Master of Science degree in this 
field. Wynand Louw & Associates is essentially Johannesburg based and mainly 
focuses on concrete diagnostics and remedials, occasionally competing with DP A in 
this area of business. Being another "one-man band", Wynand Louw does not have 
the specialist equipment and technology of DP A, but also has much lower overhead 
costs and enjoys good relationships with certain clients. 
Contest is a specialist company focusing on concrete technology. The firm is run by 
Bruce Raath and Jim Borton, two very well known and respected experts in the 
industry. Bruce Raath has a very high profile and good reputation in the industry, 
often lecturing or presenting at seminars and writing articles for various publications. 
The firm 's main line of business involves specification writing and laboratory testing, 
81 
with diagnostic investigations and forensics forming a supplementary service. Due to 
the high profile of the firm, Contest is often called in to provide services on legal 
cases, with Bruce Raath having had extensive experience as an expert witness. On 
occasion, Derek Penhall has been the expert witness for the opposition in cases 
involving Bruce Raath. 
Spec-Con is in fact a contracting company specialising in concrete and structural 
repair, offering diagnostic investigation services as well. Based in Gauteng, they often 
have the advantage of offering clients "the full service", whereby the bulk of the work 
is in the remedials and the investigations are provided as a value-added service. 
In addition, over the last few years, some of the larger mainstream civil consulting 
organizations have also set up small specialist divisions to complement their standard 
design teams. They have recognised that the specialist market presents favourable 
opportunities in an era of increased spending on maintenance and rehabilitation as 
opposed to the large scale construction of new structures. This has proved particularly 
problematic for DP A, due to the fact that DP A does not have the size and structural 
design capabilities of the larger, well-established firms . The fact that these large, well 
established firms have such capabilities, extensive histories and track records in the 
industry, and are seen as reliable mainstays, often creates favourable impressions on 
some of the larger and public sector clients. Unfortunately, many of these firms have 
no specialist experience and expertise whatsoever, often resulting in botched or 
inappropriately designed and implemented projects, creating unfavourable 
impressions of the industry overall. 
For example, in 2000, the South African National Roads Agency embarked on a 
nationwide campaign to rehabilitate existing bridge structures located along the 
national routes, in various centres around the country. They specifically insisted on 
and appointed well-established structural consultants with bridge design capabilities, 
even though Derek Penhall had spent a considerable amount of time marketing DPA'g 
capabilities to the Agency in previous years, with a view towards assisting in the 
development of a long-term plan. The reality was that the majority of the appointed 
consultants were not specialists in remedial techniques, often resulting in 
inappropriate specifications and unsuitable quality assurance on site. In a few 
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instances, the initial diagnostic investigation work was sub-contracted out by the 
consultants, with DP A successfully tendering on a few of these sub-contracts. 
However, the majority of the work and associated fee income was allocated to the 
larger consultants - work that the management of DP A believed was more suited to 
DP A' s capabilities and expertise in materials technology. This situation continues to 
play an ever increasing role in DPA' s competitive arena. 
· 3 .8.2. Competition in the Contracting Field 
Contractors often present an unexpected and sometimes insurmountable degree of 
competition, not only in the specialist contracting market in which the organization is 
active, but in the specialist consulting field as well. This has been prevalent in recent 
times, occasionally resulting in critical business and financial circumstances and legal 
action. Interestingly, such situations often develop in the waterproofing market, 
among others, where specialist contractors are numerous and often employ cutthroat 
tactics. DPA is also encountering similar threats in the organisation' s other areas of 
specialization, and is considered to be one of the motivating factors for diversification 
into the specialist contracting field . 
. The crux of the matter is that many clients simply cannot be convinced of the 
"intangible" benefits provided by a specialist consultant, often feeling that the 
payment of professional fees is an unnecessary expense. Coupled to this is the fact 
that contractors understandably prefer not to work under the scrutiny of engineers, 
and often do not have the competencies required for the proper implementation of a 
contract. In addition, most contractors, especially in the waterproofing industry, 
specialize in a particular type of system and would prefer to carry out a contract based 
on their offerings, not wishing to compete on a tender basis. As specialist consultants, 
DP A would design the optimum system, fit for purpose, and then issue the tender 
based on this. Disgruntled contractors then approach the client independently and 
provide the client with the advice he wants to hear, that is, that he does not need to 
spend money on a consultant, that the contractor has the perfect system for the 
project, and that the contractor has all the experience and expertise necessary to 
complete the contract satisfactorily. Such an approach is especially successful when 
clients are ready to seize any opportunity to save money and when they do not fully 
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comprehend or understand the benefit of engaging the services of a consultant. With 
respect to quality assurance and risk management during a contract, as Derek Penhall 
has stated, with reference to legal arguments justifying fee income, " It is impossible 
to prove what the outcome of the contract would have been had DP A not been 
involved. The contractor mayor may not have produced work to the standard that has 
been achieved. As such, the actual monetary value of the influence on risk 
management that DP A had on the achievement of a high quality final product is 
impossible to determine". Many clients do not see any value in engaging consultants, 
often settling for the (often false) sense of security provided by guarantees provided 
by the contractors. These so-called guarantees are often riddled with "escape clauses" 
and are often difficult to enforce, due to the contractor concerned going bankrupt or 
employing legal delaying tactics. As a result, the responsibility for defective 
workmanship may take years to resolve, with the client having no recourse in the 
interim. In addition, the consequential damage can be significant in terms of the cost 
of repair. 
The elimination of specialist consulting services IS occurnng on a greater scale 
throughout the industry, and appears to be increasing. For example, corrosion 
protection coatings suppliers are writing specifications for clients free of charge, in 
the understanding that their products will be used for a particular application. In this 
case, specialist corrosion consultants can only hope for limited involvement in terms 
of an appointment to provide quality assurance services. 
In the areas of specialist concrete repaIr and waterproofing contracting, DP A 
encounters many different types and sizes of competitors. 
In the larger, multi-million Rand concrete repair projects, a few well established 
contractors normally make up a consistent base of competition, with new competitors 
hanging around the fringes and attempting to enter the market. The well established 
firms generally have a large base of resources and financial backing, often posing 
significant barriers to entry, enabling them to manoeuvre strategically in their 
tendering, depending on their motives at the time. Such competitors include the likes 
of Steffanutti and Bressan, Erbacon, Group Five, WBHO Construction, Civil and 
Coastal and Karrena Africa. Generally, these competitors are not limited 
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geographically and pursue most available projects. The nature of competition is often 
governed by strategic decision making and can tend to be oligopolistic in nature. It is 
often suspected that collusion takes place in some instances in order to spread the 
available work between the contractors, depending on individual commitments and 
capabilities at the time. 
Other competitors include smaller contractors, including Concrete Repairs and 
Restoration (CR&R), Siyavusa, Gen-Rep, Gaia Holdings, Structural Maintenance and 
Spec-Con. These tend to be mostly locally based, with CR&R, Siyavusa and 
Structural Maintenance being limited mostly to Kwa-Zulu Natal, Gen-Rep to the 
Eastern Cape and Spec-Con to Gauteng. Gaia Holdings tends to move around the 
country, operating on an opportunistic basis. Besides Gen-Rep and Spec-Con, the 
more well established companies, the other smaller contractors are often termed "the 
rats and mice" by DP A. This is due to the fact that they seem to compete on the basis 
of cutthroat pricing, eventually ending up bankrupt in the process. It is apparent that 
the motive is to secure as much work as possible, but in the process, resources are 
thinly stretched and any error in tendering or unforeseen change could result in 
financial losses. In addition, many of these businesses are set up by individuals that 
have mostly worked with each other at some time in the past, resulting in substantial 
transmission of competencies and know-how. DPA's management have often 
commented on the absurdity of the situation, due to the belief that the competitive 
situation need not be determined on price, resulting in a "race to the bottom". 
Unfortunately, these competitors do pose a problem for DPA, as they often secure 
good projects on the basis of large price discounts. In addition, they occasionally form 
consortia or joint ventures for the purposes of targeting larger projects in the league of 
the large contractors. However, some clients have been adversely affected on some of 
these projects doomed for failure, and are now placing these contractors under close 
scrutiny or do not even invite them to tender on future work. 
DP A occasionally encounters obstructive behaviour and competition from materials 
suppliers themselves. Besides often giving potentially lucrative business leads to 
opposition firms, some materials suppliers have opted to explore the turnkey 
contracting route as well. For example, Ivory Industrials manufactures a wide range of 
specialist flooring and waterproofing materials, but also competes directly with 
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conventional contractors, for both the supply and installation of their systems. This 
often proves to be a very successful approach, but also tends to alienate the 
contracting fraternity . In addition, with respect to materials pricing, a crucial 
component of tendering, materials suppliers often provide selected contractors with 
more favourable prices than others. The price differences are usually significant, often 
effectively dictating the outcome of the tender process. Although this may be 
somewhat underhand, it is practically impossible to prove and to really have any 
influence in the matter. The only real solution is to develop favourable working 
relationships with the various materials suppliers. 
3.9. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that DPA is a reasonably successful firm in terms of project profitability 
and its ability to pursue opportunities successfully, displaying some significant 
strengths. However, it is also evident that DPA is suffering from a range of 
weaknesses, some appearing to be critical in terms of hindering growth and sustained 
financial success in the marketplace. The firm experiences varying degrees of 
competition, and appears to be experiencing difficulties in maintaining a positive 
market image in an industry characterised by change and opportunity. Therefore, it is 
necessary to carefully analyse the relevant aspects of industry concerned, and the 
situation of the organization, in order to arrive at appropriate recommendations for a 
strategic course of action. 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the facts and issues presented in the case study are analysed and 
evaluated through the use of the developed theoretical framework discussed in 
Chapter 2. Initially, a strategic analysis is presented, followed by the development of a 
company mission, long-term objectives and the development of strategic options. The 
proposed strategic options are then evaluated for suitability and then for acceptability 
through the selected models. This evaluation focuses on both the positive and 
negative aspects of the organisation, thereby enabling the effective generation of an 
appropriate strategy. 
4.2. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
In an attempt to establish strategic options for DP A Specialist Consulting Engineers 
for evaluation, it is necessary to carry out various forms of strategic analyses, based 
on the company's resources and its operating environment. Based on the framework 
developed in Chapter 2, and the case study provided in Chapter 3, the analyses 
explored include an analysis of various aspects of the civil engineering industry 
(specifically the specialist sector of this industry), the Five-Forces Model of 
Competition of Michael Porter for the assessment of competitive forces, and an 
assessment of the firm's resource based strengths and weaknesses versus the 
opportunities and threats posed by the external environment (a SWOT analysis). 
4.2.1. Industry Analysis 
For the purposes of analysing the relevant aspects of the organization at hand, the 
industry considered is the civil engineering industry, as opposed to just the consulting 
component of the industry alone. More specifically, the specialist sector of the 
industry in which the organization is active is focused on, as this is effectively the 
definitive "industry" the organization is involved in. 
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4.2.1.1. The Industry's Dominant Economic Features 
• Market size: At present, the South African civils consulting market is 
estimated at approximately R 4,5 billion in total revenues (Consulting 
engineering industry more upbeat, Building, July 2003), indicating that the 
industry is a sizable one. The civils contracting market is of similar size. The 
size of the specialist market is impossible to determine on its own. 
• Scope of competitive rivalry: More consulting and contracting companies are 
expanding their competitive scope beyond old geographical boundaries, 
although most competition in the specialist market is locally based. Generally, 
the larger the company, the larger the scope of activity. International revenues 
are playing a larger role than they did in the past. 
• Market growth rate: Although the civils industry III general is cyclical in 
nature, the latest findings, discussed in Chapter 3, are that the market is 
growing, even if it is doing so slowly. The specialist market is growing 
rapidly, due to a greater emphasis now being placed on the rehabilitation and 
protection of physical assets that are reaching critical stages in their life-
cycles. 
• Stage in business life cycle: The civils industry as a whole is in a mature stage, 
but the specialist segment could be described as being in a growth phase. 
• Number of companies in the industry: Literally hundreds of consulting and 
contracting organizations are present in the civil engineering industry, varying 
in size from small "one-man" operations to large multinational organizations 
with offices throughout the world. Due to the segmented nature of the civils 
industry, certain competitors tend to dominate specific segments, depending 
on their field of expertise and their size. 
• Number of buyers and their relative sizes: Again, hundreds of clients exist, 
ranging from the private individual to large public and private organizations 
backed by significant capital. 
• Degree of vertical integration: A few large multinational organizations 
display a degree of vertical integration, for example, large turnkey 
organizations handling significant projects such as airport construction. 
Generally, very few firms are vertically integrated, with consultants focusing 
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on consulting and contractors on contracting activities, due to the specific 
skills required. However, some large client bodies have developed their own 
in-house "engineering" departments or even separate companies to provide 
services that consultants would normally provide. The specialist capabilities of 
such organizations are limited though. 
• Technology/innovation: Technological advancement generally occurs slowly 
in mainstream civil engineering, but much more rapidly in the specialist 
sectors. The constant development of new investigative equipment, 
techniques, materials and remedial systems is notable. 
• Degree of product or service differentiation among firm s: Generally, the 
nature of engineering services requires standardization and conformance with 
generally accepted principles and design codes. However, especially in 
specialist segments where such standards and codes do not necessarily exist, 
competitors attempt to differentiate their services on the basis of technological 
proficiency, quality of service and track record. 
• Scale economies: Scale economies exist in consulting insofar as the full 
utilization of staff and office resources is concerned. In contracting, scale 
economies play an important role with respect to equipment use, production 
and the purchase of large quantities of materials at discount prices for many 
projects with similar requirements. In addition, in both arenas, fixed overhead 
costs can be distributed over the various projects being executed. 
• Clustering: Clustering does occur to a certain extent, with most major 
consulting firms being located in an around main cities, such as Johannesburg, 
Cape Town and Durban, with branch offices in smaller cities or towns. Large 
contractors are spread throughout the country. Smaller contractors can be very 
mobile, but tend to cluster around cities and depend on certain industries, for 
example, Sasol in Secunda, Mpumalanga. 
• Learning and experience effects: In the civil consulting and contracting 
industry, costs most definitely decline as cumulative output grows. Learning 
and experience are key aspects of the industry, with firms constantly 
developing more efficient ways of doing things. 
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• Capacity utilization is important in the contracting field, with the cost of 
equipment playing a major role. The costing of different types of projects can 
differ drastically, depending on how efficiently equipment can be utilized. 
• Capital requirements and entry/exit: Consulting firms generally require little 
start-up capital, unless costly specialised equipment is required. It is generally 
easy to enter or exit the industry, although, aspects such as qualifications, 
experience and credibility are important for success. The contracting field 
generally poses high capital requirements on start-ups, due to the equipment 
required. It is relatively easy to exit the industry, unless current contractual 
commitments prohibit this, such as performance sureties. Entry is also 
difficult, due to the experience and know-how of existing competitors 
enabling them to be more competitive. 
• Generally, profitability in the consulting industry is considered by many to be 
sub-par to average, with fees being determined on scales or time costs. In the 
contracting field, profitability can be very high, especially in the specialist 
market segments. 
4.2.1.2. Driving Forces of the Industry 
Many forces of change are constantly at play, although, some are considered to be 
more dominant than others. 
Probably the most significant driving force is the country 's economy as a whole. The 
performance of the civils industry is known to be primarily determined by the 
prevailing economic conditions. At present, greater spending by the public sector on 
the maintenance and rehabilitation of civils structures and infrastructure is occurring, 
making this specialist sector more attractive, and insulating it from the adverse 
conditions in the general industry. 
Significant changes in the long-term industry growth rate are occurring. In the 
consulting field, it is becoming more apparent that the traditional structures are 
changing, with the more opportunistic and entrepreneurial firms prospering. As the 
growth of the general industry is slowing down, the older, well-established firms are 
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finding it difficult to maintain earnings, with smaller, more flexible organizations able 
to adapt to changing circumstances. Contractors are becoming more threatening as a 
greater number of clients are favouring the "turnkey" or full-service approach 
(especially in specialist segments), negating the need for consulting input in such 
cases. 
In the specialist sector, product/service innovation and technological change is a 
significant driving force. New technologies are constantly re-shaping the landscape, 
with firms employing the older technologies gradually fading into obscurity, It 
normally takes firms a few years to catch up with the more "pioneering" firms. The 
provision of both contracting and consulting services could be seen to be innovative. 
The entry of major consulting firms into the specialist sector is changing the 
competitive conditions. No longer are small firms competing against only each other, 
but against larger firms with more resources and financial backing. 
The diffusion of hard won technical know-how between companies and even countries 
is a problem, especially due to the increasing mobility of more junior staff. 
In an industry characterised by "standardization", more buyers of services are looking 
for differentiated firms, especially in the areas of technical superiority and all round 
service. For example, many contractors do not handle their accounts very well, 
causing client frustration. Those firms that go just "that extra mile" tend to be viewed 
very favourably and develop lasting relationships with their clients. 
Black economic empowerment (BEE) is causing major ramifications in the industry. 
Firms simply have the choice of whether to comply or rapidly disappear. It is critical 
to formulate a workable strategy that includes BEE. Preferential procurement often 
delivers the result that black economically empowered firms are awarded projects of a 
specialist nature. This is occurring more frequently, even though it is often perceived 
that they do not have the necessary expertise, and as a consequence, do not price the 
projects correctly and fail. 
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As societal attitudes and concerns tend to be leaning towards environmental 
awareness and care, all aspects of civil engineering are becoming affected. Especially 
in the specialist materials sector, more "environmentally friendly" materials are 
replacing the previous ones. In this sector, where issues such as chemical containment 
and the protection of structures are critical, environmental issues are of prime 
importance. In both the consulting and contracting fields, the focus is on developing 
environmentally appropriate techniques and procedures. 
4.2.l.3. Key Success Factors 
Although many factors are responsible for success in varying degrees, key success 
factors in the industry include the following: 
• Being able to meet the client's expectations of high quality of service and 
technical ability is a key factor in both the consulting and contracting field. 
• In addition, it is vital that the client's requirements are met at a competitive 
price. Pricing must be realistic and based on industry accepted norms. 
• Contractors need to be able to accurately cost projects in order to be 
competitive, and also be able to source cost-effective suppliers. 
• In consulting, it is critical that the organization possesses the expertise relevant 
to its field of operation, for example, firms in specialist segments. A similar 
scenario exists in the contracting field. 
• It is important for organizations to employ a "critical mass" of skilled and 
trained employees with different abilities, for example, quantity surveyors, 
engineers and technicians, to enable project execution. 
• In the specialist market segment, the ongoing ability to procure new speCialist 
knowledge and technology is vital in order to develop and sustain credibility. 
4.2.1.4. The Relative Positioning of Organisations in the Industry 
Careful consideration of the relative positioning of the various competitors in the 
specialist consulting and contracting industries highlights the fact that DPA is set 
apart from conventionally identified clusters of competitors. A strategic group map 
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showing the relative positions of competitors in the specialist consulting field on the 
basis of geographic coverage and service line depth illustrates this. 
Figure 4.1. Strategic Group Map: The Specialist Consulting Industry 
Few specialist services, but 
exhibiting growth in the specialist 
market segment, high geographic coverage, 
high market share in general civils industry 
Wide range of 
specialist services, 
moderate geographic 
coverage, high mobility 
Generally low geographic coverage (local), 
narrow range of services (mostly concrete 
repair oriented). No apparent cbanges to 
this position are envisaged. 
Specialist service-l ine depth (number of different/complementary services) 
It can be clearly seen that although the larger, more well established consulting firms 
do not offer the specialist service line depth of DP A, they exhibit high geographical 
coverage and are developing more specialist divisions to broaden their service range. 
The smaller, more focused firms are generally more locally based, in and around 
major centres. The majority of these firms focus on specific concrete related services 
such as testing, diagnostics and repair, or alternatively, specifically on corrosion 
protection. DP A stands out as offering a wide range of services and having a 
relatively wide geographic reach. 
A strategic group map based on the specialist contracting industry illustrates the effect 
that the relatively recent entrance of DP A has had as a market challenger, and IS 
indicative of the fierce level of competition experienced in general. 
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Figure 4.2. Strategic Group Map: The Specialist Contracting Industry 
High market share, only pursuing 
sizeable projects 
DPA pursuing relatively 




Relative size of contracts pursued (in the spec ial ist market segment) 
The map illustrates the fact that although DP A is relatively small by industry 
standards, the firm is willing to challenge both the smaller and larger contractors for 
fairly sizeable projects (up to approximately R 15 million), not being interested in the 
lower end of the market, or small contracts (below R 200 000). It further illustrates 
that again, DP A tends to be more mobile than the smaller contractors, extending its 
geographic reach when appropriate. However, it is worth noting that this may in fact 
disadvantage the firm if its resource capabilities cannot support such mobility, 
resulting in difficulty pursuing further work and sustaining existing business in the 
main centres of Durban and Johannesburg. 
4.2.1.5. Industry Attractiveness and Profitability Prospects 
Attractiveness and profitability are key industry aspects on which to base a strategy. 
Growth prospects in both the specialist consulting and contracting industries are 
above average, with a greater number of clients requiring specialist services in an age 
characterised by the preservation of assets. The degree of profitability is fairly limited 
in the consulting field, and is expected to remain so, except in situations where rare 
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specialist knowledge and ability is required and competition IS low or absent. 
Profitability levels are variable in the contracting field, depending on the size and 
nature of the projects and the terms under which they are awarded, that is, tendered or 
negotiated. Some contracts are potentially very lucrative, especially turnkey contracts. 
However, due to so many factors being beyond control, the risks involved in the 
industry in general are significant, with management often being held personally 
responsible for engineering failures. 
The impact of the prevailing driving forces on profitability is mixed. The profitability 
outlook is grim and uncertain during periods of reduced spending by government and 
private sector firms, after all, during economic downturns, the construction or 
maintenance of assets is of lower importance than other business areas. The result is 
that prices and service levels drop, with many contractors going out of business as a 
consequence. 
In addition, the entry of more consulting firms into the specialist field reduces 
profitability, as does preferential procurement (also adding to increased risk) and the 
diffusion of technical know-how across the industry. However, the greater need for 
differentiation, the development of new technologies and services, and the increasing 
desire for single-point responsibility through turnkey contracts has a positive impact 
on profitability prospects. 
The position of the organization in both the consulting and contracting fields appears 
to be favourable. Although the larger firms are competing well and may pose a greater 
threat to the specialist sector in the future, and fierce competition may be expected 
from the smaller, local competitors, DPA is almost on its own with respect to the 
range of services offered and its mobility. In the contracting field, competition is rife, 
but DP A has the advantage of synergies created by its technical expertise developed 
through the consulting side of the business and its practical contracting abilities. In 
addition, there is sufficient potential for DP A to capitalize on the weaknesses of its 
rivals. In both the consulting and contracting fields, DP A has the advantage of 
mobility and flexibility, able to offer clients a wider range of specialist services and 
expertise than rival firms. 
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The organization is relatively well prepared to counteract the factors that reduce the 
attractiveness of the industry. DPA is relatively small in size, able to carry fewer 
overheads than the large firms, although, at present, the overheads are still quite high 
for a small firm. In addition, management is flexible enough to react and change 
under adversity. For example, when the Melrose Arch crisis threatened to destroy the 
firm, management were able to take stock of the situation and guide the firm through 
it. Not many similar firms have been as successful. 
4.2.2. The Five Forces Model of Competition 
Although the industry is dynamic, Porter' s Five Forces model is useful for illustrating 
the current competitive forces at play. It is recognised that these forces will be subject 
to change in the future, and that the model provides a 'snapshot' of current conditions. 
4.2.2.1. The Extent of Competitive Rivalry (a moderate to very strongforce) 
Competitive rivalry in the specialist consulting field can range from almost non-
existent to very strong, depending on the type of projects pursued, and the specific 
client involved. In the specialist market, competitors are generally diverse in terms of 
resources and strategies, making the degree of rivalry unpredictable. In concrete 
diagnostics and repair, rivalry is quite fierce, with many small firms competing 
territorially, as they are often locally based. When a consulting firm manages to 
secure a large client, they will zealously guard the relationship by whatever means 
possible. Some firms also attempt to dislodge other firms from such a favourable 
position. No single firm really dominates the specialist market, and many are able to 
provide similar services. Rivalry has increased over the last few years, mainly due to 
the sluggish performance of the civils industry as a whole, causing new competitors to 
seek other business avenues in the specialist market. As a result, more firms are 
developing specialist capabilities, increasing the level of rivalry. Client switching 
costs are virtually non-existent, so where many firms can provide similar services, 
rivalry is intense. 
Rivalry in the specialist contracting field is fierce, especially at the level of the small, 
local contractor. Here, rivalry is centred on price, as almost all of the smaller 
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contractors have identical capabilities and they are unable to differentiate themselves. 
Rivalry between the larger competitors has increased recently, partly due to the 
impact that DPA had upon entry into this market. However, in the larger, more 
complex projects, rivalry is tempered by the fact that relatively fewer competitors are 
present and that superior skills, knowledge and practical ability are required to be 
competitive. Such attributes can also be used to differentiate a firm, especially where 
additional or complementary services can be offered. However, switching costs are 
non-existent, due to the fact that contracts as opposed to permanent appointments are 
used. 
4.2.2.2. The Threat of Potential New Entrants (a weak to moderate force) 
In both the specialist consulting and contracting fields, the inherent attractiveness of 
the industry compared with the general civils industry raises the threat of potential 
new entrants. However, the specialist industry is fairly difficult to enter, mainly due to 
the advantages existing firms enjoy in terms of cost and resource advantages, superior 
engineering skills, technology and know-how, and inherent learning and experience 
curve effects. Successful firms have clearly differentiated themselves in terms of 
superior service levels, track record, and reputation, resulting in solid organization-
client relationships. Access to the client base is restricted, due to the many existing 
organization-client networks in the industry. Entry into the specialist contracting field 
requires high capital investment in technology and equipment. Regulatory policies, 
such as BEE policies, are rendering the industry less attractive, raising the existing 
barriers to entry. 
4.2.2.3. The Threat of Substitutes (a weak to moderate force) 
In the specialist field, there are no real substitutes for specialist services. However, 
one may consider one type of service being replaced by another, for example, an 
engineer or contractor may decide that a structure must be rehabilitated by 
conventional techniques (concrete repair), and another engineer may substitute this 
with a more cost effective approach (say, cathodic protection, or an electrochemical 
technique). This situation relies on the engineer's ability to properly consider all 
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available options in the specialist field. Therefore, those organizations focusing purely 
on a specific specialist technology may find themselves at risk, due to the threat of 
substitute technologies or obsolescence. In addition, the fact that contractors are 
encroaching on the consulting market may be seen to be a substitution issue, as 
specialist consulting services are being substituted by contracting services that 
encompass the services originally provided by consultants. 
4.2.2.4. The Bargaining Power of Suppliers and Supplier-Seller Collaboration 
(a weak to moderate force) 
Suppliers to specialist consultants are generally insignificant, due to the fact that 
consultants are usually at the beginning of the service value chain. In the contracting 
field, suppliers usually take the form of materials and equipment suppliers. Many 
suppliers and substitutes are usually available, weakening the bargaining position of 
suppliers. Where specific materials or systems are specified for a particular project, all 
the contractors are limited to the corresponding suppliers. However, where contractors 
enjoy preferential relationships with certain suppliers, or are even able to produce 
their own materials, alternative and more cost effective tenders can be submitted. In 
addition, some material suppliers have integrated forward, started their own turnkey 
divisions. However, in many such cases, they have stood the risk of losing their 
customers as they are now competing with them. 
In the specialist field, some proprietary specialist systems and techniques are available 
and cannot be substituted. In these cases, the suppliers display monopolistic 
tendencies and can literally 'name their price'. This can have a large impact in the 
contracting field where materials costs already form a significant part of the total 
costs of the operation. 
4.2.2.5. The Bargaining Power of Buyers and Seller-Buyer Collaboration 
(a moderate to strongforce) 
Generally, clients have significant bargaining power, both in the consulting and 
contracting field. Their costs to switch to alternative service providers are very low, 
and generally, firms are undifferentiated. Many client organizations are so large and 
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powerful that they are able to successfully manipulate small serVIce providers. 
However, in the specialist field, the number of suitable service providers is often 
limited, especially in areas of new technology. Unfortunately, as more firms become 
active in the specialist market, greater competition is benefiting the client base from a 
bargaining perspective. 
Many clients are very familiar with the make-up of costs, especially in the contracting 
field, and in consulting, the fee scales are often seen as a starting point for 
negotiations. In addition, due to the fact that specialist services are often auxiliary to 
the main purpose of client organizations, the procurement of such services can be 
delayed or postponed at any point in time, depending on whether or not the work is 
critical to the ongoing operation of the client organization. Many clients have also 
realized the advantages involved in forming strategic alliances with certain service 
providers. Such collaborative arrangements are formidable bargaining tools. 
4.2.3. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis 
A SWOT analysis is necessary to determine the significance of the relationships 
between the organization's resource based characteristics and the prevailing 
environmental conditions. 
4.2.3.1. Internal Resource Based Factors - Strengths and Weaknesses 






Derek Penhall is an industry leader, and forms the foundation of the firm ' s 
technical competencies with his wealth of experience. 
DP A has a lengthy track record of successful projects, including some world 
firsts. 
Derek Penhal1 is an extremely successful marketer. 
The firm has a good balance between technical and commercial ability. 
The firm has the entrepreneurial ability to continue to pursue new technologies 





DP A can differentiate itself on the basis of superior technological expertise 
and know-how. 
DP A has both the technical engineering background and the practical ability to 
provide both consulting and contracting services. 
DP A currently employs a core of competent and technically experienced staff 
members. 
• The firm owns a wide range of specialist equipment. 
Resource Based Weaknesses: 
• Derek Penhall does not focus on those areas of the business where maximum 
return could be generated from his abilities, resulting in significant 
opportunity costs being incurred. 
• Derek Penhall has difficulty in delegating tasks and responsibility, wanting to 
be involved in everything. 
• The poor handling of staff or human resource matters has resulted in high 
employee turnover and a general loss of competent, skilled personnel. 
• Staff do not receive enough technical guidance due to DerekPenhall's 
unavailability. 
• DP A currently does not employ enough skilled and able staff members that 
can be used to further the consulting and contracting concerns of the business. 
• The firm currently has no formal BEE strategy and does not qualify as an 
empowered organization. 
• Marketing is inconsistent and there is no marketing strategy. 
• Internal political issues, such as the clashes between Derek Penhall and Shane 
Harrison, or between Shane Harrison and Lanic Devananan, are preventing the 
firm from benefiting from effective teamwork, with individuals carrying on in 
their own directions. 
• Although administration systems are in place, these can be improved, are often 
poorly adhered to and are not monitored. For example, Derek Penhall hardly 
ever submits a time sheet, reflecting his involvement in projects. 
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• Management are hardly ever provided with relevant commercial information 
on which to base strategic or functional decisions, having to rely on 
guesswork. 
• The firm is heavily reliant on debt financing . 
4.2.3.2. External Environmental Based Factors - Opportunities and Threats 
Opportunities: _ 
• The specialist market is growing more rapidly than the general civils market, 
with the preservation of assets becoming of prime importance. As a result, 
more clients and more projects are becoming available. 
• Government is increasing spending on the repair and maintenance of 
infrastructure, such as bridges. 
• There is an increasing tendency for clients to prefer a full turnkey type service, 
including the provision of both engineering and contracting services. 
• There is an increasing need for differentiated services, on the basis of 
technical competence and service efficiency. 
• South African firms are gaining a greater degree of access to international 
markets, such as the rest of Africa and the Middle East. 
Threats: 
• The general state of the South African economy poses a constant threat, with 
fluctuations in industry activity and spending being caused by interest rate and 
exchange rate movements. 
• Political uncertainty is hampering investment in the South African economy. 
• Competitive levels are increasing and market shares are decreasing in the 
specialist consulting field, especially due to the entry of larger, well-
established civils consulting firms. 
• More consulting and contracting competitors are competing on the basis of 
low-cost, effectively reducing profit potentials. 
096639 
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• Regulatory changes with respect to BEE are threatening the survival of non-
BEE organizations. 
• Contractors are continuing to supplant consulting services. 
• Successful firms that are appealing employers for tend to attract valuable 
employees away from small organizations, especially where those employees 
are experienced in certain technologies and processes. 
• The entry of DP A into the contracting market has resulted in retaliatory 
actions from market competitors. This is expected to intensify rivalry. 
The weighted SWOT analysis (impact SWOT) illustrates the fact that the company 
has some significant strengths and core competencies, but also some critical 
weaknesses. The two highest scores pertaining to strengths were found for 
"entrepreneurship and ability to adapt and change" and "Derek Penhall ' s marketing 
ability" respectively. The three worst scores for weaknesses were found for 
"insufficient staff resources", "poor handling of human resource matters and staff 
turnover" and "poor commercial feedback to management" respectively. Staff 
resources were listed as a key factor for success, and the findings of the SWOT 
analysis are therefore extremely alarming. The findings are especially significant in 
that DP A does not rate well at all in terms of being able to take advantage of the 
available opportunities, WIth negative scores being obtained for most opportunities. 
The seeming inability of the firm to take advantage of a growing market is especially 
disturbing. In terms of being able to neutralize threats, DP A is at an even greater 
disadvantage, with significant negative scores being obtained for the impact of black 
empowerment regulatory changes and the threat of employee mobility and outside job 
opportunities. 
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Growth of the tncreased 
Growing 
Growing need fa The entry of Black economi Employee Retaliatory 
special ist government differentiated Access to Economic 
Political Competition or Contractors 
Environmental change preference fa uncertainty large, well empowerment mobility and actions of 
market spending on services - international fluctuations in the basis of supplanting 
+ 
(opportunities & threats) turnkey hampering established regulatory job established 
segment or infrastructure technical & markets South Africa low-cost consultants 
services growth civils firms changes opportunities contractors 
niche rehabilitation quality 
Strengths 
Derek Penhall's experience 
+2 +2 +2 +3 +3 0 0 +3 +3 0 +1 0 +1 20 0 
& expertise 
Excellent track record +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 0 0 +3 +1 0 +1 0 0 20 0 
Derek Penhall's marketing 
+3 +1 +3 +3 +3 +3 0 +2 +3 0 +3 0 +3 27 0 
ability 
Good technical I 
+3 +2 
commercia l balance 
+2 +2 +3 +3 0 0 +2 0 +2 0 +2 21 0 
Entrepreneurship & ability +3 
to adapt & change 
+3 +3 +2 +3 +2 +2 +3 +2 +3 +2 +1 +2 34 0 
Differentiation through 
technical expertise & know- +2 +2 +2 +3 +2 +2 0 +3 +1 +1 +2 0 +1 21 0 
how 
Technical competence with 
+1 +2 +3 +1 +2 +3 0 
practical abi lity 
+3 +1 0 +3 0 +1 20 0 
Core of competent & 
+3 +1 +2 +3 +2 +1 0 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +2 20 0 
experienced staff 
Wide range of equipment +3 +1 +2 +2 +1 +1 0 +3 0 0 +2 0 +1 16 0 
Weaknesses 
Lack of focus by Derek 
-3 -2 -2 -2 -3 -2 0 -3 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 0 -24 
Penhall 
Derek Penhall unable to 
-3 -2 -3 
delegate effectively 
-1 -3 0 0 -1 -3 0 -1 -3 -1 0 -21 
Poor handling of HR 
-3 -2 -2 -2 -3 -2 0 
matters, staff turnover 
-3 -1 -3 -1 -3 -2 0 -27 
Lack of technical guidance 
-3 -2 -2 -3 -2 -1 0 
of staff 
-2 -1 -2 -2 -3 -1 0 -24 
Insufficient staff resources -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -1 0 -3 -1 -2 -1 -3 -2 0 -28 
Lack of BEE status -3 -3 0 0 0 -2 0 -3 0 -3 0 0 0 0 -14 
Inconsistent marketing -2 0 -2 -2 -2 -3 0 -3 -2 0 -3 -1 -1 0 -21 
Internal politics -2 -2 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -2 0 -3 -1 -3 -2 0 -18 
Poor adm inistration & 
-3 
monitoring 
-1 -1 -2 -2 -3 0 -2 -2 0 0 -1 -1 0 -18 
Poor commercial feedback 
-3 -2 -2 -3 -2 0 -26 
to management 
-2 -2 -2 0 -3 -3 -1 -1 
Heavy reliance on debt -2 -2 0 0 -2 -3 0 -2 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -12 
Environmental Impact +23 +17 +22 +22 +22 +15 +2 +22 +14 +4 +17 +3 +13 
Scores -30 -21 -17 -18 -23 -20 0 -27 -14 -15 -12 -21 -15 
rOTAL -7 -4 +5 +4 -1 -5 +2 -5 0 -11 +5 -18 -2 
+3 is a very good advantage in such a situation 
+2 is a good advantage in such a situation 
+1 is an advantage for such a situation 
o no impact 
-1 is a disadvantage in such a situation 
-2 is a large disadvantage in such a situation 
-3 is a very large disadvantage in such a situation 
4.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
Following the detailed strategic analysis of the internal resource based characteristics 
of the organization and its environmental circumstances, various strategic options 
may be examined. The findings of the various forms of analysis may be used in the 
development and assessment of these strategic options. This process begins with the 
development of a company mission and long-term objectives. Subsequently, generic 
competitive strategies and grand strategies are selected, based on the criteria discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
4.3 .1. The Company Mission 
DP A does not have a company mission statement at present. It is necessary to develop 
an appropriate mission statement on which the development of strategic options can 
be based. The company is in the business of satisfying existing customer needs for 
specialist services, be it corrosion protection, waterproofing, concrete repair and so 
forth. In other words, the company is in the business of providing specialist solutions 
to problems, either on a consulting basis, a contracting basis, or a turnkey basis. The 
customer groups being targeted are broad, ranging from private individuals to large 
multinationals and government departments. The manner in which the firm creates 
and delivers value to customers tends to be through a professional, quality oriented 
approach, employing advanced technology and experience. 
Based on the above, the company mISSIOn statement could be: "Our business is 
providing high quality specialist engineering solutions. Our mission is total customer 
satisfaction through professionalism, efficiency, superior technology and experience". 
4.3 .2. Long-Term Objectives 
Long-term objectives are required to indicate the existence of strategic intent. Based 
on the strategic analysis, suggested long-term objectives might include the following : 
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• Profitability: The organization should maintain a profit margin of at least 15% 
on costs, and revive consulting turnover to approximately R 5 million per 
annum (the level it was at prior to diversifying into specialist contracting). 
• Productivity: In the consulting/engineering part of the business, the 
productivity of employees should be at least 75%, that is, at least six hours out 
of an eight-hour day should be billable time, or time spent productively on 
projects. 
• Competitive Position: DP A should seek to retain its status as competitive on 
the basis of service differentiation and its range of specialist services. 
• Employee Development: DP A should seek to develop a highly skilled and 
flexible team of core managers (approximately five people), providing them 
with career opportunities and the company with enhanced prospects. DP A 
should double its current complement of technically productive personnel 
within a year. 
• Employee Relations: The objective should be to reduce staff turnover, and to 
improve the current system in place for handling employee-company relations. 
• Technological leadership: The company should be seen to be a leader in 
specialist technology. 
4.3 .3. Generic Strategies 
Based on Porter's model of basic competitive strategies, DPA should orientate its 
overall strategic approach according to a focused competitive strategy, with the 
emphasis on differentiation. The firm has a low-market share in the overall civil 
engineering industry, but may achieve good returns if it remains competing in the 
specialist segment where its strengths will be highly valued. DPA can remain small, 
focus on profitability and improve competitive performance through specialist 
development and technological leadership. The niche market lends itself to service 
and technological differentiation as customers perceive value in these attributes, many 
different applications are found, and few rivals use this approach. It is necessary, 
however, to ensure that the firm properly understands what it is that requires 
differentiating and contributes to value added, and to ensure that overdifferentiation 
and overpricing does not occur. 
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The focused differentiation strategy is attractive due to the size and growth potential 
of the specialist market, large mainstream firms are more focused on mainstream 
civils type work, it is fairly costly to enter the specialist market, and the market is not 
overcrowded with firms. In addition, DP A has significant resource strengths suited to 
the niche market. However, the niche market is attractive to new firms, and unless 
DP A remains focused, other rivals may develop similar or superior competencies. 
4.3.4. Grand Strategies 
On the whole, the impact SWOT Analysis tends to indicate that DPA has numerous 
environmental opportunities, but also has critical internal weaknesses hindering its 
success. Therefore, a combination of grand strategy elements will probably be 
appropriate. Based on these factors, the SWOT analysis diagram suggests that a 
"turnaround oriented strategy" is appropriate. Taking this further, based on the Grand 
Strategy Selection Matrix, the firm should pursue internally focused strategies 
through redirection of its resources. Overcoming its weaknesses will certainly require 
elements of a turnaround strategy, while maximizing its already significant strengths 
would probably be served best by a concentrated growth type strategy with elements 
of an innovation strategy. With respect to the Model of Grand Strategy Clusters, DP A 
should find itself in sector n. Despite critical weaknesses preventing the firm from 
making the most of opportunities, the firm is still currently in a relatively fair 
competitive position. This should reaffirm the firm ' s position as a strong competitor 
in a growing market, leading to a concentrated growth strategy. With respect to sector 
11, DP A has already diversified concentrically through the formation of the specialist 
contracting business, and has integrated backwards through the manufacture of its 
own materials for certain specialist contracts. 
Turnaround: Although DP A is currently in a fair competitive position, it is clear that 
this will not remain the case unless certain aspects are "turned-around". The business 
is worth rescuing, and a potential crisis needs to be avoided. It is apparent that the 
' strategy revision' route should be followed, as the firm does not have the problem of 
large costly assets or a large inefficient workforce. However, the retrenchment of 
services could be considered, with the strategy being revised to concentrate on core 
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activities. For example, the laboratory imposes costly overheads, and only serves as a 
support function as opposed to an actual cost centre. Core clients should also be 
concentrated on, as many of the smaller clients take up a lot of valuable time and 
resources, yielding lower returns. A cost-reducing strategy is not expected to yield the 
results that strategy formulation would, as costs are generally well managed. 
Strategy revision should probably concentrate on rebuilding the position of DPA in 
the consulting market and overhauling internal operations and functional strategies, 
thereby neutralizing critical weaknesses. Such revisions would possibly include 
developing a suitable human resource management and employment strategy, a 
proper management information system, a marketing strategy, a black empowerment 
strategy and channelling the strengths of the managing director, Derek Penhall, more 
appropriately. The strategy could involve the distribution of shares to certain staff 
members, in accordance with Derek Penhall's stated plans. 
Concentrated growth and innovation: Based on the core capabilities of the firm, 
concentrated growth should be focused on building on these competencies and 
concentrating on the specialist market segment - the area of the firm's expertise. The 
market favours this approach, since it is not saturated with competitors, .barriers to 
entry are fairly high, and a high demand for the specialist services of the firm exists. 
DP A essentially needs to regain the consulting earnings it was once capable of, while 
also penetrating the specialist contracting market with the advantages of technical 
ability and efficiency. The competitive stature of the firm can be maintained through 
innovation, thereby continuously creating new service 'life-cycles' and staying ahead 
of the rest of the industry. 
Concentric diversification: The decision to form a specialist contracting company was 
a decision to diversify concentrically. This spin-off was achieved through 
compatibility between the technologies and markets involved. The rationale was that 
synergies would be created, effectively as a result of the combination of the original 
firm ' s latent practical abilities and technical engineering expertise. 
Backward integration: The management of DP A took a decision to manufacture 
materials for certain projects where cost-effectiveness would enable competitive 
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alternative tenders to be submitted. This was very successful on a few select projects, 
especially where projects were over-specified and cheaper alternative materials were 
appropriate. 
4.4. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS 
The developed strategic options (and current strategies) should be evaluated for 
suitability in order to determine whether they actually address the circumstances in 
which the firm is operating. 
4.4.1. Life-Cycle Analysis 
Based on the Life Cycle Matrix, if one considers the civil engineering industry as a 
whole, it may be classified as mature, in which case, a firm in a favourable 
competitive position should pursue niche and differentiation type options. This is 
exactly what DPA have done in terms of targeting the specialist market segment.. In 
the specialist market itself, the stage of industry maturity can be classified as 
"growth" as opposed to "mature". Despite its weaknesses, DPA may be considered to 
be in at least a "favourable" competitive position, in which case the matrix provides 
the options of "differentiate, focus, catch-up, and grow with industry". This is in line 
with the generic and grand strategy options discussed, except that focus may mean 
getting rid of certain aspects of the business, such as the laboratory and materials 
development, to concentrate on core business activities. Effective differentiation 
should enable the firm to propel itself to a stronger competitive position. 
4.4.2. Positioning 
With respect to the strategy clock, DPA tends to operate in the region of positions 3, 4 
and 5, with the contracting activities around position 3, with the consulting/ 
engineering activities around positions 4 and 5. Turnkey projects are often positioned 
around 4 to 5 on the clock, depending on the circumstances. 
These positions on the strategy clock indicate that the creation of greater perceived 
value added is critical to success. The firm is charging high prices for its services, 
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especially on the consulting front, and needs to maintain a suitable level of 
differentiation, as suggested by the developed strategic options. DP A has the key 
resources and competencies to sustain this positioning, including Derek Penhall' s 
marketing and technical ability and experience, both technical and practical abilities, 
and flexibility. A distinct competitive advantage is most certainly realized through the 
linkages between resources and competencies, and the 'tacit knowledge' of the firm. 
However, the strategy clock also illustrates the danger currently facing the firm. The 
impact of the firm's weaknesses illustrated in the impact SWOT analysis is such that 
the realization of the potential advantages is being severely compromised. Critical 
weaknesses are outweighing the firm's competencies, negatively impacting on 
perceived value-added. In this case, there is a real danger of the firm's positioning 
being pushed down into the region of 6, 7 and 8 on the clock, ultimately spelling 
disaster, with clients effectively being charged high prices for little perceived added 
value, if any. The firm 's problem of "over commitment and under delivery", 
(Giuliani, 2002), is a serious one in this regard. 
4.4.3. Value Chain Analysis 
A value chain analysis is essential to consider, especially due to the fact that DPA is 
operating in both the specialist engineering/consulting field and the specialist 
contracting field. The firm' s strategy and proposed strategic changes should improve 
value-added and competitiveness, and synergies should be realized through the 
concurrent operation of consulting and contracting activities. 
Inbound Logistics 
DP A must purchase materials and equipment to effectively 
maintain a healthy contracting organization. Basic supplies 
are required for the consulting activities, in addition to 
specialist equipment required for carrying out investigation work 
and the like. This is important for a strategy concerning innovation and differentiation 
on the basis of technical superiority. Therefore, increased spending in this area is 
necessary, and for a relatively small firm, the cash flow and liquidity implications will 
be important. The current financial situation is not allowing for this to the extent that 
it should. Value could be added through in-house materials development, based on the 
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expertise of key staff members. However, greater value added may actually be 
achieved through outsourcing such non-core activities, or through developing 
favourable supply channels. 
Operations 
DP A is effectively involved in two forms of production, the 
first being the production of consulting/engineering 
services and the other being the physical implementation of 
contracts. Strategic options should be concerned with creating 
operating efficiencies and "doing the right things" as opposed to diverting efforts 
towards unproductive activities. People should be doing the things that they do best, 
and sufficient skilled personnel need to be placed in operating positions suited to the 
needs of the firm. Synergies could be created through the use of technical staff to 
develop effective and innovative ways of doing things in the construction side of the 
business. A differentiation based strategy dictates that mediocrity simply is not good 
enough - the firm needs to execute its functions better than other firms do. This will 
require the turnaround actions suggested. 
In the case of DP A, outbound logistics would cover the 
Outbound logistics manner in which the services are carried out or 'presented' 
to the client. A differentiation strategy requires that clients 
are kept well informed and that their needs are integrated into 
the service as far as possible, in order to develop the desired level of perceived value 
added. The strategy should result in the achievement of a high level of quality of 
work, reinforcing the requirement for skilled personnel and effective management and 
guidance. 
Marketing & Sales 
Marketing of the firm on the basis of concentrated growth 
and innovation requires a carefully designed and well 
implemented marketing strategy. Value-added and 
competitiveness here depends on the ability of DP A to channel 
marketing efforts in the right direction and to turn around the current weakness of 
Derek Penhall' s lack of marketing focus and delegation. Clients do not just arrive on 
the organisation's doorstep - they have to be sought out and won-over. The ability of 
the marketers in the firm to effectively develop a market perception of high added 
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value and differentiation on the basis of technology, skills and expertise is critical in 
light of the strategic options and the firm' s current strategic approach. 
Servj~e 
A relevant attribute of the strategic options on the table is 
enhanced customer service. Greater value-added can be 
provided on the basis of turnkey services, with the client 
benefiting from single-point responsibility. DPA' s strategy could 
include the provision of follow up maintenance services after contract completion, 
thereby ensuring a lasting relationship with the client. Again, for service to contribute 
to value added and competitiveness on the basis of differentiation, efficiency and 
quality are of utmost importance. DP A has the ability to fulfil these requirements, but 
can only realistically hope to do so after turning around its critical weaknesses. 
Support activities are also important to consider. It has already been stated that the 
current human resource management infrastructure needs to be revised in line with the 
requirements of the turnaround element of the strategic options. This is critical to 
ensure that the requirements of the primary value chain activities are met. Likewise, 
strategy needs to take the development of technology into consideration, as this 
contributes to value added in terms of the proposed differentiation strategy. This 
means that the relevant personnel need to be given the time and resources to ensure 
that this aspect ofthe business does not fade into obscurity. 
4.4.4. Portfolio Analysis 
The Boston Box can be used to analyse the firm' s strategic approach towards 
diversity. On both the consulting/engineering and contracting sides of the firm, the 
different services offered can be allocated to a specific quadrant. For example, 
corrosion protection services could be classified as a 'dog' . Here, the firm has a low 
relative market share, and the market is not really growing. Similarly, the firm 's 
laboratory activities could be placed in this quadrant. Waterproofing and concrete 
investigations and remedials could be considered to be 'cash-cows' , with more 
specialist applications in these fields (for example, chemical resistant or industry 
specific applications requiring new or advanced technology) being the ' stars'. The 
turnkey engineering approach could also fit into the ' star' category. The 'question 
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mark' in the firm at the moment is the potential to capitalize from a viable black 
empowerment strategy - the market is wide open for compliant firms, and even more 
so for compliant specialist firms. 
Naturally, the objective of the selected strategic options should be to manage and 
sustain the waterproofing and concrete related activities of the firm, in order to 
generate funds for technological development and innovation, propelling new ideas or 
concepts to ' star' status, and then managing these to fall into the ' cash-cow' category 
in due course. The potential of the question mark is obvious - the strategy should 
include black empowerment plans. Finally, the 'dogs ' need to be addressed. Corrosion 
protection services, although forming a very small part of the businesses, should 
probably be kept, due to the occasional project being awarded to DPA, the fact that 
related costs are insignificant and due to the complementary nature of the service on 
waterproofing and concrete related projects. The functioning of the laboratory is 
questionable, however. This is a costly exercise in terms of equipment maintenance 
and consumes large amounts of management time. It may be effective to divest this 
part of the business and to outsource laboratory activities. 
4.5. ACCEPTABILITY ANALYSIS 
It is necessary to establish whether or not management will accept the proposed 
strategic options and changes. This is assessed through a sensitivity analysis and an 
analysis of stakeholder reactions. 
4.5.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
A great deal of emphasis has been placed on certain environmental changes. It may be 
possible that, for whatever reason, the specialist market segment will not grow as 
expected, or may even remain stagnant. In addition, government may suddenly halt 
spending on infrastructure rehabilitation if other budgetary constraints so dictate. In 
addition, procurement policies may change to such an extent that turnkey services are 
not as preferred as initially thought. In any event, most government projects stipulate 
the separate existence of a consultant and contractor. The sensitivity analysis therefore 
excludes the factors relating to these issues. However, other identified changes are 
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~CID@ M ~filill)~ (Jm fEif{jJ 
Focussed Turnaround Concentric Backward Attain black 
differentiation based on strategy 
Concentrated diversification integration - economic 
Main strategic options/initiatives based on revision & core 
growth & 
into materials empowered 
technology & competencies 
innovation 
contracting manufacturing status 
expertise 
Strengths: 
Derek Pen hall's experience & expertise +3 +3 +3 +3 +2 
+3 
Excellent track record +3 +2 +3 +3 0 
+3 
Derek Penhall's marketing ability +3 +3 +3 +3 +1 +3 
Good technical ! commercial balance +1 +3 +3 +3 0 +3 
Entrepreneurship & ability to adapt & +3 +3 +3 +3 +2 +3 
change 
Differentiation through technical +3 +2 +2 +3 +3 +3 
expertise & know-how 
Technical competence with practica l +2 +3 +3 +3 +3 +3 
ability 
Core of competent & experienced staff +2 +3 +3 +3 +1 +3 
Wide range of equipment +2 +3 +3 +3 0 +3 
Weaknesses: 
Lack of focus by Derek Penhall -2 -3 -3 -2 -3 -2 
Derek Penhall unable to delegate -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
effectively 
Poor handling of HR matters, staff -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 
turnover 
Lack of technical guidance of staff -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
Insufficient staff resources -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 
Lack of BEE status -1 -1 -3 -3 0 -3 
Inconsistent marketing -3 -3 -3 -1 0 -2 
Internal politics -1 -3 -3 -3 0 -3 
Poor administration & monitoring -1 -2 -2 -3 -2 -3 
Poor commercial feedback to ~2 -2 -2 -3 -2 -3 
management 
Heavy reliance on debt -1 -1 -1 -3 0 '0 
Environmental change: 
Growing need for differentiated services +3 +3 +2 +1 +2 0 
technical & quality 
Access to international markets +1 0 +1 0 0 0 
Economic fluctuations in SA +2 +2 +2 +2 +1 0 
Political uncertainty hampering growth +1 +2 +2 ,+1 0 0 
The entry of large, well established civils 
firms 
+3 +2 +3 +3 +2 +2 
Competition on the basis of low cost +3 +2 +3 -2 +3 0 
Black economic empowerment 
regulatory changes 
+1 +1 +1 -3 0 +3 
Contractors supplanting consultants +2 +2 +3 +2 +2 0 
Employee mobil ity & job opportunities 0 +1 -1 -1 0 +1 
Retaliatory actions of established 
+2 +1 
contractors 
-2 -3 0 0 
Aggregate (+) score +40 +41 +43 +36 +22 +33 
Aggregate (-) score -21 -26 -32 -39 -18 -28 
+3 is a very good advantage in such a situation 
+2 is a good advantage in such a situation 
+1 is an advantage for such a situation 
o no impact 
-1 is a disadvantage in such a situation 
-2 is a large disadvantage in such a situation 
-3 is a very large disadvantage in such a situation 
fairly well grounded, such as the growing need for differentiated services based on 
quality and technical proficiency and increasing access to international markets. 
Under these circumstances, the sensitivity analysis matrix yields some interesting 
results. It suggests that even under conditions of slow or stagnant industry growth and 
reduced spending DPA should perform well under a concentrated growth strategy, 
based on a competitive strategy of focused differentiation, following a successful 
turnaround strategy. The negatives marginally outweigh the positives under the 
strategy concerning concentric diversification into specialist contracting, suggesting 
that this strategy is risky and should be approached with caution. However, should the 
turnaround successfully deal with the firm's critical weaknesses, the negatives would 
be reduced considerably. Even so, this strategy appears to be sensitive to the 
environmental changes originally assumed. The black economic empowerment 
strategy only yields an overall marginally positive score, mainly due to the effect of 
the firm's weaknesses. This strategy is more concerned with compliance with 
procurement conditions as opposed to industry growth. Again, a successful 
turnaround of critical weaknesses would boost the likelihood of success of this 
strategy. The strategy concerning backward integration into materials manufacturing 
also presents a difficult call, but is also not that sensitive to the assumed 
environmental changes. 
4.5.2. Analysing Stakeholder Reactions 
The political viability of the developed strategic options is important to consider in 
the context of the power and influence of key players. The Power-Interest Matrix is a 
useful tool. The proposed initial turnaround strategy (the critical starting point) is 
important to consider in terms of the proposed actions, including focusing on core 
clients, closing the laboratory, revising the current approach to human resources, 
improving the administrative and marketing functions of the firm, adopting a black 
empowerment plan, distributing shares to certain staff members, and re-directing the 
efforts of Derek Penhall to those areas better serving the firm. All the other strategic 
options essentially follow from the success of the turnaround actions. The Power-
Interest Matrix below reflects the potential political situation. 
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Based on the stakeholder mapping reflected in the matrix, it is evident that many 
positive stakeholders are located in the high-interest and low-power quadrant. These 
supportive stakeholders will have to rely on the decisions stakeholders in the high-
power, high-interest quadrant and the degree to which they are empowered by them. 
All stakeholders in this quadrant need to be kept informed of developments. Derek 
Penhall is probably the most powerful player and has been allocated a question mark, 
due to the expectation that although he will agree to most of the elements of the 
turnaround strategy, he will probably be reluctant to close the laboratory (which he 
was instrumental in developing) and to agree to the re-direction of his efforts, as he is 
already doing what he believes is best for the firm. 
It would be necessary for Brendon lewaskiewitz to champion the strategy by means 
of participation and communication, attempting to foster interest from other 
stakeholders. The potential situation of the 'political battleground' needs to be 
avoided, as this would essentially result in stakeholders pulling the firm in different 
directions. 
Shane Harrison is also an unknown quantity, having expressed a loss of interest in the 
strategic direction of the firm. This is a potential 'political trap' and care must be 
taken to keep him satisfied and involved, lest he decide to reposition himself and 
oppose elements of the strategy. After all, he is a powerful player and would be 
involved in a major part of the strategy - that is the revision of functional strategies 
concerning administration, management reporting and human resource management. 
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Figure 4.5. Power-Interest Matrix - Proposed turnaround actions 
Level of interest 
Low High 
Company employees (+) 
Core clients (+) 
Clients requiring black 
Low empowerment status (+) 
Laboratory personnel (-) 
Power 
Shane Harrison (?) Derek Pen hall (?) 
Brendon Jewaskiewitz (+) 
High 
With respect to the subsequent strategic options concerning concentrated growth and 
concentric diversification (the spin-off of the firm ' s contracting business), it is clear 
that no real opposition exists. All high-interest, high-power quadrant members are 
positive about the elements of these strategies, which can therefore be considered to 
be acceptable. This is notable, considering the fact that the sensitivity analysis has 
shown that the turnaround strategy could be extremely beneficial and relatively risk 
free, while the concentric diversification strategy could be relatively risky. This 
probably has much to do with the influence of the type of leadership and the culture of 
the organization, discussed below. 
Leadership: 
Upon examination of the leadership characteristics of Derek Penhall and Shane 
Harrison, it is apparent that two completely contrasting characters emerge. Derek is a 
"risktaker" type leader, having been prepared to put everything on the line to start the 
business, and having been prepared to do so again during periods of financial 
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difficulty. He has a talent in developing new business avenues and being able to 
market extremely effectively, constantly promoting his way of thinking and new 
ideas. He has based his career on DP A and its success in the market place, and 
therefore, at this point, is the individual with the most at stake. Unfortunately, Derek' s 
leadership style also carries some negative and damaging attributes, including 
autocracy and a seeming inability to delegate and empower people. He wants to be 
involved in everything, and almost always has a "better" way of doing things, no 
matter what it is. This is one of the main reasons why so many people cite their 
inability to work with Derek, as he practically takes over. The reality is that in doing 
so, he neglects the aspects of business development and management the firm 
desperately requires. Staff have also cited the problem of Derek making certain 
"promises" or commitments to them, only to eventually reach the realization that it 
was all "talk". 
Shane Harrison is effectively a "surgeon" type leader - able to cut costs in key areas 
and to make rational financial decisions. This was the main reason for Derek 
originally bringing him into DP A. Shane was very effective in restoring some 
organizational capabilities, such as administrative systems and management reporting 
mechanisms, which by all accounts were a complete shambles at the time. However, 
Shane gets bored quickly, and having done so much good work in the beginning, has 
let it slip. According to Shane, this is due to his efforts not having the desired impact 
- Derek being one of the main culprits in terms of not adhering to the systems and 
setting a poor example for other employees. Shane effectively lost interest, and as a 
result, pursued the specialist contracting work. 
One of the major problems is that the firm has never had a "caretaker" type leader, 
someone capable of managing the business as it grows, making sure of the proper 
functioning of functional business areas, and maintaining the overall healthy state of 
the firm. It is clear that neither Derek nor Shane will be able to lead the business in 
this manner. It is possible that Brendon lewaskiewitz could fill the gap and add the 
desired balance to the firm, but that would require the acceptance of Derek Penhall 
and Shane Harrison, who, for all intents and purposes, "run" the firm and make most 
strategic decisions on their own. 
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As a result, under the current leadership, the firm may experience difficulty in the 
acceptance and implementation of the proposed turnaround strategic options, 
depending on whether the key players can be convinced to ' buy into' the plan. In any 
event, the turnaround options require the exploitation of the relative strengths that all 
three directors have to offer. 
The Culture of the Organisation: 
The culture ofthe firm can be illustrated through the use ofthe "cultural web": 
• Paradigm: Common assumptions include the idea that "Derek will solve the 
problem", that clients are generally ignorant, and that the company's services 
are always the best. This can be problematic, especially when the company' s 
services are clearly not the best and where Derek should be delegating 
responsibility. 
• Routines and rituals: Members of the organization generally behave casually 
towards each other, even between top management and lower level staff, with 
an emphasis on socializing. Training is informal, as is assessment and 
promotion. This casual approach can be problematic, especially when trying to 
enforce authority and when trying to get things done. 
• Stories: Stories tend to be centred around the past successes of DPA, how the 
firm bettered its rivals, how the firm won court cases against previous 
employees and clients, how Derek and Pat Draper used to work together, and 
Derek' s maverick nature of doing business. Such stories are often motivating 
to employees. 
• Symbols: Symbols normally consist of status symbols for the directors of the 
firm (such as luxury vehicles). Generally, the atomic symbol used by DPA is 
the universal organizational symbol, and is used everywhere, from the office, 
to site vehicles, to signboards and on the letterhead of the firm. Technical 
jargon permeates the language used by employees - even the secretaries take 
pride in their understanding of such language. 
• Control Systems: Control systems effectively only include time sheets on 
which employees record their involvement in various projects or activities. 
Otherwise, there are no real systems focused on measurement and reward. 
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This is done informally and subjectively, creating tension among staff 
members who feel that they have "fallen out of favour" and those that are 
perceived to be favoured by either Derek Penhall or Shane Harrison. 
• Power Structures: Derek Penhall effectively dominates the organization, 
reinforcing his core assumptions and beliefs in what is important. This could 
be potentially harmful to the proposed strategic options. 
• Organisational Structure: The firm is generally informally structured, with no 
real hierarchical structures. Below the three directors, the organisation' s 
structure is fairly flat. This may pose problems with respect to developing an 
effective reporting or delegation system to remove Derek Penhall from 
involvement in everything, as the turnaround strategy requires that he re-
focuses his attention and efforts. 
Overall, the culture of the firm should be generally supportive of the proposed 
strategic options, however, some aspects need to be changed. For example, the degree 
of staff / management relationship informality is concerning, especially with respect 
to the assessment of performance and reward. The firm requires formal systems in 
order to be successful, and management need the credibility and respect to be able to 
enforce them. 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical framework has illustrated that DP A is a fairly unique organization 
with formidable strengths and excellent opportunities. However, it was also illustrated 
that DP A is "its own worst enemy", as a result of some critical weaknesses. Given the 
situation of the organization, realistic strategic options were developed and then 
assessed for suitability and acceptability. Whether or not the proposed strategies will 
work depends almost entirely on whether or not the key players in the firm are able to 
realize the potential benefits through their involvement and participation in the 
proposed strategies. Specific recommendations based on these proposed strategies can 
now be made. 
119 
CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 . INTRODUCTION 
The industry and organizational analysis and evaluation presented in Chapter 4 
provided many useful insights pertaining to the positive and negative attributes of 
DPA' s current strategic position and elements of the firm. These insights can be used 
to develop a set of appropriate recommendations with respect to a strategic course of 
action, through reinforcement of the firm ' s strengths and neutralization of its major 
weaknesses. The recommendations address the four strategic areas of the turnaround, 
concentrated growth and innovation, concentric diversification, and backward 
integration, and the issue of organisational culture. 
5.2. THE TURNAROUND STRATEGY 
The turnaround strategy proposed as a result of the evaluation of DPA' s current 
situation should be regarded as critical to the future success of the firm. This is the 
turning point on which the future of the company may be determined, regardless of 
whatever opportunities the management of the firm decides to pursue. The "do-
nothing" strategic option is not viable, since although DP A is currently in a 
reasonable competitive position and not yet in a deep crisis, it is evident that the 
combination of the firm's critical weaknesses and growing environmental threats is at 
a point where the potential future success of the firm is being jeopardized. 
The recommendations pertaining to the turnaround strategy are based on attacking 
and neutralizing the major weaknesses of the firm, thereby enhancing the ability of 
the firm to pursue the opportunities presented and to overcome environmental threats 
currently facing the firm. 
Dramatic and visible actions must be taken in order for the employees of the firm to 
realize that management are genuinely cOl1lI11itted to the recommended turnaround 
actions. Such actions should be symbolic of management's commitment to change. 
Whatever actions are decided upon should be based on the particular 
recommendations provided, and it must be ensured that the strategic vision is clearly 
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communicated throughout the firm and backed up with action. With so much 
emphasis placed on the power and past actions of Derek Penhall within the firm's 
culture, such action should inevitably start with him. 
5.2.1. Human Resources 
Firstly, some major organizational changes have to be made. It was identified that the 
major problems in this regard were the poor handling of human resource matters, staff 
turnover, and insufficient staff resources. It was also identified that one of the key 
factors for success in the industry is a "critical mass" of skilled and trained 
employees. It is clear then that these shortcomings are critical weaknesses that must 
be resolved as a matter of priority and urgency. 
The management of the firm needs to change their approach towards human 
resources, viewing the sourcing of enthusiastic and skilled employees as an 
investment as opposed to an unnecessary expense as has often been the case in the 
past. This will be necessary to realize the objective of at least doubling the number of 
technically productive employees within a year. The firm requires young, educated 
employees with training in the fields of civil engineering, quantity surveying, drafting 
and architecture - employees that can effectively be trained by Derek Penhall and the 
other technically experienced personnel in the firm. 
A properly managed human resource system needs to be designed and properly 
implemented, with the removal of the subjective and casual performance assessment 
and reward system currently in place. In fact, a lot of the tension currently permeating 
staff relations is based on the perception that certain staff members are favoured over 
others. It will be especially necessary to ensure that racial or sexist prejudices are 
absent from the process, due to the multi-cultural and gender-equity stance of the 
firm. People need to be treated differently, and ways in which to measure and reward 
co-operation need to be found. All too often, employees are expected to "fit in" with 
Derek Penhall' s or Shane Harrison' s expectations for the culture of the firm, without 
consideration for other cultural norms and expectations. Those that do "fit in" are 
often treated differently to those that do not. This attitude needs to change to allow for 
the re-alignment of the organisation's culture with that of its employees. 
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All of the directors should be involved in this process, and those in management 
positions need to be integrated into the system. This process should be seen as the first 
step in assuring that the firm has the human resources necessary for effectively 
implementing a strategy of focused differentiation, where skills, experience and 
teamwork are core features . In this regard, the implementation of a suitable reward 
system should be seen as a key factor in the development of employee contributions 
to the success of the firm. Bonus payments should be seen to be a major portion of the 
overall remuneration package, resulting in a greater emphasis on performance - the 
attribute that effectively defines DPA' s competitive approach. Not everyone should 
receive a standard increase at year end - those that have contributed well should be 
appropriately rewarded, and those that have not should realize that their own welfare 
is linked to their input and effort and the overall welfare of the firm. 
5.2.2. Administration and Commercial Issues 
The administrative and monitoring systems need to be revised and commercial 
feedback to management needs to be drastically improved. Shane Harrison is 
presently responsible for this and needs to be convinced of the benefit to the overall 
operation of the organization. At present, he believes that most of this is a "waste of 
time" due to the lack of feedback or participation by other management members. 
Such improvements are expected to improve management efficiency and result in a 
greater awareness of current or pending problems and also areas of success, such that 
management are more sensitive to the real issues surrounding the organization and 
can make appropriate strategic decisions. Directors meetings should be held at least 
once a month in order to ensure solidarity and agreement on strategic issues of 
importance. The directors need to be continuously updated as to what it is that the 
firm is doing well and what it is that the firm is doing poorly, so that strengths can be 
reinforced and problems rectified timeously. 
Although the financial aspects of the business are excluded from the evaluation it is , 
relevant to note that improvements should be made in terms of planning and reporting 
- thereby removing speculation as to the financial well-being of the firm or otherwise. 
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Derek Penhall has often commented that he "doesn't have a clue" as to why it seems 
that the business is achieving high income levels while still having cash-flow and 
profitability problems. The managing director of the firm should have his finger on 
the pulse at all times. This can only be achieved through better communication from 
Shane Harrison and the existence of administrative systems able to provide such 
information quickly, accurately and efficiently. Such a system should also be able to 
provide reports on individual projects, including the status of the project, expenses, 
anticipated cash flows and other relevant financial information. This would also 
facilitate the management of projects in real time, so that appropriate corrective action 
can be taken timeously, should problems become evident. 
A relevant aspect to consider here is also the fact that the same directors are running 
two completely separate companies as far as registrations and legal implications are 
concerned - the specialist consulting business and the specialist contracting business. 
The effective development and implementation of administrative and financial 
systems and associated reporting could be facilitated by officially combining the two 
firms, especially in light of Derek Penhall's desire to distribute shares to Brendon 
lewaskiewitz and Lanic Devananan. This is complicated by the fact that officially, 
Derek Penhall owns 100% of the consulting business and shares the contracting 
business equally with Shane Harrison. It is envisaged that major complications could 
arise in allocating costs and profits to the two separate companies correctly, due to the 
fact that the resources are essentially shared, and employees work on both consulting 
and contracting activities, depending on the circumstances. It is recommended that the 
two businesses be combined and operated as one company, trading either as DPA 
Specialist Consulting Engineers or DP A Projects, making use of the DP A name and 
reputation in the industry. In light of the turnkey type work pursued by the firm, 
requiring both consulting and contracting input, this seems to be the most viable 
option. Should the two firms remain as separate entities, the danger would be that they 
start pulling in opposite strategic directions, thereby destroying the synergies on 
which the arrangement was originally based. This has already happened to an extent, 
and is borne out of the fact that the consulting revenue of the organisation has 
dropped drastically. The combination of the businesses would also serve to prevent 
the current situation of a powerful player such as Shane Harrison deciding to abandon 
certain aspects of one side of the business, in this case, the consulting side. 
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The recommendation that the two firms be combined and operate under the 
recognised name of DP A will require resignation from the South African Association 
of Consulting Engineers (SAACE), as continued membership would require 
abandonment of contracting activities or complete separation of the consulting and 
contracting firms, with different leadership and structures. In fact, the current situation 
is not really in compliance with the rules of the Association anyway, as a consulting 
firm is not supposed to have an interest in a contracting organization, in terms of the 
rules. As this organization has never contributed anything worthwhile to the success 
of DP A and has no real power in influencing the future of the business (or the 
specialist industry for that matter), it is recommended that the benefits of pursuing the 
recommended course of action will far outweigh any benefits associated with 
continuing membership of SAACE. 
5.2.3. Derek Penhall's Contribution 
Derek Penhall himself is at the centre of some of the proposed turnaround actions. His 
lack of focus on areas in which his expertise, marketing abilities and technical 
leadership qualities is especially crippling to the organization. Significant opportunity 
costs are being incurred, and furthermore, his involvement in terms of marketing and 
technical guidance for the rest of the firm is recognised to be critical for the 
organization to effectively differentiate itself. Derek needs to develop his delegation 
and communication abilities, helping and thereby empowering employees to carry out 
their functions within the firm, as opposed to simply taking over their responsibilities 
as he currently tends to do. 
Derek needs to re-focus on his strong points, even if it means that the firm spends a 
little more money on outsourcing certain activities (such as equipment servicing). 
Surely spending a few hours on a proposal worth a few hundred thousand Rand in 
consulting fees is better spent than a few hours saving a couple of thousand Rand by 
servicing a piece of equipment. Even einploying a full-time mechanic dedicated to 
site equipment maintenance would be more cost-effective. With Derek currently 
removed from the business altogether as a result of his commitment to the Port 
Elizabeth contract, the firm is rapidly losing ground and is finding it difficult to take 
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advantage of other available opportunities. The managing director of the organization 
should not be a site agent on one of its major projects. By the same token, Derek 
Penhall would be able to re-focus and delegate more effectively if the firm took a 
different view on the procurement and management of human resources, as described 
above, and if Shane Harrison provided more backup in this regard. 
Importantly, the changes and turnaround actions focussed on Derek Penhall will have 
to be carefully thought out and implemented, as unfortunately it is doubtful as to 
whether he has the necessary credibility at this point to enforce change on the rest of 
the firm. Due to his past approaches and actions, change may in fact be viewed with 
suspicion and mistrust by employees, as many of them regard him as being "the 
biggest culprit" when it comes to a lack of adherence to systems and rules. He does, 
however, yield significant power within the firm, and should he consciously agree 
with and decide on the proposed course of action, the result will more than likely be 
successful. A challenge would be to keep the plan on track, as Derek' s personality 
dictates that he does tend to deviate from plans at times. 
5.2.4. Black Economic Empowerment 
Without a doubt, the organization requires a black empowerment policy, and needs a 
strategy to achieve black empowered status in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities available to black empowered firms. Due to the likely reluctance of the 
current shareholders to distribute at least 25% of the business to a "black partner", the 
most appropriate course of action at this point would probably be to revive LDN 
Specialist Waterproofing and Concrete Repair, headed up by Lanic Devananan. This 
company could then trade together with DPA under a 26%/74% joint venture 
agreement for the purpose of targeting specifically nominated contracts requiring 
black empowered status, with a long term vision of eventually integrating LDN into 
DP A, as Derek Penhall gradually hands over control of the business over the next ten 
years, as he heads towards retirement. 
Lanic Devananan has considerable experience in the firm, and Derek has stated that 
he wants to include him in the future ownership plans of the business anyway. This 
black empowerment strategy may also be a way of ensuring Lanic's ongoing 
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commitment to DP A, under current conditions which seem to favour the breakaway 
of "black" employees to form their own companies which automatically qualify as 
black owned organizations. This situation would be extremely detrimental to DP A, an 
in any event, Lanic Devananan is a valuable asset to the firm. 
Lanic Devananan has always maintained that he IS In agreement with the LDN 
concept, but that proper communication with respect to administrative and 
commercial issues was the major problem contributing to his resignation and the 
company' s subsequent demise. It is recommended that a detailed formal joint venture 
agreement be compiled by an independent attorney, to the satisfaction of all parties 
concerned, and that Shane Harrison adopts a more communicative approach in terms 
of everyday commercial and financial issues. It is recommended that this will be the 
only realistic approach to restoring the level of trust required in the running of the 
joint affairs of LDN and DP A. 
As far as preferential, employment is concerned, DP A needs to be cognisant of the 
long-term goals of the firm. Such goals need to be pursued in accordance with 
changing legislation and environmental threats. Therefore, it is recommended that 
DP A actively seek out qualified, skilled and trained PDI's (Previously Disadvantaged 
Individuals) that can be strategically incorporated into key positions within the 
business, and developed according to the firm's long-term objectives. If this is 
a£hieved, the firm will find the transition to a fully empowered firm a much easier 
requirement than would otherwise be the case. 
5.2.5. Retrenchment of Services and Clients 
It has been shown that the ongoing operation of the laboratory is undesirable from the 
perspective of generating very little return while requiring ongoing investment and the 
employment of a laboratory technician. In addition, in terms of the organisation' s core 
business activities, the laboratory provides only a supplementary service, but 
nevertheless, takes up a disproportionate amount of managerial time which could 
otherwise be more productively focused on core business areas. 
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Most of the regular testing carried out in the laboratory can be outsourced at very 
competitive costs. It is recommended that the laboratory be closed and the redundant 
equipment sold off. The alternative would be to invest a large sum of money into the 
laboratory to develop it to the standard required of a formal laboratory. At present, it 
has no proper ventilation and temperature control, and the humidity is variable. As a 
separate cost centre or business unit, the operation is sure to fail. 
However, it is relevant to consider that some strategically important specialist services 
are occasionally processed through the laboratory. For example, forensic 
investigations requiring DPA' s expertise and specialised equipment do form part of 
the firm ' s core business and cannot simply be discarded. Overall, however, this still 
does not warrant keeping the laboratory running. When such specialist services are 
required, it would still be possible to carry out these services without needing a fully 
functioning laboratory. Most forensic work requires very expensive and specialised 
equipment which is outsourced anyway, and whatever else is required can be 
performed in the office, by the appropriately skilled personnel. It is only really the 
"wet" chemical work that the laboratory is needed for, but this can also be outsourced 
at a lower overall cost to the company. 
Another consideration is that Derek Penhall has maintained that the laboratory is a 
useful marketing tool. He suggests that many clients view the existence of an in-house 
laboratory as a sign of the company 's expertise and that it is therefore a differentiating 
factor. However, it is argued that this consideration is misplaced, and that the physical 
existence of a laboratory should not be punted as a differentiating feature, but rather 
the technical ability of the firm to determine what procedures are necessary and how 
to properly interpret the results . The actual testing should not be seen to be the source 
of competitive advantage. 
With respect to the client base and the nature of the specialist work pursued, DP A 
should focus on clients most suited to the firm ' s core business activities, and to those 
areas of the business generating the best returns, mainly concrete related work and 
waterproofing (the cash-cows of the business). More specialist applications and 
turnkey projects (the stars) can then be pursued opportunistically, with a view to 
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developing some of these applications into standard serVIces, should the 
circumstances at the time be favourable to such an approach. 
New technologies and ideas should be vigorously pursued, enabling the firm to 
continuously differentiate itself on the basis of being technology leaders in the 
industry. The firm has had a habit of trying to be "everything to everyone" in the past. 
This is detrimental to the firms core business and to the competitive advantage 
provided by its strengths and core competencies. For example, the management of the 
firm should seriously re-consider undertaking low-paying body corporate type work. 
In addition, clients that have a reputation for occasionally trying to squeeze as much 
information out of the firm as they can without actually contracting the firm should be 
avoided, with better clients receiving quality attention and professional service. 
5.2.6. Marketing 
DP A needs to concentrate on its numerous market strengths, including its marketing 
ability. It is imperative that the firm's management takes some time to consider what 
it really is that its clients really want in terms of service and deliverables. It has been 
shown that there is a growing need for differentiated services on the basis of technical 
proficiency and quality, and that turnkey services are becoming more popular. It has 
also been shown that DP A is operating in a region of high perceived value added and 
high price (around positions 3,4 and 5 on the strategy clock). It is therefore critical for 
the management of the firm to develop a well thought-out marketing plan. The 
inconsistent approach currently being implemented is simply not good enough. 
The marketing plan should be developed jointly between the three people effectively 
engaged in active marketing activities, Derek Penhall, Brendon lewaskiewitz and 
Lanic Devananan, thereby ensuring continuity and commonality of purpose. The plan 
should initially concentrate on identifying and re-approaching key clients that have 
been disappointed with DPA's services in the past, and re-convincing them that the 
organization is now able to satisfy their needs and requirements better than the 
competition. The ability to perform both engineering and contracting services should 
be emphasized, along with the technical strengths of the firm. 
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The marketing plan should also include advertising, and measures to enable the 
effective monitoring of client contact and potential opportunities, so as to ensure that 
come clients are not periodically ignored by mistake, and that good opportunities are 
identified and pursued timeously by the appropriate personnel. All too often has DP A 
passed over fantastic opportunities due to Derek Penhall simply being unavailable or 
unfocussed. The system should be designed so as to obviate such occurrences. It 
should be noted that this can only be effective if Derek Penhall is able to adjust his 
focus, as discussed. 
It is relevant to note just how important Derek Penhall really is to this process, besides 
the impact that his experience and marketing ability can have. The engineering 
industry generally provides much more credibility to older, more experienced people, 
regardless of whether or not a young engineer or technician is equally as capable in a 
particular situation. At a certain point in the marketing process, Derek could hand the 
project over to Brendon lewaskiewitz for implementation and general management of 
the project, after satisfying the initial marketing needs of the client. This has been 
successful in the past, but it is also relevant to note that Brendon lewaskiewitz should 
be involved in the particular project from the initial stages, so as to ensure the 
development of his own marketing abilities. 
The marketing plan must be realistically based on the firm's differentiating features, 
with care being taken not to "over promise" and also not to overdifferentiate. Offering 
clients specialist services incorporating expensive new technologies is not always the 
best approach, and can result in many hours of frustrated marketing efforts. It is 
important to remember that clients are, more often than not, operating with fixed 
budgets, and a low-cost but technically sound approach may often be the most 
appropriate. DP A has been guilty of over designing and overdifferentiating in the 
past, thereby losing touch with the client's actual needs and opening the door for other 
competitors. This situation needs to be avoided at all costs, and the aim should be to 
provide added value in the areas in which clients need it and perceive it to be 
necessary. 
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5.3 . CONCENTRATED GROWTH AND INNOVATION 
DP A has significant internal strengths that need to be developed and nurtured in order 
to benefit from concentrated growth in the specialist industry. It has been shown that 
such concentrated growth is possible, and that DP A has the ability to succeed on the 
basis of focused differentiation. The most significant strengths probably reside in the 
managing director, Derek Penhall. His experience, expertise and marketing abilities 
are core competencies of the firm, and need to be deployed in the appropriate form 
and directions, while also being passed on to the other key players, Brendon 
lewaskiewitz and Lanic Devananan. This is the key to continuing the organisation ' s 
status as a differentiated firm through technical expertise and know-how, and the 
development of new technical competencies. 
With respect to concentrated growth, it should be reinforced that the contracting side 
of the business is indeed a spin-off from the original consulting side of the firm, and 
should remain as such. The original success of the contract work undertaken by the 
firm was the result of the practical deployment of the firm's engineering expertise and 
professional ability. At this point, DPA needs to reassert its position in the consulting 
field, through marketing and growing the capacity of the consulting side of the 
business to its previous levels. At present, the firm does not even employ a draftsman, 
having not yet replaced Deloshnan Naidoo. In addition, the firm's only quantity 
surveyor is currently in Port Elizabeth and is fully committed to the Burman Road 
contract. The re-capture of consulting business market share is therefore inextricably 
linked to the recommended strategy revisions regarding human resource management 
and employment. 
The technical and commercial balance of the firm needs to be maintained for the firm 
to remain successful in this area of the business. In this regard, Shane Harrison and 
Brendon lewaskiewitz will have important roles to play, freeing Derek to focus on 
technical and marketing functions . This will also be expected to enhance the 
entrepreneurial ability and capacity of the firm and its ability to adapt and change, 
with the focus of the directors being appropriately determined. 
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DPA's core of technically competent staff is one of the organisation's major 
strengths. It must be ensured that this core is grown, maintained and developed in 
accordance with the company's objectives. It is recommended that appropriate 
members of this core should be specifically assured of good career development 
options and financial benefits, in tandem with the development of DP A as a 
successful and competitive business. This will probably be achieved through Derek 
Penhall's plans to distribute shares in the organization and to develop a cohesive team 
of key players, besides the current combination of himself (the risktaker leader) and 
Shane Harrison (the surgeon leader). A balance of leadership styles is appropriate 
under the circumstances of a growing business. Brendon Jewaskiewitz and Lanic 
Devananan could assist in achieving this balance. 
DP A needs to maintain and grow its current equipment base and ensure that it does 
not find itself in a situation in the future of owning a range of obsolete items. It is 
critical that the directors maintain focus on the fact that specialist equipment forms 
the basis of the specialist services provided by the firm and that constant investment 
in new equipment is necessary to reinforce the firm ' s basis of differentiation. 
The key players in DP A should occasionally be sent on technical "missions" to other 
regions and countries so as to ensure the ongoing viability ofDPA's technologies and 
to procure new technologies, processes and equipment otherwise unavailable in South 
Africa. This was originally the basis for the procurement of much ofDPA's founding 
technology and know-how by Derek Penhall, leading to the competitive stance of the 
organization today. International conferences on the relevant areas of technology 
should be attended and participated in, thereby spreading awareness of the capabilities 
and expertise of the organization, and further developing the knowledge and expertise 
of the firm. The publication of technical articles in engineering periodicals could 
enhance this process, as well as providing a form of advertising for the firm. 
The technical knowledge of the firm should be jealously guarded, and pride should be 
taken in the superior capabilities of the organization. This will be congruent with the 
firm ' s existing culture. In addition, formal training programmes should be 
implemented, designed to bring the technically oriented staff up to date with the 
firm 's technology and to allow for open discussion and debate on various matters. 
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This approach has been successfully used in the past, with staff teams spending time 
with material suppliers, getting to know the available products from a practical 
perspective. 
Specifically, with respect to the markets in which the firm is active, senous 
consideration should be given to re-establishing an office in Gauteng, following a 
successful turnaround. It is evident that the size of the Gauteng market is significantly 
larger than that of Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Eastern Cape. This is important if the firm 
is going to be serious about a concentrated growth strategy - other firms entering the 
specialist market niche will have similar objectives. However, DP A will need to find 
suitable staff and management based in Gauteng for the decision to be viable. This 
was a problem before, but, in light of the proposed turnaround actions, specifically 
with respect to the re-focussing of Derek Penhall, and the proposed changes with 
respect to the management of human resources, it will be more probable that the 
venture would prove successful. 
Innovation should be seen to be one of the keys to success. In order for the firm to 
remain differentiated on the basis of service and technological expertise, it will be 
necessary to keep moving ahead of the competition. In this context, innovation will 
mean bringing ideas into the marketplace in a practical form. It will not be enough to 
just have good ideas - these ideas must be converted into tangible benefits for the 
firm 's clients. For example, Derek Penhall recently developed a superior system for 
concrete crack injection, enabling the process to be carried out more efficiently and 
with less waste. This is now being used on a number of projects in which DP A is 
involved, and can be seen to be contributing to value added and to competitive 
advantage. It will be important that such contributions by management or staff 
members are not overlooked. Experimentation is important in this regard, and 
employees should be encouraged to "get their hands dirty". 
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5.4. CONCENTRIC DIVERSIFICATION 
It has been recommended that the spin-off business of specialist contracting should 
remain as such and that the consulting side of DP A be revived. That is not to say that 
the parallel development of the contracting business should not take place. Specialist 
contracting is a lucrative avenue of growth for the firm, and it was for this reason that 
the opportunity was pursued. As long as the professional and technical contribution to 
the specialist contracting work provided by the consulting side of the business 
remains to be recognised as a key success factor, the expected synergies between 
engineering and practical abilities will be achieved. This will especially enable the 
successful pursuit of lucrative turnkey projects. It is in this area that DPA really 
experiences little competition, if any. 
Shane Harrison has stated that he prefers being involved in the contracting side of the 
business. This should remain the case, as he is very capable of managing the logistical 
set up of contracts, procurement, accounts and the like. Derek Penhall should only get 
involved from a technical perspective, providing advice with respect to the way things 
are done, and as the managing director, making sure that responsible personnel 
provide the required deliverables on time. The danger is that Derek may become tied 
down as he gets more involved in the day-to-day operations. This will present the 
greatest challenge. 
Inbound logistics are important to consider in terms of the financial impact the 
contracting side of the business has on the firm as a whole. Due to the small but 
growing nature of the firm, the high costs of equipment and materials severely impact 
on cash flow and liquidity. As the firm grows, it is important to consider the role that 
outsourcing could play. Certain high cost-low return activities should be sub-
contracted out, with DP A capitalizing on those areas in which its expertise and 
practical capabilities generate the highest value added. The firm has been guilty of 
dismissing this option on occasion. Relationships with materials suppliers should be 
developed and nurtured, with a view to possibly developing preferential supply 
conditions and prices. 
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5.5. BACKWARD INTEGRATION 
DP A has integrated backwards on occaSlOn through the manufacture of its own 
materials for specific applications, where the alternatives supplied by well-known 
materials suppliers have been "over specified" and are extremely expensive. This 
approach has enabled DPA to win specialist contracts that otherwise would have been 
awarded to a low-cost competitor. On occasion, such projects have been of strategic 
importance to the firm, being a "foot in the door" with certain new clients, and as a 
way of displacing other competitors with established relationships with the clients 
concerned. 
It is recommended that this form of backward integration be treated as a low priority 
when compared to other recommended actions. This strategic move is not core to the 
well-being and competitive capability of the organization, and could actually be 
detrimental due to the additional pressure it places on certain resources and 
management input. A certain degree of risk is involved, as the firm becomes 
responsible for not only workmanship, but also the quality and performance of the 
applied materials. This can be problematic if the required degree of quality control is 
not achieved in the mixing or packaging of the products or components. 
However, the manufacture of certain materials may be advantageous on occasion. As 
discussed, this can be used as a strategic weapon when the opportunity presents itself, 
and can be very effective, boosting the firm to a better strategic position. This is also a 
manner in which clients can be convinced of the technical capabilities of the firm, and 
could also be seen as a favourable contribution to reducing the overall cost of a 
particular project. 
The backward integration into the manufacture of materials should therefore only be 
considered on an opportunistic basis, and where the firm has the potential to realize 
significant strategic and financial gains, thereby warranting acceptance of the risk 
involved and the commitment of resources required. This is by no means to be 
considered to be integral to the firm ' s competitive success in the specialist contracting 
market. There are far too many other aspects of the business requiring urgent 
attention. 
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5.6. ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
It is recommended that various aspects of the overall culture of the firm need to be 
changed in order for the proposed strategic remedial actions to achieve the desired 
degree of success. 
• Paradigm: The general assumption that "Derek will solve the problem" needs 
to be destroyed. This is effectively handing everything back to Derek Penhall, 
one of the pitfalls to be avoided at all costs. Employees need to be empowered 
to solve their own problems. 
• Routines and Rituals: The overly social approach to staff relations should be 
toned down somewhat, enabling a healthy respect for authority to be 
developed. 
• Stories: Stories for the future should centre around the dramatic changes 
implemented by the firms current leadership, and the degree of success 
enabled by these changes. 
• Symbols: The atomic symbol of DPA should pervade every aspect of DPA's 
operations, from decals on vehicles to company clothing, such as site jackets. 
• Control Systems: These need to become more formalized and enforced. The 
recording of commercial data in the form of time sheets is critical for record . 
purposes and invoicing. 
• Power Structures: The power structure of the future should be more evenly . 
distributed between the directors and shareholders of the firm. 
• Organisational Structure: The flat organizational structure is likely to serve 
the firm well, adding to its flexibility. However, some degree of structure will 
be required for effective delegation to be successful. The optimal arrangement 
should be considered carefully. 
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5.7. CONCLUSION 
DPA is a reasonably well-placed competitive firm displaying a number of significant 
strengths that have been developed over many years of operation in the specialist 
civils industry. Many of these strengths are attributed to the abilities and experience of 
Derek Penhall, the managing director. However, the firm also exhibits a number of 
critical weaknesses, most of which are currently severely hampering the sustained 
success of the business. 
It has been shown that the majority of the organization' s strategic moves have been 
worthwhile and that the organization is worth saving from a potential crisis. The 
majority of the recommended strategic actions lie in a proposed turnaround strategy, 
focusing on neutralizing the identified weaknesses of the organization. Following this 
approach, it was recommended that a concentrated growth and innovation strategy is 
appropriate, based on the organisation's strengths. It was also determined that the 
decision to diversify concentrically into specialist contracting was of strategic 
importance, and that these activities should form an integral part of the business in the 
future. One of the most important issues identified was that the management of the 
organization desperately need to focus on core business issues in order to realize the 
potential gains the specialist market has to offer. 
Overall, the potential is still there for the organization to capitalize on the available 
opportunities, however, it will be essential for the directors of the firm to show visible 
commitment to the principles of the proposed strategies and to agree on a unified 
course of action. Given the organisation's history, current leadership and culture, this 
may be a difficult task, and may in fact require a change in leadership. It will 
therefore be of vital importance that the process is planned carefully from the outset, 
ensuring the necessary "buy-in" and commitment from all concerned. 
l36 
REFERENCES 
Ambrosini, V. 1998. Exploring Techniques of Analysis and Evaluation in Strategic 
Management, Prentice Hall 
Andrews, K. 1987. The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Irwin 
Ansoff, 1. 1989. Corporate Strategy, revised edition, Penguin 
Baker, M.J. (1992). Marketing Strategy and Management, 2nd Edition, Macmillan 
Barnett, lH., Wilsted, W.D. 1988. Strategic Management - Concepts & Cases, PWS-
Kent 
Buzzell , R. , Wiersema, F. 1981. Successful Share-Building Strategies, Harvard 
Business Review, Jan-Feb 
Consulting engineering industry more upbeat, Building, July 2003 Edition, .Tohnnic 
Publishing Limited 
David, F.R. 1986. Fundamentals 0/ Strategic Management, Merril Publishing 
Company 
Davidson, J. 1987. Offensive Marketing, 2nd Edition, Penguin 
Day, G.S. 1987. Ibid 
Doz, Y.L. , Hamel, G. 1998. Alliance Advantage: The Art o/ Creating Value through 
Partnering, Harvard Business School 
Engelbrecht, D. 2000. Making Strategic Choices ConIine), 
http://www.gsb.co.zalmodules/MODULE I5MakingStrategicChoices.HTM 
137 
Extracts from President Mbeki 's State of the Nation Address, 2003. (Online), 
Available at http://www.saace.co.za 
Faulkner, D. 1998. Chapter 13 - Portfolio Matrices, Exploring Techniques of Analysis 
and Evaluation in Strategic Management, Ambrosini, V., Prentice Hall 
Giuliani , R. 2002. Leadership, Little, Brown 
Goleman, D. 2000. Leadership That Gets Results, Harvard Business Review, March-
April 
Grant, R.M. 1991. Contemporary Strategy Analysis, Basil Blackwell 
Hamel, G. , Prahalad, C.K. 1989. Strategic Intent, Harvard Business Review, May-
June 
Hamel, G. , Prahalad, C.K. 1994. Competing for the Future, Harvard Business School 
Press 
Hamermesh, R.G. , Anderson, M.l. Jr., Harris, l.E. 1983. Chapter 9 - Strategies For 
Low Market-Share Businesses, Strategic Management, Harvard Business Review, 
Hamermesh, R.G. , John Wiley & Sons 
Hisrich, R.D., Peters, M.P. 2002. Entrepreneurship, 5th Edition, McGraw Hill 
Hollensen, S. 2001. Global Marketing - A Market Responsive Approach, 2nd Edition, 
Prentice Hall 
Hunger, J.D. , Wheelen, T.L. 2001. Essentials of Strategic Management, 2nd Edition, 
Prentice Hall 
Jacobs, T., Shepherd, J., Johnson, G. 1998. Chapter 8 - Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis, Exploring Techniques of Analysis and 
Evaluation in Strategic Management, Ambrosini, V. , Prentice Hall 
138 
Johnson, G. 1998. Chapter 9 - Mapping and re-mapping organizational culture, 
Exploring Techniques of Analysis and Evaluation in Strategic Management, 
Ambrosini, V., Prentice Hall 
Johnson, G., Scholes, K. 1993. Exploring Corporate Strategy, 3rd Edition, Prentice 
Hall 
Johnson, G., Scholes, K. 2000. Exploring Corporate Strategy, Prentice Hall 
Lasher, W.R. 1999. Strategic Thinking for Smaller Businesses and Divisions, 
Blackwell 
Lynch, R:-2000. Corporate Strategy, 2nd Edition, Prentice Hall 
McNamee, P.B. 1992. Strategic Management - A PC-based Approach, Butterworth-
Heinemann 
Noe, R.A. , Hollenbeck, J.R., Gerhart, B., Wright, P.M. 2000. Human Resource 
Management - Gaining A Competitive Advantage, 3rd Edition, McGraw Hill 
Ohmae, K. 1983. The Mind of the Strategist, Penguin, Harmondsworth 
Ohmae, K. 1983 . Ibid 
Pearce, J.A., Robinson, R.B. 1991. Strategic Management, 4th Edition, Irwin 
Pearce, J.A. , Robinson, R.B. 2000. Strategic Management, McGraw Hill 
Porter, M.E. 1980. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and 
Competitors, New York - Free Press 
Porter, M.E. 1985. Competitive Advantage, The Free Press 
139 
Prahalad, C.K., Hamel, G. 1990. The Core Competence of the Corporation, Harvard 
Business Review, May-June 
Robbins, S.P. , DeCenzo, D.A. 2001. Fundamentals of Management, 3rd Edition, 
Prentice Hall 
Rothschild, W.E. 1993. Risktaker, Caretaker, Surgeon, Undertaker, John Wiley & 
Sons 
SAACE Management Information Survey, 2003. COnIine), available at 
http://www.saace.co.za 
Scholes, K. 1998. Chapter 10 - Stakeholder mapping: a practical tool for managers, 
Exploring Techniques of Analysis and Evaluation in Strategic Management, 
Ambrosini, V., Prentice Hall 
Thompson, A. & Strickland, A. 2003. Strategic .Management Concepts and Cases, 
13 th Edition, McGraw Hill 
140 
